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                                          ABSTRACT 
 
I examine three cases of successful second generation reformist political 
opposition to market reforming leaders in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico. In these three 
countries, opposition presidential candidates, despite considerable public discontent with 
economic conditions, did not propose a clear alternative to the free market economic 
model established by the incumbent party, but instead proposed minor and marginal 
changes intended to improve the social outcomes of the free market model. In contrast 
with their promises of continuity on economic policy, presidential challengers drew 
strong distinctions between themselves and incumbent party leaders on issues of 
governance. The campaign messages of opposition candidates accorded with the 
widespread perception that Latin America required a “second generation” of reforms.  
   
I conduct case studies and examine public opinion and electoral data from the 
three countries in order to explain the emergence of a similar opposition campaign 
message in three apparently different contexts. I find that the use of a similar reformist 
message is paralleled by similarities in the attitudinal and demographic sources of support 
for the opposition in each case: the opposition’s supporters, in addition to having a 
greater concern with governance issues, tended to represent more educated and affluent 
sectors than supporters of the governing party. I link this pattern to a previous pattern also 
present in each case: a “neoliberal populist” approach to the implementation of market 
 iii 
reforms, in which strong executives promoted economic liberalization while maintaining 
the electoral support of the popular sectors.  I then examine the experiences in 
government of the reformist challengers, and argue that setbacks and failures encountered  
by the new administrations can be linked to the manner in which the reformist opposition 
coalition was established. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
Latin America and Second Generation Reformism in the Era of “Reform Fatigue” 
 
Politics in Latin America during the 1990s was marked by the culmination of two 
broad trends: the nearly universal consolidation of democratic regimes, and the region 
wide adoption of programs of market-oriented structural reform. By the middle of the 
decade, it had become clear that the transitions to democracy that had swept the Americas 
were more than a passing trend, and reversion to outright authoritarianism seemed a 
distant prospect in most of the hemisphere. At the same time, market oriented economic 
reform programs had become the norm throughout Latin America. Many of the crucial 
questions surrounding Latin American politics during the 1990s involved the interaction 
of these two transitions.  
The retraction of the state from its central role in economic policy, beyond 
causing economic changes, also undermined traditional structures of political 
representation that had been built around the government role as an arbiter among social 
interests.   The breakdown of traditional corporatist representative structures was 
accompanied by a generalized weakening of political parties, and declining levels of 
public faith in parties and leaders.  Moreover, the perceived imperative to move in a 
market-oriented direction raised questions about the quality and content of programmatic 
political representation, and the capacity of parties to offer clear alternatives to voters 
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dissatisfied with the status quo. Both the practical constraints imposed by fiscal burdens, 
and the general ideological discrediting of state-centered approaches to development, 
resulted in a perception that shifts toward a market economy were the only available 
option.  
 To a great extent, the consequences of these trends would depend on the 
performance of Latin America’s newly liberalized economies, and the degree to which 
Latin American publics were satisfied with those results. Strong economic performance 
would likely lessen the tensions between market reform and political democratization,  
helping political leaders to maintain public approval and offering opportunities to build 
and strengthen representative ties,  while economic underperformance would tend to 
sharpen public concerns about inadequate political representation, potentially threatening 
democratic stability and governability. During the early 1990s, initial signs in this regard 
appeared positive.  Economic growth returned to Latin America following the prolonged 
stagnation of the “lost decade,” and voters in several Latin American countries offered 
strong electoral support to parties or leaders that had presided over sweeping programs of 
market reform.  By the end of the decade, however, a different political context had 
emerged. Economic stagnation and persistent or rising unemployment became a region-
wide trend, and were accompanied by a widespread sense of disillusionment with the 
outcomes of economic reforms. 
 
Taking note of these unwelcome developments, many international observers 
asserted that the region needed a “second generation” of reforms. According to this view, 
the initial programs of stabilization and market-oriented structural adjustment, while 
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necessary and positive, were insufficient to guarantee sustained economic growth or to 
ensure that economic growth would translate into improved standards of living. To 
supplement the initial, “first generation” reforms, Latin American governments were 
advised to implement a new set of measures.  These second generation reforms would 
build on the positive results of the initial liberalization process, but would involve 
renewed attention to the role of the state. The second generation reformist agenda had 
two major components: a socioeconomic dimension and a governance dimension. In 
socioeconomic terms, the second generation reformist agenda involved sectoral reforms 
and regulations to ensure competition and efficiency, as well as an increased emphasis on 
distributional concerns and on investment in “human capital.” The governance dimension 
involved increased attention to the quality of institutions: issues of democratic 
accountability, administrative integrity, and the rule of law (Naím 1994, Krueger 2000, 
Pastor Jr. and Wise 1999). Overall, the second generation reformist agenda (discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter) can be summarized as an acceptance of the basic 
principles of the free market with minor adjustments to promote efficiency and improved 
social outcomes, alongside a strong emphasis on issues of good government. 
 
The disappointing outcomes of economic reform created opportunities and 
challenges for opposition parties and candidates in Latin America. While public 
disenchantment with economic conditions offered an opening for political opposition in 
many countries, establishing a clear and convincing case for an alternative policy agenda 
entailed significant difficulties. Under these conditions, opposition campaign messages in 
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Latin America varied substantially in the extent to which they accorded with the second 
generation reform agenda.  
In particular, three cases from this period of “reform fatigue” are notable for the 
adoption of a clearly second generation reformist message by challengers to market- 
reforming leaders and parties: the presidential elections of October 1999 in Argentina, 
April 2000 in Peru, and July 2000 in Mexico. Despite significant differences among the 
three cases in terms of the political context in which the elections occurred, the 
opposition in each case proposed a similar agenda and adopted a similar message. The 
campaigns of Fernando de la Rúa of the Alianza in Argentina, Alejandro Toledo of Perú 
Posible in Peru, and Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) in Mexico, all took 
pains to avoid sharp criticism of the free market policies adopted by their incumbent 
opponents. Instead, they proposed more marginal changes to give more of a “human 
face” to the market.  In order to draw clear contrasts with incumbent parties and leaders, 
De la Rúa, Toledo, and Fox relied primarily on criticisms related to the quality of 
governance, promising less corrupt and more democratic leadership and an end to abuses 
of power.   
 
In each of the three countries, this type of opposition met with considerable 
success: the reformist challenger won a decisive victory in Argentina and Mexico, and 
overcame severe disadvantages to force a runoff election in Peru (and eventually won 
office after scandal drove the incumbent from power).  The study that follows addresses 
the following questions: Why did the most important opposition leaders in these three 
countries adopt a second generation reformist message in response to public 
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discontentment at the end of the 1990s? Why was such an approach politically 
successful?  And, what were the eventual consquences of the political success of second-
generation reformist opposition, in terms of the political sustainability and policy success 
of their reformist agenda? 
 
The answers to these questions potentially hold significant implications for 
broader questions surrounding the relationship between democratization and economic 
liberalization in Latin America. The impact of the mutual interaction between these 
simultaneous transitions has been the subject of extensive scholarly interest. Much of the 
inquiry in this regard has been concerned with the prospects for initial implementation of 
market reform and the compatibility of these liberalization efforts with political 
democracy. By the end of the 1990s, the dramatic and seemingly durable free-market 
shift throughout most of contintent, and the equally widespread and unprecented 
expansion and persistence of democratic systems in Latin America, apparently confirmed 
the basic compatibility of economic liberalization and democratization.  The emergence 
of “reform fatigue” in a context of political openness and democratic competition raised a 
new set of general questions. How, and to what extent would the democratic political 
system provide a vehicle for the representation of renewed economic demands? To what 
extent would public discontents, and the messages of the political leaders that represented 
those discontents, take the form of opposition to the recently installed neoliberal model?  
In regard to these questions, the second generation reformist opposition 
campaigns in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico are particularly notable cases.   These were 
the instances in which the political opposition that emerged in response to economic 
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discontenment most closely paralleled the views of the international financial 
establishment; despite substantial economic hardship, the political opposition’s route to 
success did not involve challenges to the neoliberal economic model, but rather an 
outright endorsement of that model.  For advocates of market reform (and believers in the 
compatibility of such reform with healthy democracy), these opposition campaigns could 
be viewed as supporting an optimistic scenario in which widespread social acceptance of 
market economics and democratic politics reinforced each other, channeling political 
competition into pressures for good government and administrative effectiveness, rather 
than ideological polarization1.  An alternative, pessimistic explanation for the 
opposition’s adoption of second generation reformism might link the apparent consensus 
on free market economics to shortcomings of the new democratic system;  for example,  
an artificial narrowing of the ideological agenda as a result of neoliberalism’s negative 
impact on mass representation and organization.   
Thus, the question of what the appearance of second generation reformism tells us 
about political representation in post-liberalization Argentina, Peru, and Mexico is clearly 
central to assessments of the quality of democracy in those three countries. Furthermore, 
the character and strength of the representative ties between reformist challengers and the 
electorate has profound implications for future democratic governability.  The sources of 
electoral loyalty and the nature of the democratic mandate granted to reformist 
challengers can be expected to have a significant impact on the sustainability of public 
support for those leaders following the election, and on the political viability of their 
reformist agenda. As such, an in-depth examination and a precise explanation of the 
phenomenon of second generation reformist opposition in Argentina, Peru and Mexico 
                                                 
1
 As per Fukuyama (1989), this could be dubbed an “End of History” scenario. 
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could offer insight into both the short and longer-term political trajectories of those three 
countries, helping account for their immediate reactions to “reform fatigue” as well as for 
the eventual performance of second generation reformists once in office. 
 
Rejecting Possible Explanations: Democratization 
 
 A possible approach to explaining the emergence of second generation reformist 
opposition might view democratization processes as central; the decision of an opposition 
party to focus on governance issues when criticizing an incumbent might result from a 
context where democracy and democratization were pressing issues of the day. However, 
at the time of the elections considered here, Argentina, Peru, and Mexico confronted very 
different situations with regard to both the status and the apparent direction of processes 
of democratization. 
 In Argentina, the 1999 elections were widely regarded as signifying the full 
consolidation of democratic politics in the country. Argentina’s transition from 
authoritarianism had occurred sixteen years earlier, and the country had already 
witnessed a peaceful transfer of power between parties, when the incumbent Unión 
Cívica Radical (UCR) was swept out of office by the Peronist party (Partido Justicialista, 
or PJ), under Carlos Menem. While Peronist government in the past had invariably 
resulted in military intervention, Menem went on to serve two full terms, and the 
presidential and legislative elections held in Argentina during the 1990s were universally 
considered to be free and fair.  
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 Despite the persistence of democratic procedures and the cementing of political 
freedoms, Argentina’s transition to democracy through the 1980s and 1990s was not 
entirely smooth. Conflicts over human rights resulted in several confrontations between 
civilian authorities and the armed forces, and eventually compelled Argentina’s leaders to 
largely abandon attempts at transitional justice and install sweeping amnesty for crimes 
committed during the dictatorship.  The transfer of power to Menem was somewhat 
irregular, with the previous president being forced to leave office several months early in 
the face of a severe economic crisis. And Menem’s leadership in the subsequent decade 
was marked by obvious corruption, attempts to undermine judicial independence and 
administrative oversight, and personalistic and autocratic tendencies. 
However, by the end of the 1990s, these troubling trends largely paled in the face 
of clear progress toward stable and institutionalized democratic politics.  The military had 
lost virtually all of its clout and had become essentially weak and apolitical,  Menem’s 
attempts to allow himself a constitutionally prohibited third term had failed, and the 
freeness and fairness of the upcoming election was viewed as a given.  At the end of the 
1990s, democracy in Argentina seemed more secure than at any time in the country’s 
history and observers described Argentina’s typically tumultous politics as becoming 
“normal” (Levitsky 2001, Di Tella 2000); another successful election would simply serve 
to confirm this trend. 
In Peru, by contrast, the situation was very different.    Peru had also experienced 
a transition to democracy at the beginning of the 1980s, and Peru’s president Alberto 
Fujimori took office via democratic elections. However, Fujimori, faced with an 
economic crisis and a debilitating insurgency, proceeded to take Peruvian politics in a 
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distinctly authoritarian direction. The first obvious indication of this trend came in 1992, 
when Fujimori dissolved the legislature and suspended the constitution in response to 
legislative opposition.  
Enjoying strong public support as a result of the autogolpe (self coup), economic 
progress, and victories against the Sendero Luminoso terrorist group, Fujimori went on to 
restore electoral procedures in the years that followed, and won a sweeping reelection  in 
1995. Following the 1995 elections, Fujimori’s popularity began to decline. At the same 
time, he began setting the groundwork for a constitutionally prohibited third term., in 
large part via obvious attempts to manipulate the judiciary.  As Fujimori began his 
campaign for a third term, concern grew over the regime’s use of undemocratic electoral 
tactics, including bribery of journalists and media owners, manipulation of state resources 
for political ends, and harassment and defamation of opposition figures (Conaghan 2001, 
McClintock 2006, Mauceri 2006, Burt 2003, Grompone and Cotler 2000). As Fujimori’s 
administration cemented its grip on power, increasing attention was paid to the 
president’s political reliance on the military and the state intelligence services. Overall, as 
the elections approached, Fujimori’s authoritarian tendencies and electoral abuses 
became more conspicuous, eventually coming to occupy a central position in the electoral 
debate. Thus, at the time of the 2000 elections, the immediate future of Peru’s democracy 
seemed uncertain, and there was little confidence that the election process itself would be 
valid. 
 
In contrast with the democratic consolidation associated with the Argentine 
election, and the democratic deterioration associated with Peru’s election, the Mexican 
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elections of 2000 marked the possible culmination of a long period of democratic 
transition. The 2000 elections offered the best chance to unseat the hegemonic 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) from Mexico’s presidency following 71 years of 
continuous rule.  Cracks had begun to appear in the PRI's formerly unchallenged 
hegemony decades earlier.  Mexico's move towards genuine political contestation may 
have begun with the brutal suppression of student protests in Mexico City in 1968.  More 
recent notable events in this process included the debt crisis of the early 1980s, and the 
1988 elections, in which a newly competitive opposition was defeated under suspicious 
circumstances amid widely held assumptions of substantial fraud.  
Accompanying these events and the pressures they imposed on the PRI were a 
series of electoral reforms that opened up space for opposition parties (Levy and Bruhn 
2006, 88-89; Domínguez 1999, 1-10).    The most recent of these reforms took place in 
1996, and included measures to make party financing more equitable, and to guarantee 
independence for electoral oversight bodies (Schedler 2000). The effect of these reforms 
was felt rapidly and profoundly, as the 1997 legislative elections resulted in the PRI 
losing control of the lower house of Congress, and the Mexico City mayor's office.  
Approaching the 2000 campaign, the newfound competitiveness of Mexican politics that 
had been demonstrated by opposition victories augured well for the chances of an 
opposition candidate breaking the PRI's hold on the presidency. 
 
In sum, Argentina, Peru, and Mexico found themselves in very different 
circumstances with regard to the process of democratization at the beginning of the 
1990s. In Argentina, democracy had firmly taken hold, and the competitiveness and 
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fairness of elections were assured, in Peru, the integrity of democratic procedures was 
under assault from a semi-authoritarian leader, and in Mexico, an opposition victory in 
the election would be seen as signaling the completion of a transition from a long-
standing one-party regime.  Given these differences, the appearance of a second 
generation reformist opposition agenda in each of the three cases cannot be viewed 
simply as an outgrowth of processes of democratic transition and the accompanying 
importance of institutional concerns. 
  
Rejecting Possible Explanations: Political Parties 
 
 A logical explanation for the adoption of a similar campaign message by 
opposition parties would consider the history, ideology, and structure of the opposition 
parties themselves as crucial.  In general, one would expect a party’s political agenda to 
stem from its historical identity, its internal decision making structure, and the ideological 
origins of its leaders and activists. However, in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico, second 
generation reformist opposition parties differed drastically in these regards. 
 In Argentina, the second generation reformist banner was taken up by the Alianza, 
a coalition between two parties: the long existing UCR, or “Radicals,” and the recently 
created FREPASO (Front for a Country in Solidarity).  The UCR was a centrist party that 
had its origins in the late nineteenth century, and had traditionally represented the 
country’s middle class.  During the mid-1990s, the UCR’s public support dropped to all-
time lows.  Already discredited by the disastrous outcome of the previous UCR 
administration, the party lost further prestige and considerable support when its 
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leadership signed on to a set of constitutional reforms proposed by Menem, apparently 
abdicating their role as the main opposition. The new leftist party, FREPASO, emerged to 
help fill the political vacuum left by the UCR’s decline.  Intitially focusing on the issues 
of economic policy and human rights, the new party soon switched its primary focus to 
corruption.  On the basis of the positive images of its leaders and the support of 
disaffected UCR supporters, FREPASO performed strongly in the 1995 election. In 1997, 
the two opposition parties joined forces to contest the PJ, and won a convincing victory in 
the 1997 midterm elections. 
   
 In contrast to Argentina’s second generation reformist coalition, Peru’s 
opposition parties could barely be considered parties at all. Peru’s traditional party 
system had fallen into disrepute during the 1980s, and continued to decline during the 
1990s. Unlike in Argentina, where traditional parties remained in the forefront of politics 
and attempted to reinvent themselves during the 1990s, Peru’s main political parties 
essentially faded from the scene, being replaced by personalistic movements associated 
with individual leaders.  Both the governing party of Alberto Fujimori and the main 
opposition alternatives were similarly weak, being little more than labels applied to 
individual campaigns, with no strong institutional structures, social ties, or programmatic 
underpinnings. The party of the eventual opposition challenger, Alejandro Toledo, Perú 
Posible, was amorphous, ideologically vague, and personalistic even by Peruvian 
standards. Toledo did not emerge onto center stage until just before the election.  In rising 
from virtually insignificant support to the position of top challenger within a matter of 
weeks, Toledo became the standard-bearer for a diverse assortment of opponents of 
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Fujimori; neither the candidate nor his party ever built a durable base of public support 
within the broader electorate.  
 
 Mexico’s second generation reformist opposition party differed greatly from 
Argentina’s center-left coalition and Peru’s heterogeneous and personalistic political 
movements. The Mexican PAN was a longstanding party of the center-right that had 
contested the PRI’s control of the Mexican political system almost since the beginning of 
the one-party era.  The party had maintained strong links with business interests and the 
Catholic Church throughout its history. Over time, the party’s ideology shifted between 
an emphasis on Christian Democratic social policies and a pro-business agenda; however, 
the party retained a commitment to the same basic principles from its founding until its 
presidential victory of 2000. In 2000, the PAN momentarily took on a less ideological 
character in order to successfully challenge the PRI for supremacy. Vicente Fox, a 
candidate who had established his profile mostly independently of his party, promoted his 
campaign as an inclusive and diverse movement whose sole purpose was to unseat the 
PRI from power, and appealed for “useful votes” from strategic anti-PRI voters in order 
to temporarily extend his party’s electoral reach. 
 
Thus, the three opposition parties examined here differed markedly in terms of 
their historical background, identity and structure. In Argentina, the second generation 
reformist opposition was a coalition of the center and left; in Peru it was an unstructured, 
ideologically unclear, and personalistic movement, and in Mexico it was a well 
established party of the center-right that had temporarily adopted a more inclusive and 
 14
less ideological appeal. Given these dramatic differences, the nature and history of 
political parties cannot provide an explanation for the emergence of a similar second 
generation reformist agenda in the three cases2. 
 
Partial Explanations: Neoliberal Consensus and Lack of Alternatives 
 
Taking into account these differences among the three countries, another potential 
explanation for the emergence of second generation reformist opposition would view the 
phenomenon as fundamentally a result of larger trends throughout Latin America, rather 
than individual characteristics of Argentina, Peru, and Mexico. In this regard, a likely 
explanation would center on the overall dominance of the free-market paradigm and pro-
market international forces in the post-1990 environment, and the resultant difficulty for 
opposition campaigns in creating a coherent alternative economic policy. According to 
this view, drastic challenges to market economics are seen as imprudent or lacking 
credibility in the post-socialist era. Factors such as the widespread acceptance of free 
market principles following the Cold War (Castañeda 1993) a reduction of the state’s 
capacity to intervene in the economy, practical limitations on policy choices created by 
debt and capital mobility, and the propensity of many leaders to violate campaign 
promises by imposing neoliberal policies after taking office (Stokes 2001) have all 
mitigated against the ability of Latin American opposition parties to propose and credibly 
commit to clear alternatives to the neoliberal economic model.  In place of clear 
                                                 
2
 Beyond the differences in the character and historical background of the opposition parties specifically, 
the overall nature of the party systems in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico exhibited strong differences. 
According to the classifications of Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Argentina could be considered to have 
an institutionalized party system, Peru an  inchoate party system, and Mexico a hegemonic party system in 
transition. 
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alternatives, opposition parties may be forced to fall back on general promises of  
“change,” often based on vague assurances of a higher standard of governance (Hagopian 
1998, 108). 
The presence of these general constraints undoubtedly provides a partial 
explanation for opposition parties’ reliance on second generation reformist themes.  
However, even under these conditions (and contrary to the expectations of some 
observers), post-liberalization political opposition in Latin America has been 
characterized by a wide variety of rhetorical campaign strategies. The reformist 
campaigns detailed here represent one response to the post-reform Latin American 
political environment, but a range of other responses existed.   
Leftist parties throughout Latin America mostly came to terms with the free 
market during the 1990s.  Nonetheless, in contrast with the governance centered 
messages of the three cases examined here, the rhetoric of many leftist candidates still 
tended to center primarily on economic discontents, and on promises to shift toward a 
more inclusive economic model (although the exact nature of that economic alternative is 
rarely made clear): leaders such as Luis Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Tabaré 
Vázquez of Uruguay can be placed in this category. Much further removed from the 
second generation reformist position are the more radical and anti-system campaigns of 
such leaders as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Lucio Gutiérrez 
in Ecuador; these opposition movements combined a vehement critique of neoliberalism 
with a similarly radical challenge to the existing political order.  At the beginning of the 
21st century, Latin America displayed a wide range of possible responses to 
disenchantment with the effects of market reform.  
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Despite the presence of general regional tendencies that might promote a 
narrowing of the ideological debate and the emergence of reformist tendencies 
opposition, the phenomenon observed in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico at the end of the 
1990s was a relatively infrequent occurrence.  Only in these countries did challengers to 
parties that had presided over market reforms find success by stressing their commitment 
to the main precepts of the free market model, proposing minor alterations to 
socioeconomic policies, and emphasizing governance issues in order to draw contrasts 
between opposition and incumbent.  The emergence of a similar type of political 
opposition in three seemingly different contexts represents a puzzle, one whose solution 
could provide insight into fundamental questions about the evolution of political 
representation and political competition in Latin America during the post-market reform 
era. 
 
From Neoliberal Populism to Second Generation Reformism 
 
 In order to explain the appearance and success of second generation reformist 
opposition in three apparently different cases, a possible line of inquiry involves looking 
for an underlying similarity among the three that may be plausibly linked to the common 
outcome.  Adopting the logic of a “most different systems” approach, this study identifies 
a particular factor as crucial: the previous government’s application, in each case, of a 
“neoliberal populist” strategy for implementing market reform while maintaining public 
support.  
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 In one form or another, processes of market reform were almost universal in Latin 
during the late 1980s and 1990s; however, the political method by which market reform 
was implemented varied from country to country. Argentina, Peru, and Mexico represent 
examples of a particular pattern: the implementation of market reform by a strong 
executive with sustained electoral support from the lower classes. Scholars of Latin 
American politics and political economy have called attention to these three cases as 
examples of a new and unexpected fusion between political styles and strategies 
traditionally associated with populism, and free market economic policies that are far 
removed from the statist agenda that typically accompany populism. (Roberts 1995, 
Weyland 1996) 
 While the exact manner by which neoliberal populist leaders maintained support 
varied among the three countries, several common tendencies can be observed.  
Neoliberal populists successfully implemented market reform while maintaining a base of 
support in the lower classes (having also obtained strong support from the economic elite 
at some point during their tenure). This popular support was sustained in large part 
through effective use of clientelistic methods; under neoliberal populists, the use of 
clientelism involved extensive executive discretion and political targeting of state 
resources. Neoliberal populist strategies were associated more broadly with a 
concentration of power in the hands of the executive, at the expense of existing 
representative organizations and sometimes defiance of institutional and legal limits. 
 
The successful application of a neoliberal populist approach as an economic 
policy program and electoral strategy strongly affected the options available to would-be 
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challengers.  Most importantly, the government’s maintenance of a firm electoral base in 
the popular sectors required that opposition success would require winning a strong 
majority among more affluent and educated voters. It was this necessity that prompted 
the opposition candidates to avoid strong criticisms of the economic model. As such, the 
opposition’s decision to opt for a second generation reformist message can be viewed as 
representing an essentially ad hoc response to a narrow and immediate set of political 
circumstances. This explanation, if accurate, has significant implications both for the 
broader viability of second generation reformism as an electoral strategy outside of the 
particular cases examined here, as well as for the prospects for effective governance by 
parties who win office behind second generation reformist messages. 
 
   In the chapters that follow, I examine the emergence of second generation 
reformist opposition in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico from a historical and comparative 
perspective. Chapter 2 involves a more detailed discussion of the concept of “second 
generation” reform: the origin of the concept, its usage, its application to the debate over 
Latin American economic policy at the end of the 1990s, and some of the limitations and 
shortcomings of the concept.  In Chapters 3 through 5, I examine each of the three 
countries in which second generation reformist challenges to a market reforming 
incumbent party were politically successful. I describe the major political developments 
associated with the implementation of market reform and the nature of the market 
reforming incumbent party. I then describe the origin and nature of the main opposition 
alternative in each case, and the content of their campaign message. I conclude by 
describing the election campaign and its outcome.  In Chapter 6, I examine the three 
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cases in comparative perspective and propose an explanation for the similarity of 
opposition messages. Drawing on survey and electoral data, I detail the connections 
between the presence of a neoliberal populist incumbent, an opposition constituency 
centered on the urban middle class, and the employment of a second generation reformist 
appeal. In Chapter 7, I discuss the outcomes encountered by the victorious second 
generation reformist candidates upon assuming office, identify similar problems faced by 
each newly elected president, and draw connections between these shared problems and 
the previously mentioned explanation for the origin of second generation reformism.  In 
Chapter 8, I summarize the main conclusions of the preceding study, and explore some 
broader implications of those conclusions
  
Chapter 2: Latin America and the “Second Generation” of Reform 
 
 
Introduction 
 
During the late 1990s, observers frequently asserted that Latin American 
countries required a second generation, or second stage, of reforms in order to sustain and 
improve economic performance and increase standards of living. The (largely completed) 
first generation of reforms involved reducing the scope of the state through market-
oriented structural adjustment programs; the still incomplete second generation reforms 
would involve increased attention to the ability of the state to promote the efficiency of 
markets and purssue effective social policy, as well as improvements in the quality and 
integrity of state institutions.   The argument for the necessity of a second generation of 
reforms contained several assumptions: an assumption that economic reform occurred in 
stages, that a first stage had been successfully completed, and that ensuing policies would 
be built on the foundations laid during this first generation of economic reforms.  These 
judgments were drawn from a particular reading of Latin America’s economic experience 
in the post-debt crisis era, and formed the basis for widely held views of the reasons for 
the positive and negative outcomes of the economic liberalization process of the previous 
decade. 
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In this chapter I examine the concept of “second generation reform,” as a broad 
set of policy prescriptions applied to Latin American countries in the post-liberalization 
era. I summarize the regional economic trends that led observers to conclude that another 
generation of economic reforms was necessary for Latin America, and the impact of 
those trends in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico. I then describe the specific measures that 
have been placed under the “second generation” heading, outline some of the 
fundamental assumptions underlying the concept, and offer several general criticisms of 
the concept.  
 
Origins of the Concept 
 
In the wake of the debt crisis of the early 1980s and the ensuing “lost decade,” 
governments throughout Latin America found themselves faced with the common 
challenge of restarting economic growth.  The policies eventually adopted in response to 
this situation tended to adhere closely to a standard set of economic prescriptions, and 
included both stabilization policies (measures intended to resolve immediate balance of 
payments problems) and structural adjustment policies (measures intended to restructure 
the economy in order to promote long term growth).   
Stabilization policies typically involved adjustments to fiscal and monetary 
policy, and were intended to reduce inflation and curb current account deficits.  To 
address these problems, governments were advised to pursue tight monetary policies, 
reduce government spending, raise taxes, and in some cases, devalue their currencies. 
While the fiscal tightening associated with stabilization packages generated recessionary 
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tendencies, a reduction in consumption was viewed as necessary to restore external 
balances.  
Looking beyond short term stabilization, policy makers eventually concluded that 
a shift in the overall orientation of Latin American economies was necessary to promote 
long term growth.  While fiscal austerity was necessary to resolve immediate balance of 
payments problems, the prevention of future crises was viewed as hinging on the removal 
of impediments to growth within the broader macroeconomy.  In the view of the 
international financial establishment, the primary impediment to future growth in Latin 
America was the heavy role played by the state. The failure of state centered 
development strategies incorporating import substitution was viewed as the central cause 
of Latin America’s economic crisis in the 1980s.  In accordance with this diagnosis, the 
structural adjustment policies promoted by international lenders typically involved a 
reduction in state intervention of various kinds.  Latin American governments were 
advised to privatize public enterprises, reduce government spending, pursue deregulation, 
and lower barriers to foreign trade and international investment.  These recommendations 
were based on the presumption that excessive state involvement in the economy 
continued to be the fundamental factor limiting growth in Latin America, and that freeing 
markets was central to promoting the long term economic growth necessary to ensure 
repayment of debts, and improve standards of living. This new emphasis on promoting 
economic growth by constraining the scope of the state has frequently been characterized 
as the “neoliberal” agenda.   
 To a great extent, the neoliberal reform agenda represented a standard recipe: a 
basic set of policies promoted in developing countries in a wide variety of circumstances 
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throughout the post-debt crisis developing world.  This basic agreement within the 
international economic establishment on what was meant by policy reform came to be 
known as the “Washington Consensus,” a term coined by economist John Williamson to 
describe the set of market oriented policies on which the international lending community 
supposedly agreed (Williamson 1990). In the aftermath of the debt crisis, Latin American 
governments came under considerable pressure to adopt stabilization and structural 
adjustment measures as a condition for international loans and aid.  
In the terminology of neoliberal reform advocates, these basic stabilization and 
structural adjustment policies are sometimes described as representing the “first 
generation” of reforms.  According to the prevailing orthodoxy embodied by this term, 
the most immediate task facing economic policy makers in post-crisis Latin America was 
a drastic adjustment in the macroeconomic fundamentals underlying the national 
economy.  Neoliberal reforms were seen both as a top priority and a necessary first step. 
Only once these basic goals of stabilization, deregulation, privatization, and international 
opening had been accomplished should attention then turn to more varied and narrowly 
targeted policies.     
 
First Generation Reforms in Latin America 
 
While the extent to which Washington Consensus polices were adopted varied 
across the countries of Latin America, the overall region-wide pattern during the post-
crisis era was characterized by an increased emphasis on economic stability, and a 
dramatic shift toward the free market economic model.  
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    In terms of economic stabilization, this increased emphasis can be seen in 
indicators of both fiscal and monetary policy.  As governments moved away inflationary 
policies, the mean annual inflation rate in LAC countries, which had soared to 322% 
during the 1986-1990 period, dropped to 13% by 1997 (Burki and Perry 1997, 20).  In the 
fiscal realm, public sector nonfinancial deficits dropped from a region wide average of 
7%  of GDP in 1986-1990, to 2.4% in 1996 (Burki and Perry 1997, 21) . 
 Latin America’s implementation of market-oriented structural adjustment 
policies was similarly widespread and profound.  While the emphasis and extent of 
market oriented structural reform varied from country to country, an overall shift toward 
the neoliberal model occurred throughout the region. This trend encompassed both an  
external opening to trade and investment, as well as a shift toward the free market model 
within domestic economic policies.  
During the market reform era, trade barriers throughout the region dropped 
substantially: between 1985 and 1995, the average tariff in countries decreased from 46% 
to 12% (Morley et al. 1999, 14) By the end of the 1990s, the use of tariffs to protect 
domestic industries had nearly disappeared from Latin America (Morley et al. 1999, 13), 
and the use of non tariff barriers and multiple exchange rates also declined precipitously 
(Burki and Perry 1997, 29-30; Lora 1997, 10-11; Lora 2001, 5). The lowering of barriers 
corresponded with a rise in the volume of trade: overall commercial exchange between 
Latin America and the rest of the world more than doubled between 1990 and 1997 (Wise 
2003a). Accompanying the opening to trade was an opening to international capital. The 
liberalization of international capital movements was not as widespread and universal as 
the trade opening: several major countries, including Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, 
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maintained substantial controls on capital flows (Morley et al. 1999, 15). However, the 
overall regional trend was toward greater liberalization, with one index of regional 
international financial liberalization showing a 49% increase between 1984 and 1995 
(Morley et al. 1999, 16).  
The increase in international openness was paralleled by liberalization of 
domestic economic policies. During the post-debt crisis era, Latin American governments 
greatly curtailed the state role in the domestic economy.  Privatization of state enterprises 
was commonplace throughout most of Latin America. The extent to which countries were 
willing to sell off state enterprises varied: Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico,  and Peru were 
among the most assiduous privatizers, with proceeds from privatization between 1990- 
and 1995 exceeding 1% or GDP (Burki and Perry 1997, 46; Morley et al.1999, 16),while 
Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay  pursued less or no privatization.   Overall, however, the 
trend was toward privatization, with the percentage of domestic investment that was 
private rising from approximately 65 to 73% between 1985 and 1994. The adoption of 
market oriented structural adjustment policies at the domestic level went beyond 
privatization.  Liberalization of financial systems was also a widespread, with the most 
significant liberalizations occurring in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (Lora 1997, 9-10; Corbo 
2000, 80), and state controls on interest rates were lifted throughout the region by 1995. 
In addition, most countries of the region reformed their taxation systems to bring them 
more in line with Washington Consensus prescriptions for efficiency (Lora 1997, 6-7; 
Lora 2001, 10-14; Corbo 2000, 78). 
     Overall, although the extent and nature of market reform varied from country to 
country, economic policy in Latin America was characterized by a dramatic shift in favor 
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of the stabilization and structural adjustment measures recommended by the international 
financial community.  A composite index of Latin American market reform progress 
assembled by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) shows an overall increase 
from 35% to 62% between 1985 and 1995, and other indexes display similar movement 
(for example, Lora 2001 and Morley et al. 1999). By the mid-to-late 1990s, most Latin 
American countries had apparently accomplished the essential goals laid out in the first-
generation reformist agenda.   
 
The First Generation of Reforms in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico 
 
Within Latin America’s overall shift toward the free market, the leaders of 
Argentina, Peru, and Mexico stand out as particularly ardent promoter of the neoliberal 
agenda.  Argentina’s shift toward the neoliberal model began with assumption of power 
by Carlos Saúl Menem of the Partido Justicialista in 1989.  Menem entered office in the 
midst of a raging economic crisis that had forced his predecessor, Raúl Alfonsín, out of 
office several months before the legal end of his term.  Heterodox stabilization plans 
adopted by Alfonsín’s administration in response to the debt crisis had failed, resulting in 
negative growth rates and surging rates of inflation that eventually surpassed 4000% by 
his last year in office.   
 Menem had promised traditional populist remedies for the economic crisis during 
the campaign, pledging that his leadership would produce a “productive revolution” and 
wage increases (Waisman 1999, 100). Immediately after assuming office, however, 
Menem drastically changed course. His government implemented a package of drastic 
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stabilization policies and sweeping market reforms that affected nearly every area of the 
economy. A centerpiece of these efforts was the currency board system, an anti-
inflationary measure that pegged the peso to the US dollar.  
Menem’s government rapidly privatized major government-owned enterprises, 
including the telecommunications, airlines, railroads, electricity, military hardware, and 
petroleum industries (Teichman 2001, 112). Many of these privatizations were 
implemented by presidential decree, and most of them had been accomplished by 1994. 
The new administration was equally aggressive in opening the economy to trade; by 
1996, average tariff rates had dropped from 26% to less than 10%, and most price 
controls had been eliminated. Restrictions on capital flows were lifted, and much of the 
economy was deregulated.  At the end of the 1980s, Argentina had been viewed as an 
exemplar of failed mercantilist and state-centered economic policies, and as a notoriously 
recalcitrant debtor; half a decade later, the country was considered the region’s foremost 
model of adherence to free market policies. 
  
Peru’s adoption of neoliberal economics in many ways paralleled that of 
Argentina.  As in Argentina, the initial in response to the debt crisis only led to further 
economic instability.  The expansionary policies adopted by the government of Alan 
García, while initially generated strong growth, but proved unsustainable. By the end of 
the decade, Peru was faced with fiscal crisis and hyperinflation, and García was forced to 
flee the country under suspicion of corruption. 
The new president, Alberto Fujimori, had adopted a vague and populist discourse 
during his campaign. Like Menem, he immediately abandoned his campaign rhetoric 
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after entering office, and plunged into a drastic set of market reforms. Fujimori adopted a 
package of harsh austerity measures in response to IMF demands, and then went on to 
drastically reduce the role of the state in the economy. The ratio of public investment to 
GDP, which had reached 5.5 % in 1986, fell to 2 % in 1991. Fujimori privatized 
numerous state enterprises, including airlines, mines, banks, oil, and utilities.  Fujimori’s 
administration slashed tariffs and no-tariff barriers, and encouraged international 
investment, particularly in newly privatized sectors. By the end of Fujimori’s first term in 
office in 1995, Peru, like Argentina, was held up as an exemplar of reform by advocates 
of neoliberal policies, having gone, in the words of one observer “from pariah to darling 
of the financial world.” (Stokes 2001a, 163)  
  
In contrast with Argentina and Peru, Mexico’s shift to free market policies was 
more gradual, spreading out over more than a decade. The initial impetus for the market 
reform project came from economic crisis of 1982, in which a drop in petroleum prices 
led to an unraveling of Mexico’s fiscal position and an eventual default on foreign debt   
In response to this disaster, and to Mexico’s newly vulnerable financial status, the 
hegemonic PRI began to maneuver Mexican economic policies toward the free market 
model.  Under President Miguel de la Madrid, Mexico adopted fiscal austerity policies, 
slashing government spending and state salaries, and began to privatize state run 
enterprises. As free market reformers gradually gained more influence within the 
Mexican policy apparatus, the pace of reform quickened; privatization, tariff reductions, 
and deregulation were pursued throughout the mid to late 1980s.    
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The Mexican government’s commitment to free market reforms was cemented by 
the rise of Carlos Salinas to the PRI leadership and to the presidency in 1988.  A 
committed neoliberal, Salinas doggedly pursued privatizations and lowered barriers to 
foreign investment. The North American Free Trade Agreement, adopted by the United 
States, Mexico, and Canada in 1993, beyond representing a major liberalization initiative 
in its own right, was also viewed as method of locking in these reforms, committing 
Mexico irrevocably to the free market path.  
 
Within the overall trend toward market reform in Latin America, then, Argentina, 
Peru and Mexico stand out as particularly notable cases:  once widely viewed as 
exemplifying ineffective, state-centered approaches to development, during the 1990s 
they developed a new reputation as models of market oriented reformism.   
 
 
 Outcomes of First Generation Reform 
 
Taken as a whole, economic policies in Latin America shifted dramatically in the 
neoliberal direction during the 1990s. By and large, the recommendations of the 
international financial establishment had been adopted over the course of the decade. The 
results of these measures, however, failed to live up to the expectations and predictions of 
market reform’s proponents.  
During the early 1990s, most economic signs were positive:  Between 1990 and 
1995, economic growth rates averaged a reasonably healthy 4.2  percent (Kuczynski 
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2003, 25).  Stabilization and structural adjustment policies were accompanied by a boom 
in foreign investment. Capital flows to the region turned positive in 1991, and by 1997, 
the annual net flow of capital to Latin America and the Caribbean approached an all time 
high of $70 billion dollars. (Griffith-Jones 2000, 12).   Latin American stock markets 
surged, appreciating by an average of 25% between 1989 and 1994. (Kuczynski 2003, 
25). Fiscal deficits declined, and by 1996 the region’s current account deficit had fallen to 
2% of GDP (Edwards 1997) 
During the mid-to-late1990s, however, economic crises returned to the region. In 
Mexico in 1994, mounting current account deficits led to a sharp devaluation the peso, 
and only a massive international bailout saved the country from default on its 
international debt. The region wide effects of the peso crisis were intense but limited, 
with capital flows declining sharply, but recovering shortly after. A series of international 
crises in 1997 and 1998 had more profound effects.  The contagion from financial crises 
in Asia and Russia spread to Brazil, which was forced to drastically devalue its currency, 
triggering an economic crisis that threatened the economic viability of its neighbor, 
Argentina, and raised the specter of a region-wide slowdown (Kuczynski 2003, 25-26). 
As crises shook the confidence of investors, the capital inflows of the early 1990s began 
to decline, with volatile portfolio investments experiencing the most significant reversals 
At the same time, growth rates were slowing throughout the region. During the 
second half of the 1990s, the overall growth rate in Latin America barely reached 2.5 
percent (Kuczynski 2003, 26), substantially below the 3.4 percent that the World Bank 
believes is necessary to reduce poverty rates.   By the end of the 1990s, the average 
annual growth rate over the entire decade had shrunk to 3.8%, an improvement over the 
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“lost decade” of the 1980s but considerably lower than the growth experienced during the 
decades that had preceded the debt crisis (Lora 2003,11-12).  
Furthermore, even the weak improvements in macroeconomic performance 
recorded in Latin America during the 1990s had a distinctly limited impact on poverty 
rates and unemployment; the gains from the growth experienced during the 1990s tended 
to be distributed unequally. Of the LAC countries, only Chile and Uruguay experienced a 
substantial decline in poverty during the 1990s (Birdsall and Székely 2003).  While the 
region as a whole saw some decline in poverty levels, rates of poverty remained above 
those experienced prior to the crisis of the 1980s (Huber and Solt 2004).   Persistent 
poverty was linked in part to levels of economic inequality, which overall stayed the 
same or increased throughout all of the countries of the region during the1990s  
(Behrman et al. 2001).   Unemployment rates remained roughly the same throughout the 
region as whole between 1989 and 1996 (Burki and Perry 1997, 91), and significantly 
increased in some countries (notably, Argentina) during the 1990s.  
By the end of the 1990s, then, the social costs of the debt crisis were still keenly 
felt throughout Latin America.   The limited growth experienced during the decade, 
having done relatively little to ease these effects, was now fading.   Inevitably, this 
economic decline was accompanied by some public discontent with the economic 
policies that had failed to live up to expectations. At the end of the 1990s, observers had 
begun to characterize the overall mood within Latin America as one of “reform fatigue.” 
Region wide surveys showed a dramatic decline in support for the principle of the free 
market in general, as well as specific free market policies (Lora 2003, 4). 
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Faced with this worsening picture, advocates of market reform policies searched 
for explanations for the inadequate outcomes of economic liberalization, and for potential 
solutions.   Some of the blame for the disappointing results was ascribed to external 
conditions; in particular, the financial crises in Asia and Russia that had sent international 
ripples through developing country markets (Williamson 2003b, 307).   However, most 
observers also concluded that Latin America’s free market policies had failed to perform 
as advertised at the domestic level.  Despite the fact that structural reforms had largely 
removed the interventionist policies that were seen as the primary obstacles to growth, 
sustained growth and the corresponding enhancements in welfare had failed to reach 
promised levels.   
The rise to prominence of the idea of a “second generation” of economic and 
institutional reform in the region stemmed in part from this retrospective reexamination 
of Latin America’s experiences with economic liberalization.  According to this 
perspective, the disappointing economic performance following economic liberalization 
did not call into question the basic principles of the free market model adopted by Latin 
America following the debt crisis.  Rather, the economic shortcomings demonstrated that 
the existing reforms were insufficient.  The ability to sustain high levels of economic 
growth, and to translate that growth into improved standards of living, would depend on 
the implementation of a new set of reforms to supplement and reinforce free market 
policies. The exact nature of those reforms, and how best to implement them, were 
subjects of considerable debate.   
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Outcomes of Market Reform: Argentina, Peru and Mexico 
 
This debate was of obvious relevance to three countries in this study, whose 
economic experiences during the 1990s generally paralleled the overall pattern observed 
throughout the region.  During the optimistic years of the early 1990s, market reform 
advocates depicted Argentina, Peru and Mexico as model countries.  The initial outcomes 
of neoliberal reform- strong economic performance, booming inflows of capital, and 
public approval of the leaders or parties that had implemented market reform–s seemed to 
justify this acclaim.  However, by the end of the decade economic performance in each of 
the three cases had weakened substantially, and public optimism had been replaced by 
disenchantment. 
 
In Argentina, most early results of Menem and Cavallo’s market reforms were 
overwhelmingly positive.  The adoption of the currency board and peso-dollar 
convertibility dramatically curtailed inflation, lowering annual inflation rates from 5000 
percent in 1989 to less than 5 percent in 1994 (Pastor  Jr. and Wise 2001, 62 ).  Argentina 
quickly returned to strong rates of growth, averaging 10% annual growth between 1989 
and 1994.  This boom was in large part fueled by foreign investment, which poured into 
the country rapidly following the liberalization of the economy and the lowering of 
capital controls. This economic growth, combined with the proceeds of privatizations, 
initially brightened the Argentine government’s fiscal picture.  By the middle of the 
decade, Argentina was being touted by the international financial establishment as a 
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model country for the implementation of economic reforms, and the booming Argentine 
economy was viewed as strong evidence in support of the neoliberal policy agenda. 
The first serious signs of trouble began to emerge in the mid-1990s.  The Mexican 
crisis of 1994 jolted the Argentine economy, which suffered a capital outflow of $6 
billion in 1995 (Pastor Jr. and Wise 2001). Despite this setback, high levels of growth 
soon resumed, and the Argentine public registered its approval of Menem’s tenure by 
overwhelmingly reelecting him in 1995. Soon after Menem’s reelection, however, the 
situation began to sour.  Over the next few years, growth rates slowed substantially, 
unemployment, which had been an unwelcome side effect of Argentina’s reforms, 
continued to rise, reaching record levels by the end of the decade.  Brazil’s 1998 currency 
crisis triggered another drop in investment, and damaged Argentina’s international 
competitiveness (already weakened due to the appreciation the peso that had resulted 
from convertibility).  As the economy weakened, Menem’s approval dropped 
precipitously, and a newly formed coalition of anti-Menem parties, having won 
resoundingly in legislative elections of 1997, looked well positioned to take the 
presidency in 1999.  
  
In Peru, Fujimori’s unanticipated adoption of neoliberal orthodoxy soon appeared 
to be paying both political and economic dividends. Growth, which had stagnated during 
the last years of García’s administration, soon returned strongly, surpassing 13% in 1994 
(Wise 2003b). Inflation rates dropped from 30% per month in 1990 to 0.5% per month by 
1997. The Peruvian stock market surged, and foreign investment flowed into the country.  
Buoyed both by perceptions of economic progress and by his administration’s successes 
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in fighting the brutal Sendero Luminoso insurgency,  Fujimori won a resounding 
reelection in 1995. 
 During Fujimori’s second term, however, the economy slipped back into 
recession. As growth slowed, unemployment rose, and wages (which had not risen in 
proportion to Peru’s overall growth during the boom of the early 1990s) stagnated.  
While Fujimori had used the proceeds of privatization to fund social programs to build 
electoral support among Peru’s poor, the availability of this fiscal resource declined over 
time.  As the economy worsened, Fujimori’s approval ratings dropped, with disapproval 
of both Fujimori and of his economic program rising from mid-1996 on.  In this context, 
Fujimori began manipulating the judicial system to allow a run for a constitutionally   
prohibited third term, further damaging his government’s image.  Although the economy, 
and Fujimori’s approval, improved somewhat in the year preceding the 2000 election, it 
appeared that that contest would take place in an atmosphere of overall public 
discontentment.  
  
  In Mexico, by the early 1990s economic reforms appeared to be producing 
positive results. GDP growth rebounded, averaging 5.6% between 1984 and 1994. 
Exports and imports both surged, with non-oil exports in 1994 being eleven times their 
level of 1982.  Levels of foreign direct investment grew, and foreign portfolio investment 
surged, moving from negative levels under De la Madrid to an average of  $8.2 billion 
dollars in 1994. (González Gomez 1998, 42). An appreciating peso, combined with 
liberalization of spending, led to an increase in consumer purchasing power and 
spending. By 1988, the PRI, which a few years before had been buffeted by economic 
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discontent and internal fractures, was riding a wave of perceived prosperity to electoral 
victories. 
 By 1993, signs of trouble had begun to emerge. Mexico gradually settled into a 
recession, while the appreciation of the peso, and liberalization of trade led to a rapid 
increase in trade deficits. The booming foreign investment that Mexico relied on to 
finance its boom was heavily concentrated in potentially volatile portfolio flows. In the 
short term, Salinas was able to maintain enough of a semblance of prosperity to maintain 
the PRI’s hold on the presidency via Ernesto Zedillo’s victory in the 1994 elections, and 
1994 also saw the implementation of NAFTA, a measure that Salinas promoted as key to 
continuing Mexico’s progress toward first world status. 
 Shortly after Zedillo’s election, however, Mexico underwent a catastrophic 
economic crisis, as unsustainable external balances forced a massive and disorderly 
devaluation of the peso.  In the aftermath of devaluation, unemployment surged, inflation 
rates surpassed 50%, and public wages and purchasing power plummeted.  While a $50 
billion bailout package forestalled the possibility of a default on Mexico’s external 
obligations and allowed the country a relatively rapid return to economic growth, the 
effects of the crisis, and accompanying disillusionment, persisted throughout the rest of 
the 1990s. The political effects of the crisis became clearly apparent in the legislative 
elections of 1997, as the PRI lost its majority on Mexico’s congress for the first time in 
the country’s modern history.  By 2000, the combination of economic discontent and an 
unprecedented degree of political competitiveness created the possibly that opposition 
parties could dislodge the PRI from its similarly longstanding grip on the country’s 
powerful presidency. 
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The Second Generation of Reforms 
 
The idea of the necessity of a second generation of reform policies attained 
widespread support in reaction to the disappointing outcomes of market reform processes 
in Latin America. The specific policy priorities associated with the second generation 
reformist agenda were not new. However, the conception of economic reform as 
occurring in two discrete stages appears to have originated in an influential 1994 article 
by Moíses Naím (Naím 1994, see also Navia and Velasco 2003) According to Naím,  
Latin America had undergone a first stage in the reform process, one primarily involving 
“decree driven, hard-to-decide but simple-to-execute economic shocks” (Naím 1994, 35). 
The completion of these initial reforms could be credited for the “spectacular turnaround” 
in Latin American economic performance. However, Naím argued, that stage was now 
mostly over; furthermore, the future sustainability of Latin America’s economic growth, 
and the translation of that growth into improved standards of living would depend on the 
implementation of a new set of policies. These new policies would be intended to 
increase the competitiveness of Latin American economies and improve social 
conditions, would involve many different policy areas, and would incorporate renewed 
attention to the role of the state, a process that Naím characterized as one of “institutional 
creation and rehabilitation.” (Naím 1994, 35). 
While the concept of second generation reform was introduced at the apogee of 
Latin America’s post-liberalization economic performance, its prominence would 
increase as the region’s fortunes worsened.  As economic growth slowed and “reform 
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fatigue” began to emerge (seemingly bearing out Naím’s predictions of the uncertain 
sustainability of the gains associated with the initial market reforms), calls for the 
implementation of second generation policies became commonplace.   By 1999,  Manuel 
Pastor Jr. and Carol Wise observed that  the second generation reformist perspective had 
“received support from across the political and policy spectrum,”  and had been embraced 
by the multilateral financial organizations. In that year, the IMF convened a conference 
on the implementation of second generation reforms in the developing world; the 
following year,  Ann Krueger (soon to be named First Deputy Managing Director of the 
IMF) edited a volume of essays addressing the same topic (Krueger 2000).  By 2002, 
Dani Rodrik noted that the disappointing outcomes of neoliberal reform had led to the 
emergence of what he termed an “Augmented Washington Consensus,” in which the 
stabilization and structural adjustment prescriptions associated with the original 
consensus were supplemented by second generation reform policies “entailing heavy duty 
institutional reform.”(Rodrik 2002)   In 2003, John Williamson, acknowledging the 
expansion of this reform agenda beyond the original measures he had described, coedited 
a volume on second generation reform in Latin America entitled “After the Washington 
Consensus.” An increasing adoption of second generation reformist themes as a political 
message by Latin American politicians (particularly prominent and successful in the three 
countries examined here) occurred concurrently with the increasing popularity of the 
concept in academic and international policy circles (Wise 2003). 
 
While the region’s economic travails had generated broad agreement on the need 
for a new set of policies, no similar consensus existed on the exact nature of those 
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policies.  As a consequence, the precise meaning of “second generation reform” has 
never been established in clear and universal terms.  Despite this lack of consensus, most 
versions of the concept of second generation reform have several fundamental tendencies 
in common. The commonly held meanings of the term are best understood by 
emphasizing the basic assumptions that lie behind the second generation reformist 
perspective.   
At the most basic level, the concept assumes that the basic elements of 
stabilization and structural adjustment according to the Washington Consensus 
framework represent a necessary first step in economic reform, and a foundation for 
future policies.  As the name suggests, rolling back structural adjustment and stabilization 
policies is not part of the second generation agenda. Rather, these first generation reforms 
are viewed as necessary but insufficient:  in addition to macroeconomic adjustments, 
state policy within individual sectors of the economy must be modified to enhance 
efficiency, and governments must also actively undertake measures to guarantee that the 
benefits of economic growth are distributed among all social groups, and translate into 
broad improvements in living standards.  
Additionally, a central aspect of the second generation reformist perspective is 
increased attention to the quality of institutions.   Moving from a first generation to 
second generation agenda implies incorporating the assumption that the quality, integrity, 
and effectiveness of the institutions that carry out economic and social policy is as 
fundamental to eventual outcomes as the content of those policies themselves.  Much of 
the second generation reformist agenda, then, involves governance issues: prevention of 
corruption and the promotion of institutional effectiveness and accountability. Thus, 
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second generation reformism can best be viewed as having two related but conceptually 
distinct components: a socioeconomic policy component, and a governance component.  
 
  Second Generation Reforms: Socioeconomic Aspects 
 
The socioeconomic policy aspect of second generation reformism incorporates a broad 
and diverse set of issues, and is characterized by considerable ambiguity as to both the 
boundaries of the concept itself and the specific content and priority of policies within 
each area.  In this regard, the second generation agenda contrasts with the original 
Washington Consensus. Although some disagreement exists as to the exact nature of the 
“Washington Consensus,” the basic policy instruments and overall approaches of 
stabilization and structural adjustment are fairly widely agreed upon.  Unlike the first 
stage of reform, which involved changes at the macro level, second generation policies 
tend to involve attention to individual sectors of the economy and specific issues. In the 
words of Ann Krueger, the economic policy aspect of second generation reform consists 
of the “implementation of particulars.” (Krueger 2000, 4)   Second generation reforms 
address policy areas that fall outside of the realm of the basic fiscal and structural 
adjustment policies, but nevertheless have a significant economic and social impact, and 
require state action.   
   
 As the preceding discussion should make clear, the range of “particulars” that 
could be potentially construed as falling under the second generation heading is 
extensive. However, along the lines of the general tendencies outlined above, certain 
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concerns tend feature prominently within the second generation socioeconomic agenda. 
There is considerable consensus as to the desired goals of second generation reforms: 
improved efficiency, and the translation of growth into improvements in social welfare. 
Employing the terminology of Pastor Jr. and Wise (1999), most second generation 
socioeconomic reforms can be broadly considered “market completing” or 
“distributional” in intent.   
Market completing reforms involve policies designed to create a policy 
environment that maximizes the competitiveness and efficiency of the private sector, and 
to correct for market failures (Pastor Jr. and Wise 1999).   In the words of John 
Williamson, they involve “creating and maintaining the institutional infrastructure of a 
market economy.” (Williamson 2003, 11)  Along these lines, the creation and effective 
enforcement of anti-trust regulation is viewed as an important second generation priority.  
Regulation of banking is also central to many conceptions of the second generation 
reformist agenda, as is regulation of the financial sector. Reforms in labor market 
regulations also fall under this heading. 
Alongside efforts to generate higher levels of overall growth through promoting 
increased efficiency and competition, a central goal of second generation reforms is the 
promotion of policies that support the equitable distribution of the economic and social 
benefits of growth. Rather than assuming that growth will naturally translate into 
improvements in standards of living, the second generation perspective views 
government action as necessary. Pro-equity policies can take a variety of forms. The 
“human capital” issues of improvements in the availability and quality of education and 
health care are generally viewed as major priorities.  Anti-poverty social spending 
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programs of various kinds also could fall under this heading, as could efforts to improve 
access to credit for the poor.   Policies intended improve the competitiveness of small and 
medium sized firms relative to larger ones also have been frequently cited as a means of 
addressing distributional issues within a second generation reformist framework.   (Pastor 
Jr. and Wise 1999, 42-43).   
  While second generation socioeconomic reforms can be broadly classified as 
market completing or distributional in intent, many policies areas have implications for 
both the efficiency and equity aspects of the reform agenda. Tax reforms, for example, 
could conceivably be oriented toward both ends, with redesigns of the tax structure either 
being intended to promote overall market efficiency, or to generate a more egalitarian 
distribution of assets (with the specific content of the reform possibly depending on the 
priority ascribed to one goal or the other). The regulation of recently privatized public 
utilities, commonly a major second generation concern, also has implications for both the 
overall performance of the economy, as well as for the distribution of economic benefits 
and broader social-well being.  
 
To some extent the socioeconomic agenda of second generation reformism seems 
potentially boundless, with the potential to incorporate anything that could be viewed as 
unfinished business from the first generation of reforms. Moreover, these policies are 
often conceptualized in terms of generally desirable outcomes rather than specific policy 
inputs (Navia and Velasco 2003).  An emphasis on improvements in public education and 
the delivery of health care are goals, not policies, and opinions may vary on the exact 
policy steps needed to accomplish those goals (Corbo 2000).  
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Despite this heterogeneity and lack of specificity, however, the socioeconomic 
reforms that fall into the second generation category share some general principles in 
common: they are intended to promote a more efficient capitalist economy and to ensure 
that growth translates into improved social welfare, and they typically involve attention 
to narrower sectors of the economy, rather than the overall macroeconomic framework.  
Most importantly, second generation reforms generally involve a renewed emphasis on 
the role of the state in solving problems that unfettered markets fail to address. In this last 
regard the division between first generation and second generation reforms is clear:  first 
generation policies typically involve a retreat of the state from the economic stage, while 
in second generation reforms, the role of the state is central. (Navia and Velasco 2003, 
270). However, second generation reformist prescriptions typically do not involve calls 
for an expansion of the size of the government, but rather for increased attention to the 
strength and quality of governance. In this regard, the fundamentally state-centered 
nature of second generation reformism is linked to the other major aspect of the second 
generation agenda: an increased emphasis on the accountability and integrity of 
institutions. 
 
Second Generation Reforms: Governance Aspects 
  
While the socioeconomic component of the second generation agenda is 
ambiguous and diverse in content, the other main component of the agenda is far more 
straightforward: an increased attention to governance issues   Concerns over the quality 
of governance underlie many second generation reformist ideas, and the introduction of 
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governance issues to the equation represents a clear and distinct augmentation of the 
concept of economic policy reform. According to this expanded perspective, social and 
economic outcomes are viewed as depending not only on the content of policies, but on 
the quality and integrity of the institutions that undertake those policies.   The increasing  
link between governance issues between economic reform efforts has been a result of 
both theoretical principles and real world experiences.  
In theoretical terms, the argument for incorporating governance issues into 
economic policy prescriptions derives primarily from a few general concerns: concerns 
over the security of private property and market inefficiencies due to transaction costs, 
and concerns over the effectiveness of public policies. 
Much of the theoretical justification for attention to institutions and the rule of law in 
economic policy studies arises from the issues of property rights and the impact of 
transaction costs.  Secure property rights are viewed as a necessary precondition for 
investment: lack of secure property rights raises the associated risks, leading to lower 
levels of investment.  
More broadly, the importance of governance issues to economic performance 
stems from the potential of transaction costs to reduce the efficiency of market 
interactions.  While the neoclassical economic paradigm presumes a market in which all 
parties have access to perfect information and agreements are enforceable, most actual 
markets do not operate under these ideal conditions. In practice, the existence of 
asymmetrical information between buyers and sellers of a good or service, combined 
with concerns over the enforceability of contracts and agreements, may raise the cost of 
conducting a transaction to the point where a potentially mutually beneficial exchange 
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cannot occur.  Effective institutions and rules lower these costs by helping provide the 
buyers with credible assurances about the good or service they are receiving, and the 
enforcement of the agreement.   Rates of investment, and the existence and efficiency of 
markets, then, depend on the existence of clear, credible rules: not only the existence of 
such rules in law, but the extent to which the rules are enforced in a reliable and even-
handed manner (Burki and Perry 1998, North 1990, Keefer 2004, Rodrik 1999, Aron 
1997). 
Finally, and perhaps obviously, the effectiveness of public policies designed to 
render the economy more competitive and distribute the gains of growth depends not 
only on the correct design of institutions and laws, but on whether those institutions and 
laws function as they are intended to. As such, the good governance aspect of the second 
generation reformist agenda stems directly from the nature of socioeconomic second 
generation reforms: Once the state is brought back into the picture, attention to the 
quality and integrity of the state is necessary.  The broadening of the economic reform 
agenda to include market completing and distributional policies undertaken during the 
post-reform era requires consideration of the quality of public administration itself (Burki 
and Perry 1998, 15). 
  
Beyond purely theoretical justifications for the increased importance placed on  
institutions as factors in economic growth,  major events outside of Latin America during 
the 1990s brought institutional issues to the fore.  The Asian financial crisis, for example, 
was viewed as partly a result of inadequate transparency and supervision in the financial 
sector.  Similarly, assessments of economic and social difficulties in Russia following the 
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free market shock therapy of the early 1990s often concluded that corruption, cronyism 
and state incapacity resulted in a process that often replaced inefficient state monopolies 
with inefficient and corrupt private monopolies or oligopolies, and created a form of 
capitalism in which much of the benefit of growth flowed to a small class of well 
connected oligarchs.   
Concurrently with these events, economists and leaders of international financial 
institutions (in particular, the World Bank), increased the emphasis placed on governance 
issues in their research and in policy pronouncements. Numerous studies were undertaken 
to assess links between institutional quality and economic performance.  Despite the 
obvious importance of corruption issues for the effectiveness of aid policies, the World 
Bank had traditionally viewed the issue of corruption as largely off-limits, holding that 
attention or pressures related to that subject would constitute unacceptable involvement 
in the domestic politics of recipient countries. By the 1990s, this stance had shifted 
dramatically, to the point that corruption and governance issues became one of the World 
Bank’s primary preoccupations; a preoccupation reflected in the Bank’s publication of a 
1998 report entitled Institutions Matter. (Burki and Perry 1998) As was the case with 
second generation reforms in general, the incorporation of governance issues into the 
economic reform debate created significant complications, as the question of how to 
create what Rodrik (1999) has referred to as “institutions for high quality growth”) 
offered few simple and straightforward answers.   Furthermore, external promotion of an 
institutional reform agenda was an uncertain proposition, due to the questionable 
usefulness of conditionality as a means to compel concrete improvements in governance. 
Despite these obstacles, by the late 1990s the governance issue was firmly esconced at 
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the top of the reform agenda, and efforts to reform anticorruption mechanisms, the civil 
service, and judicial systems were widely viewed as crucial.  
 
In summary, the emerging idea of second generation reformism involved a broad 
range of policies intended to generate sustainable growth and improvements in social 
welfare. In contrast to the first generation reforms, which were involved broad 
macroeconomic reforms and typically represented a decrease in the role of the state, 
second generation reforms involved a renewed attention to the role of the state in a wide 
range of policy areas. Accompanying this increased attention the state role, a concern 
with the quality, integrity, and accountability of state institutions took on a new 
prominence within the economic policy agenda.  
 
The Politics of Second Generation Reformism 
 
 Most of the research and writing on the process of second generation reform in 
Latin America has focused primarily on the goals and policy content of those reforms. 
However, equally important from a practical standpoint is the question of what political 
conditions and strategies are necessary to implement a second generation reformist 
agenda in the context of democratic politics.  The disappointing economic results that 
eventually appeared in the years following market reform provided a general opportunity 
for political appeals based on modifications to free market policies (Pastor Jr. and Wise 
1999).  However, it is not immediately obvious why, or under what circumstances, this 
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public discontent could be expected to lead to support for a second generation reformist 
appeal involving primarily continuity with existing policies.  
Moreover, regardless of the general character of mass public opinion, many of the 
specific reforms within the second generation agenda tend to provoke opposition from 
privileged and well organized social sectors and groups.   While some of the costs of first 
generation market reforms are widely distributed and may be perceived as temporary, 
second generation reforms generally involve costs that narrowly affect influential groups 
(Naím 1994, 37) and threaten permanent harm for those sectors. Given the difficulty in 
establishing an organized and mobilized constituency in favor of these reforms, the 
defenders of the status quo can carry substantial political weight. Thus, declining 
economic performance should not be expected to automatically translate into political or 
policy success for second generation reformists; even under apparently propitious 
conditions, the implementation of a second generation agenda via democratic politics 
represents a substantial challenge.    
 A potential obstacle facing would-be reformists is the lack of consensus on the 
specific content of second generation reforms. As discussed above, this diversity of 
policies poses difficulties in establishing a clear definition of “second generation” 
reforms; in practical terms, it also poses similar difficulties for the possibilities of 
implementing such an agenda. This confusion goes beyond the question of what policy 
areas should be addressed, but also can be seen in disputes over the precise content of 
policy reforms in any given area. In this regard, the contrast between second generation 
reformist policies and the “Washington Consensus” on stabilization and structural 
adjustment is instructive.  The existence of a relative consensus within the policy 
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community on essential policy measures facilitated the creation of domestic and 
international policy networks that consistently pressed for those basic goals.  This 
consensus was drawn in part from the fact that the neoliberal perspective was based on a 
fairly simple and straightforward principle (the reduction of the state role in the 
economy) and the fact that the links between the goals of first generation neoliberal 
reform and the policies needed to achieve those goals are clear.  By way of contrast, the 
diversity of opinions regarding the basic elements of second generation reformism, the 
relative priority of different elements within the reformist agenda, and the specific 
policies needed to address each element, tends to diminish the possibility of building 
political and administrative momentum behind a cohesive policy package.  
Another obstacle to the implementation of a second generation reformist agenda 
lies in the technical difficulty of the reforms themselves (Navia and Velasco 2003, 266). 
The major policy reforms of the first generation were relatively simple, requiring broad 
changes in policies at the top levels.  As attention moves to more specialized sectors of 
the economy and the bureaucracy, the complexity of the required policies themselves 
increases dramatically. The increased complexity of second generation reforms makes 
their successful implementation a more daunting challenge in purely administrative 
terms, and also creates political obstacles and complications  
Similarly, many second generation reforms require a great deal of time to put into 
place.  Many of the important first generation reforms, such as privatizations, cuts in 
tariffs, and fiscal and monetary adjustments can be made in a matter of weeks. In 
contrast,  improving the quality of educational and health care systems, or improving the 
effectiveness and integrity of public administration, are extended processes where only 
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incremental progress is realistic. Furthermore, while some first generation policies can be 
expected to generate immediate and clear positive effects (for example, anti-inflationary 
policies), any improved economic and policy performance that results from second 
generation reforms will only emerge in the long term (Navia and Velasco 2003, 302; 
Naím 1994, 36).  These positive effects of second generation reforms, in addition to 
being delayed, may not be clearly connected to the reforms themselves in the popular 
consciousness. Even if reforms to education and health care do make some contribution 
to overall economic growth, the effects likely will be limited, and the public visibility of 
the impact of reforms on outcomes will be low (Naím 1994, 36). As such, politicians 
elected on second generation reformist agendas will likely have difficulty pointing to 
clear and immediate improvements as a means of sustaining their public support  
The obstacles to mobilizing public support behind a second generation reformist 
agenda are heightened by another frequent difference between the first and second stage 
– the presence or absence of an immediate crisis (Bambaci 1999). The initial policies of 
stabilization and structural adjustment were often undertaken in response to an immediate 
crisis. Under these circumstances, leaders were able to present drastic changes as a 
necessary response to a desperate situation, and to gain public approval when conditions 
improved (even if their market reforms directly violated campaign promises, as was the 
case in Argentina and Peru) (Weyland 2003). Second generation reforms, on the other 
hand, are not driven by an urgent crisis, but rather are more often viewed seen as a 
response to inadequate public services (Navia and Velasco 2003, 236) and as an antidote 
to creeping economic stagnation; the implementation of reforms will not necessarily 
trigger an immediate reversal of these trends. 
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Taken together, these factors suggest that political methods and strategies that 
served well for the implementation of stabilization and structural adjustment policies may 
not be appropriate for the implementation of second generation reformist agendas.  In 
many cases, first generation reforms could be implemented by a relatively small number 
of political leaders or technocrats in the executive branch, acting with considerable 
autonomy from the public.  The presence of a crisis, combined with strong international 
pressures, created momentum for a drastic shift in policies, and this shift could often be 
accomplished relatively quickly.    Second generation reforms seem less amenable to this 
sort of approach. As Korzeniewicz and Smith note: 
 
Whereas the first generation of reforms (macroeconomic stabilization)  
was relatively simple and could be enacted by presidents and insulated agencies in 
the executive branch, the reforms of the “second generation” involve an array of 
microeconomic issues and complex interrelated institutional changes...as well as 
voluntary coordination among diverse social and economic forces. Therefore, the 
coalitional underpinnings of these more ambitious reforms are essential, making 
the new reform agenda political par excellence (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001, 
29) 
 
In order to achieve success within a democratic system, would-be second generation 
reformers would need to build considerable political momentum behind their project, and 
enjoy reliable support from a broad and durable enough coalition to outlast the resistance 
of anti-reform interest groups.   
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A Critique of the Concept 
  
The idea of the necessity for a “second generation” of reforms in Latin America 
obtained widespread currency during the 1990s, becoming part of a general orthodoxy 
among proponents of neoliberal economics, and increasingly forming the basis for some 
politicians’ campaign messages and campaign promises.   However, as the above 
discussion has suggested, the concept itself suffers from several basic flaws that 
potentially call into question its usefulness as a basis for effectively describing and 
constructing economic policy. A central flaw is the lack of clarity regarding the exact 
content and category limits of what could be considered “second generation reformist” 
policies.   There is considerable disagreement among different observers on which policy 
areas fall into the second generation category. Additionally, in areas where there is 
agreement on which policy outcomes are important second generation priorities, the exact 
content of the policies to achieve those outcomes is often disputed.  
Furthermore, the division of market reform policies into first and second stages 
involves making several assumptions about the sequencing, priority, and desirability of 
various reform policies.   Some of the assumptions about the desirability, priority, and 
ideal sequence of reforms may be unjustified from a policy standpoint; in many cases the 
implementation of first generation reforms may be flawed, and their outcomes 
unsatisfactory, in the absence of conditions that the second generation of reforms are 
intended to achieve. 
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Finally, a conception of reforms as occurring in first and second stages overlooks 
the possibility that the implementation of first generation reforms may involve political 
strategies and tendencies that actively undermine subsequent efforts to pursue second 
generation reforms. In particular, the implementation of market reform may involve 
leadership strategies that exacerbate institutional weakness, thus raising the hurdles to 
efforts to promote post-liberalization accountability and good governance.  In addition, 
the tendency of top-down market reform programs to be associated with weakening of 
political representation may lead to a political environment that undermines the capacity 
for democratic governability necessary to implement second generation reforms. 
 
Conceptual Problems 
 
 Considerable variation exists in the usage of the term “second generation” to 
classify economic reforms; some observers view the concept as encompassing a broad 
range of economic policy areas, while others have a far narrower perspective. In some 
cases, there seems to be little clear theoretical basis for classifying a reform as first 
generation, second generation, or something else entirely. 
 At the most basic level, all versions of the “second generation” concept seem to 
involve an emphasis on attention to the quality of institutions. Beyond this basic 
agreement, however, usages differ.  For example, Williamson (2003a, 11-13) describes 
second generation reform as synonymous with reforms to institutions, encompassing 
reforms to the judiciary and civil service, as well as economic regulations. Issues of 
economic distribution and education are viewed as separate from the second generation 
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agenda, while labor reform is described as an incomplete element of the first generation 
agenda (in contrast with Pastor Jr. and Wise (1999), who treat labor reform and 
distributional issues as part of the second generation agenda).  Similarly, Lora (2001), 
Burki and Perry (1997) and Corbo (2000) view labor reform as part of the first stage of 
structural adjustment, albeit one in which relatively less progress has been made. 
However, Corbo describes health care and education policy as falling under the second 
generation heading. Perhaps the most expansive conception of second generation reform 
comes from Naím’s original (1994) statement of the policies that accompanied Latin 
America’s purported “second stage.” According to Naím, second stage reform includes 
the typically cited priorities of attention to the quality of institutions and the regulatory 
capacity of the state, as well as issues such as labor reform, health care, and education.  
Naím additionally describes second stage reform as involving the building of export 
promotion capacities, restructuring of relationships between states and the national 
government, and privatizations that are have yet to be carried out, and are more complex 
than those undertaken during the first stage (in contrast with Williamson, who views the 
unfinished privatizations as incomplete first generation reforms).   
 To some extent, these differences in terminology may be viewed as solely 
semantic: Williamson, for example, describes labor reform and education reform as 
important pending priorities, notwithstanding their exclusion from the “second 
generation” classification.  However, the lack of a clear and shared definition of second 
generation reform suggests that the concept itself may be of little use in analyzing 
existing economic policies or in formulating new policy agendas.   The seemingly endless 
list of policy areas that could fall under the “second generation” heading creates the 
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possibility that the category may evolve into little more a shorthand for every piece of 
unfinished business remaining after the implementation of stabilization and structural 
adjustment policies.  The widespread use of this catch-all term may obscure a basic lack 
of agreement on exactly what that unfinished business consists of.    
Even in areas where there is relative consensus on what sorts of policies fall under 
the second generation heading, a basic limitation of the concept of second generation 
reform lies in the previously mentioned fact that much of the agenda associated with 
second generation reform does not consist of policy prescriptions as such, but rather (as 
Navia and Velasco put it) “statements of desired results...without a clear sense of policy 
design.” (Navia and Velasco 2003, 266) The belief that improvement in education and 
health care, more efficient public administration, and reduced corruption are important 
goals is not particularly novel or controversial; nonetheless, agreement on such a view 
does not translate into a clear sense of the relative priority of those goals, or a universally 
shared policy agenda for accomplishing those goals.  
 The example of labor reform is useful in illustrating the conceptual shortcomings 
of the first/second generation distinction. While the belief that adjustments in policies 
toward labor markets are an important component of the second generation agenda is 
widely shared among many observers. However, there appears to be no clear theoretical 
reason why many labor market policies should be viewed as distinct from first generation 
reforms; deregulation in labor market policy does not seem substantively different from 
deregulation in other areas.  In addition, opinions differ on what the nature and goals of 
labor reform should be. Many different policies fall under the heading of “labor reform:” 
Saavedra (2003) mentions laws and regulations dealing with firing costs, job protection 
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and income smoothing, social security contributions, collective bargaining, and 
enforcement as components of the labor reform agenda. There is no clear and universally 
shared guideline for prioritizing these areas, and in fact some visions of the goals of labor 
reform may be in conflict; Pastor Jr. and Wise note that some actors believe that labor 
reform should emphasize reductions in union power and increased employer flexibility, 
while others view the primary goal as “securing human capital commitments so that 
workers are better prepared to reap the benefits of the market economy.” (Pastor Jr. and 
Wise 1999, 35) Given this diversity of possible approaches to the topic, one could 
question the substantive meaningfulness of the basic statement that labor reform is an 
important second generation priority. 
 
Although the diverse usage of “second generation reform” raises concerns about 
conceptual clarity, the concept does have a basic identity that unifies most perspectives; 
despite the lack of agreement on the policy details of a second generation agenda, most 
versions of the concept share several important features. In particular, the most clear 
delineation of the meaning of second generation reformism can be seen in the several 
fundamental assumptions that underlie the concept: the assumption that the basic 
macroeconomic policies of stabilization and structural adjustment represent a first stage 
of reforms that is necessary but insufficient to provide for sustained economic growth, the 
assumption that these policies must then be supplemented by a set of more narrowly 
targeted government interventions aimed at improving the environment in which 
capitalism operates and ensuring that the gains of growth of distributed to all social 
sectors), and the assumption that attention to the integrity and effectiveness of institutions 
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represents a critical element of this second stage.  While these basic assumptions provide 
coherence to the concept of second generation reform, they also present some concerns as 
the appropriateness of that concept to real life economic liberalization processes.   
  
Questionable Assumptions of Priority and Sequence 
 
The grouping of economic policy reforms first and second stages or generations 
implies both an order of priority and a temporal sequence: first come stabilization and 
structural adjustment, followed by everything else. However, neither this priority 
ordering nor the sequence implied by the first/second generation division has a clear basis 
in theory or in empirical reality.  At the most basic level, stabilization policies are often 
urgently needed in order to ward off imminent or ongoing economic collapse. Beyond 
this, however, there is no obvious reason to assume that the “first generation” 
macroeconomic policies of the Washington Consensus should represent the most 
immediate priorities of would-be reformers. 
This shortcoming is particularly notable in regard to issue of the quality of 
institutions.  The ascription of institutional reform to the “second generation”  suggests 
that it should be addressed following the implementation of stabilization and structural 
adjustment policies. Both theory and historical experience, however, have suggested that 
this is not the case, and in fact the adoption of stabilization and structural adjustment 
policies in the absence of high-quality institutions may lead to their failure.  Manzetti 
(2003) hypothesizes that corruption, collusion, and patronage associated with market 
reform processes that occur under poor institutional conditions will lead to detrimental 
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policy outcomes; corruption undermines property rights, and causes the proceeds from 
privatization to be used for private instead of public gain, collusion between the 
government and private sector allies undermines competition and promotes rent-seeking 
behavior, and patronage leads to inefficient allocation of resources and hinders fiscal 
austerity efforts.  Manzetti observes that the presence of major financial crises following 
economic liberalization appears to be tied to governance shortcomings.  Similarly, Pastor 
Jr. and Wise (1999, 39) note that many regulations typically viewed as part of the second 
generation agenda “should have been part of the first phase” of reform, citing effective 
anti-trust laws as an example. The potential for inadequate regulation and low-quality 
institutions to undermine market reforms suggests that Naím’s two stage view, in which 
“institutional creation and rehabilitation” is enacted following liberalization in order to 
sustain growth, may be inadequate, and that Krueger’s (1999, 4) contention that “[first 
generation reforms’] very success...generates the need for second stage reforms,” is 
questionable. In fact, a flawed governance environment at the time of liberalization can 
potentially distort and undermine the liberalization process itself.  
To some extent, the first/second generation division may be based less on clear 
theoretical or policy grounds than on observation of what actually happened in Latin 
America, with the “second generation” classification being applied to those areas in 
which policy change lagged behind the rapid changes associated with stabilization and 
structural adjustment (a fact which also helps account for the lack of clear and universal 
theoretical divisions between first and second generations, alluded to in the previous 
section). Nonetheless, this suggests that the distinction is of questionable relevance from 
a prescriptive standpoint.  Some observers, acknowledging this problem, have continued 
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to use the first/second generation terminology while arguing that the term should not 
imply any optimal sequence (see Camdessus 1999 and Wolfensohn 1999). However, to 
the extent that a preferable priority or sequence of reforms does exist, the common usage 
of a first/second generation division that is unrelated to that sequence serves only to 
confuse the issue, impeding attempts to discern which reform priorities should be 
implemented immediately in any given case, and which should be delayed or set aside if 
supporting conditions and institutions are not in place. 
  
“Intergenerational” Contradictions 
 
  Beyond implying a sequential order of policy reforms that is of questionable 
prescriptive validity, the first/second generation division overlooks the ways in which 
efforts to implement first generation policies may actively undermine later efforts to 
implement reforms along second generation lines.  The first/second generation division is 
derived from a view that considers the reform process as essentially technical in nature, 
while largely ignoring the politics associated with policy implementation. However, in 
practice, certain political tendencies and strategies frequently associated with processes 
of structural adjustment may create impediments or threats to the pursuit of second 
generation priorities.  In this regard, two main tendencies are crucial: the possible 
association of market reform with the weakening of institutional accountability, and the 
impact of market reform on democratic representation. 
 While the trends and outcomes associated with market reform have varied 
throughout the region, Latin America’s liberalization experience has overall 
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demonstrated that a rollback of the state’s role does not necessarily translate into an 
increase in the accountability and effectiveness of the state.  In many cases, the shrinking 
of the state was accompanied by continued, or possibly even increased, corruption and 
clientelism.   Rapid and sweeping privatization processes, for example, often offered the 
potential for new levels and forms of state capture and collusion.  Market reforming 
leaders also often relied on clientelistic practices to overcome resistance to reform and 
sustain their political support in reform’s aftermath;  the discretionary targeting of social 
spending for political purposes, for example, featured in the strategies of several of the 
most politically successful market reformers.  Naím (1994, 33) has credited the first 
generation of reforms with “rejecting economic policies based on the discretionary 
decisions of poorly trained bureaucrats accountable only to the political bosses who 
controlled their badly paid (but highly profitable) jobs.” Nonetheless, while the rollback 
of the state may have removed some bureaucracy, the ability of largely unaccountable 
political leaders to make discretionary policy decisions to reward supporters and punish 
opponents persisted, and in some cases may have increased.  This weakening of 
institutional accountability and quality runs counter to the main goals of the second 
generation reformist agenda. 
 More broadly speaking, the impact of market reform on the quality and nature of 
democratic representation has implications for the potential implementation of a second 
generation reform agenda.  As Weyland (2004) has noted, while neoliberalism has been 
associated with the survival of political democracy in Latin America, the region’s turn to 
the free market has raised questions for the quality of democracy. The impact of market 
reform on democratic representation has taken several forms. As Hagopian (1998, 106-
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109) notes, the shift toward free market economics undermined existing representative 
ties that had been based on corporatist practices.  Beyond this initial impact, however, 
neoliberalism has also to some extent hindered the formation of new representative ties to 
replace the old ones.  The move toward the free market international and economic 
integration generated constraints on the ability of political leaders to propose, or to 
credibly commit to, alternative economic policies in the face of public dissatisfaction 
(Weyland 2004, 145).  The effective limits on the policy latitude of leaders led to the 
frequent appearance of “policy switches” (Stokes 2001b), in which politicians who have 
won elections campaigning against neoliberalism adopted neoliberal policies upon 
entering office. These tendencies have served to undermine the public trust in leaders, 
and promote perceptions that democratic participation was of limited importance for 
policy outcomes (Weyland 2004, 146), leading to increased political frustration in the 
face of unmet social demands.  Beyond limiting the choices available to leaders and the 
public, some scholars (for example, Roberts 2002) have argued that market reform 
undermines the capacity of social groups to organize in pursuit of economic interests.    
 
The sum of these trends has contributed to situations in which public trust in 
leaders is low, parties are widely discredited and lack strong organizational structures and 
social roots, and high levels of electoral volatility are commonplace.  Under these 
circumstances, democratic accountability serves a primarily punitive function, allowing 
voters to punish incumbent leaders, but often failing to satisfy public demands for 
meaningful representation.  
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The weakening of political parties and of representative ties between the public 
and government, immensely important issues in their own right, are also relevant trends 
for the potential implementation of second generation reforms, due to the character of the 
political challenges associated with those reforms. As discussed earlier, in contrast with 
the first generation, the capacity of reform-minded leaders to promote a second 
generation agenda will depend on their ability to sustain reliable public support, and to 
overcome the resistance of influential interest groups who are disadvantaged by the 
reforms.  The political conditions that follow structural adjustment, however, may lessen 
the capacity of elected leaders to mobilize support for their program.   In an environment 
in which political accountability primarily serves to punish incumbents, the mandates of 
elected leaders are likely to be tenuous, and the patience of their voters will likely be 
short.  
Moreover, in such an environment, the ability of political parties and leaders to 
maintain stable public support and hold together potentially fractious legislative 
coalitions may depend on the ability to buy support via patronage, corruption, and on a 
willingness to circumvent institutional norms (Weyland 1996b). As a result, a situation 
may arise in which those political parties and leaders that have the greatest capacity to 
successfully govern and implement policy are also those with the least incentive to 
implement policies to strengthen institutional integrity and accountability, due to their 
own political reliance on a lack of effective oversight. The emergence of an inverse 
relationship between the reformist inclinations and the governance effectiveness of 
political parties would greatly magnify the already significant obstacles to meaningful 
institutional reform. 
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 In short, while the idea that first generation reforms and second generation 
reforms are mutually supportive may make sense from a strictly policy oriented 
perspective, the inclusion of the politics of reform implementation into the picture calls 
into question this complementarity in some circumstances. To the extent that market 
reforms are accompanied by a weakening of institutional accountability, and to the extent 
that their implementation promotes weaker political representation and electoral 
volatility, the side effects of first generation policy successes may promote second 
generation reformist failures.      
  
 This overview of shortcomings and difficulties associated with the first-
generation/second generation division should not be construed as calling into question the 
importance or validity of the specific, individual policy measures that often fall under the 
“second generation” heading. Attention to distributional concerns, human capital issues, 
effective regulation, institutional quality, and overall good governance can be 
legitimately viewed as key priorities, even if consensus is often lacking on the speficic 
policies required to address those matters. Nonetheless, it is important to that an 
ana;ytical scheme which assumes that policy reforms occur in sequential stages may 
obscure important policy distinctions and political complexities, and may also overlook 
inherent contradictions between reform efforts in the two “stages.” 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout Latin America at the end of the 1990s, a central political question was 
that of the nature of political responses to disenchantment with the outcomes of market 
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reform.  The search for answers for public dissatisfaction in Latin American capitals 
corresponded with a search for an improved set of reform policy prescriptions among the 
international advocates of economic liberalization.   In Argentina, Peru, and Mexico, 
which experienced the boom and decline cycle as strongly as anywhere in the region, this 
question took on particular intensity.  
 
Despite its associated conceptual and practical problems, the idea of a second 
generation reforms served a useful function for certain parties in Latin America.  For 
opposition parties that intended to capitalize on economic disenchantment, but were not 
able or willing to offer a sharp critique of the free market model, second generation 
reformism offered an apparently coherent means of promising improved outcomes 
without proposing drastic changes in economic policy.  In each of the three countries 
studied here, the approach adopted by opposition politicians closely paralleled the 
evolving orthodoxy within the world financial establishment on the appropriate responses 
to the shortcomings of free market policies.  The following chapters examine the specific 
circumstances and trends that led to the adoption of a second generation reformist 
opposition posture in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico
  
 
Chapter 3 - Argentina 
 
  
Introduction 
 
The 1990s were a decade of profound transformation for Argentina at multiple 
levels.  At the level of the political system, the decade was characterized by the 
consolidation of democracy, with the rules of the democratic game becoming firmly 
accepted by all significant political actors.  Economically, the transition was equally 
profound, as Argentina’s state centered development strategy was rapidly dismantled in 
favor of a free market economic model. The results of this shift were initially positive; 
however by the late 1990s, Argentina had fallen into a recession, unemployment had 
reached all time highs, and the public mood was one of discontent, both with economic 
conditions and with the leadership of President Carlos Menem. 
 The 1990s also witnessed significant changes in the nature of Argentina’s party 
system. The governing Peronist party underwent an ideological transformation with the 
adoption of free market policies, and shifted from being a labor-based party centered in 
the urban working class to a clientelistic machine party built around the support of the 
rural poor.  Argentina’s other major party (and oldest party), the Unión Cívica Radical 
(UCR) saw its support plummet as a result of past economic mismanagement and its 
leaders’ submissiveness to Menem. As a result of these changes, the opposition that arose 
to capitalize on the emerging social discontent was a fusion of old and new: a coalition 
consisting of the UCR, which for most of its century of existence had provided 
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representation to the country’s middle class, and FREPASO, a newly formed party with 
social democratic inclinations that had emerged during the 1990s to fill the political space 
generated by the UCR’s rapid decline in support.  The message on which this coalition, 
the Alianza, based its challenge was one of second generation reformism, with an 
emphasis on issues of corruption and governance and only the mildest criticisms of 
existing economic policies.  This approach brought immediate political success; the 
Alianza soundly defeated the incumbent Peronist party in legislative elections of 1997, 
and capped its rapid ascendance with an equally resounding victory in the presidential 
elections of 1999. 
 In this chapter I examine the origin and nature of the Alianza’s formation, 
campaign message, and political victories.  I begin with a brief overview of the most 
important events of the prior administration, and the political and economic context in 
which the Alianza mounted its second-generation reformist challenge.  I describe the 
main strategies adopted during the 1990s by Carlos Menem to maintain electoral support 
while pursuing market reform, and the resulting evolution of the governing Peronist 
party. I then detail the formation and political strategy of the opposition Alianza, and the 
public perceptions and attitudes associated with the Alianza’s message. Finally, I 
describe the election campaign and its outcome. 
 
Argentina in the 1990s 
 
 Argentine politics during the 1990s were dominated by the figure of President 
Carlos Saúl Menem.   Menem’s leadership was central to the restructuring of Argentina’s 
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economy. His influence was equally central to changes in the country’s party system. 
Under his command, his own Peronist party drastically altered its economic ideology, and 
reshaped the nature of the party’s support coalition. At the same time, the UCR’s 
acquiescence to Menem’s policy agenda and proposed constitutional revisions resulted in 
the transformation of the opposition, with the UCR suffering a rapid decline in stature 
and a new third party emerging on the scene.  Thanks to a constitutional change that 
permitted previously proscribed presidential reelection, Menem remained at the helm 
throughout the entire decade.  Although Menem’s attempts to engineer a third term fell 
short, his image and public views of his tenure in office were central to the electoral 
debate during the 1999 campaign, and the second generation reformist opposition relied 
on various forms of anti-Menem sentiment for cohesion. 
 The Menem era, and the deep changes associated with it, succeeded a period of 
hyperinflation and economic crisis.  Raúl Alfonsín, of the UCR, had led the country since 
the 1983 elections that had marked Argentina’s transition to democracy- the first 
elections in the country’s history in which a Peronist candidate had been defeated fairly at 
the ballot box.   Alfonsín’s administration was notably successful in promoting the 
consolidation of a democratic regime, one of his primary objectives. However, his 
government’s performance in the economic realm was far less auspicious, and it was 
these shortcomings that eventually came to dominate voter priorities (McGuire 1995, 
224).   Under Alfonsín, economic growth rates were negative every year, with the 
country’s GDP eventually having dropped 10% by the end of his tenure (Waisman 1999). 
Fiscal deficits surged, and inflation was followed by hyperinflation. A series of 
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stabilization plans failed to forestall economic crisis, and Alfonsín left power with 
Argentina in the midst of economic collapse  
  
Alfonsín’s successor, Carlos Menem, seemed like an unlikely candidate to lead 
the most sweeping economic liberalization process in Argentina’s history.   The 
flamboyant governor of the remote and impoverished province of La Rioja, he had won 
the election based on a campaign that combined a populist style with promises to address 
Argentina’ economic problems by instituting a salariazo (large increase in wages) and a 
“productive revolution,” and to impose a moratorium on payments of the national debt.  
After taking office from Alfonsín, who was forced from the presidency five months early 
in the face of worsening economic crisis and the threat of a breakdown in governance, 
Menem rapidly reversed course, implementing an package of free market reforms whose 
depth and rapidity were without precedent (Teichman 2001, 111) 
During the first few years of his administration, Menem’s policies transformed the 
Argentine economy and the role of the state. Menem quickly moved to privatize most of 
the country’s state-owned enterprises.  By 1994, Argentina’s telecommunications, 
railroad, airline, petroleum, electricity, gas, steel, and defense sectors had almost entirely 
been privatized (Teichman 2001, 111-112), and the estimated total value of privatized 
enterprises had reached $24 billion.  In the course of these privatizations 85,000 workers 
were removed from government payrolls. In addition to selling off state-owned 
enterprises, Menem also drastically reduced subsidies to the private sector, and slashed 
overall government employment by  217,000. Accompanying the reductions in the size of 
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the state were policies to deregulate investments and liberalize prices and exchange rates 
McGuire 1997, 218-219). 
Alongside this drastic liberalization of the Argentine economy, Menem’s 
government launched a similarly dramatic move toward international economic 
integration.  By 1992, Menem’s government had reduced the average tariff rate to 10 
percent, less than a third of the average rate during the mid-1980s.  Non-tariff barriers 
were nearly eliminated as were barriers to foreign investment (McGuire 1997, 219; 
Teichman 2001, 112). 
Despite Menem’s dogged pursuit of economic liberalization, Argentina’s 
economic performance during the first year of his term continued to be marked by 
recession and high rates of inflation, and initial attempts at stabilization were 
unsuccessful (Echegaray and Elordi 2001, 198). The country’s economic turnaround only 
materialized following the implementation of the measure that would come to be viewed 
as the linchpin of Argentina’s new economic model: the currency board scheme of newly 
appointed economy minister Domingo Cavallo. Beginning in March 1991, the exchange 
rate would be pegged at one peso to one dollar, and pesos would be freely convertible 
into dollars.   
The establishment of convertibility brought immediate results.  Inflation 
plummeted, with the annual increase in consumer prices dropping from 84% in 1991 to 
1.6% by 1995 economic growth burgeoned, averaging 8.8% between 1990 and 1994 
(Gerchunoff and Llach  2005, 434-435).  Foreign investment surged, and the country’s 
fiscal picture improved substantially, with the public sector deficit that had averaged 8% 
of GDP during the 1980s dropping to .5% during the 1991-1994 period (Gerchunoff and 
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Llach 2005, 438).  The combination of the elimination of inflation with improved growth 
had important positive repercussions for Argentina’s poor, as evidenced by a 50% drop in 
poverty in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area between 1989 and 1993 (Gerchunoff and 
Llach 2005, 435). 
However, Argentina’s post-convertibility boom was marred by increasing levels 
of unemployment.  Even during the economic expansion that followed Menem’s reforms 
created relatively few new jobs were created: between 1992 and 1994, rates of urban 
unemployment rose from 7% to 12.2 % (Gerchunoff and Llach 2005). As Argentina’s 
economic growth began to falter during the second half of the 1990s, the problem of 
unemployment would continue to worsen, and the government’s inability to reverse this 
trend would become a primary source of public dissatisfaction. 
 
Peronism and Neoliberalism in the Menem Era 
 
 Menem’s sudden conversion to neoliberal orthodoxy posed potentially significant 
problems for his party.  The free market doctrine adopted by his administration 
represented both a dramatic departure from both his own campaign promises and the 
Peronist party’s traditional ideology; which emphasized state-led industrialization 
strategies and Keynesian management of demand (Levitsky 2003, 28).  Neoliberalism 
also was a direct affront to the material interests of the organized urban working classes 
that had provided one of the backbones of Peronist support. Furthermore, Menem’s 
adoption of economic liberalization involved turning for support to groups that had long 
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been viewed as bitter foes of Peronism (most notably by offering top economic policy 
positions to executives of the powerful agricultural conglomerate Bunge y Born).  
 Despite these apparent pitfalls, the PJ maintained strong electoral support during 
the initial years of the economic program.  Following Menem’s assumption of office, the 
Peronist party won a string of victories, not suffering its first election defeat until the 
legislative elections of 1997. The PJ ‘s victory in the legislative elections of 1993 
strengthened Menem’s political position to the extent that he was able to push through a 
constitutional change that permitted his eventual landslide reelection in 1995.  The ability 
of the Peronist party to maintain internal unity and electoral majorities in the face of this 
policy reversal can be tied in part to the initial positive outcomes of Argentina’s shift to 
the market. However, Menem’s electoral success also depended on deliberate efforts to 
target and distribute the benefits and costs of economic liberalization to politically 
strategic groups; this sort of electoral strategy became increasingly central to his party’s 
prospects as Argentina’s economic growth and surging investment eventually gave way 
to stagnation and surging unemployment. 
 Menem’s ability to maintain electoral support in the face of his drastic departure 
from traditional Peronist principles to some extent can be credited to the early successes 
of his economic reforms. In particular, the success of Cavallo’s convertibilty plan in 
controlling inflation provided Menem with a significant and clear accomplishment to 
emphasize in making his case to the public.  While opinion surveys taken in 1990 showed 
that inflation dominated voters’ perceptions of the country’s principal problems, by 1995 
similar surveys showed that the inflation issue had practically disappeared from the 
agenda (Etchegaray and Elordi 2001, 201).  Menem’s success in defeating a problem that 
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had bedeviled the Argentine economy provided him with a considerable measure of 
public sympathy and support, especially when combined with the healthy growth rates 
that Argentina experienced between 1991 and 1994. The high value placed on the 
newfound economic stability ensured that by the end of the 1990s, none of the major 
political parties was willing to propose departure from convertibility as a means to lift 
Argentina from recession.   The defeat of inflation helped build approval among the poor, 
who were most severely affected by hyperinflationary crises; however, economic stability 
also won Menem some support from middle and upper class voters who had previously 
shown little inclination to support Peronist candidates (Gervasoni 1997, 19; Gervasoni 
1998, 14-15; Weyland 2003). 
  
The removal of societal preoccupations over inflation from the political agenda 
provided Menem with a degree of public gratitude and earned him votes from outside the 
PJ’s traditional base of support. However, this achievment eventually resulted in the 
emergence of a “paradox of success,” (Weyland 2003, 174-175) in which the declining 
salience of the issue undermined the PJ’s political strength. As memories of the 
hyperinflation of 1989 faded, concerns over unemployment (which had surged to 
unprecedented levels during economic liberalization) came to the fore; and while Menem 
promised to “pulverize unemployment as [he had] pulverized inflation” (Weyland 2003), 
the new problem proved far less amenable to drastic and immediate resolution.  Even by 
the time of Menem’s reelection in 1995, public approval of the president and his 
economic program had begun to wane, and pessimism about the future had begun to 
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replace optimism (Etchegaray and Elordi 2001, Weyland 2003), a trend that accelerated 
as Argentina fell into recession during the second half of the decade.  
 Beyond broad public approval and support based on demonstrated achievements,  
Menem’s administration relied on a set of strategic choices and favorable conditions that 
reduced the potential impact for internal divisions within the party  and its support base, 
and helped reshaped the Peronist electoral coalition to suit the new political and 
economic realities. During the first year of Menem’s term, when economic improvements 
was elusive, and again during Argentina’s 1996-1999 economic decline, the government 
was unable to rely on majoritarian public satisfaction and optimism as a basis for 
leadership. Under those less favorable circumstances in particular, efforts to maintain 
internal party loyalty and build support via patronage became crucial. 
Along with strategies to co-opt or neutralize potentially troublesome factions 
within the party and its supporting organizations, the PJ’s ability to shift toward 
neoliberalism was based in part on changes within the nature of its support coalition, and 
the main representative mechanisms linking the party to its electoral base.  During the 
1990s, according to Steven Levitsky (2003),  the PJ underwent a shift from  “union 
politics” to “machine politics;” the previous centrality of the shrinking urban working 
class and of unions was supplanted by the creation of territorial political machines based 
on patronage, and on government employment in particular. While Menem’s reforms 
slashed the number of federal government jobs, state employment held relatively steady 
at the level of provincial governments during his tenure (Gibson and Calvo 2000, 40) 
Levels of social spending also dramatically increased during Menem’s tenure, and 
spending was targeted to politically strategic areas (Weyland 1998, Corrales 2002, 210). 
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The PJ’s shift toward a reliance on patronage and public employment as a basis 
for electoral support was accompanied by a shift in the territorial and demographic nature 
of the Peronist electoral coalition.  During Menem’s tenure, the political center of gravity 
within the PJ shifted away from the urban working class, and toward the rural poor.  This 
shift was driven by a number of factors beyond the overall decline of the organized labor 
as a political force.  The socioeconomic disparity between the urban and industrialized 
centers and the impoverished interior, combined with the greater importance of the state 
as a source of employment in the provinces, meant that that the use patronage was far 
more cost-effective as a means of obtaining political support in the provinces than in the 
cities.  In addition to the disproportionate devotion of state resources to rural sectors,  
Gibson and Calvo (2000) have found that the social effects of economic reform were 
distributed in such a way that initial costs of market reform were concentrated in 
metropolitan areas, while the rural and informal sectors tended to benefit from those same 
reforms. Bambaci et al. have noted that Menem’s economic liberalization, while 
sweeping, nonetheless allowed for the maintenance of “illiberal enclaves” that shielded 
politically important constituencies from economic pain (with the lack of fiscal reform at 
the provincial level being a key example); they argue that the perpetuation of these 
enclaves, rather than representing setbacks to market reform were essential to 
liberalization’s success (Bambaci et al. 2002).  Peronist electoral strength in the interior 
was further bolstered by Menem’s ability to form alliances with provincial conservative 
parties (Gibson and Calvo 2000, 38).  Beyond providing votes for Menem’s eventual 
reelection, the increased centrality of the PJ’s rural support strengthened the party’s 
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position in the legislature (and in particular, in the Senate), due the disproportionate 
representative weight given to the interior in Argentina’s federal system. 
 Finally, a significant element in the PJ’s ability to maintain public support amid a 
turn to neoliberalism was the persistence of Peronist political identity. The strength of 
partisan attachments to the Peronist label has been sufficient to provide PJ governments 
witha “floor” of support (usually estimated at around 30%) that is largely unmoved by 
changes in economic performance and unchanged by shifts in party ideology and policy 
positions (Levitsky 2003, 65; Gervasoni 1998, 6; Ostiguy 1997, 21-22). As the volatility 
of the opposition vote in Argentina during the 1990s attests, no other political party in 
Argentina enjoyed a remotely comparable base of loyal support. 
.  
These strategies and conditions allowed Menem and the Peronists to maintain  
much of their electoral strength in the context of a sharp turn toward neoliberalism.   By 
1997, however, significant complications emerged in the political panorama facing the 
PJ. The overall decline in economic performance and public optimism had translated into 
a sharp drop in Menem’s approval ratings.  No longer benefiting from a reserve of public 
gratitude for economic stability, the PJ was forced to rely more strongly on clientelism 
and partisan identity.  As a result, their electoral coalition came to depend more on the 
voters attracted by those factors; in particular, poorer voters in the country’s rural 
interior.  
 
Menem’s approach to governing also had costs for his image, in the form of 
constant corruption scandals that accompanied his tenure. From the beginning of his  
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Menem had made extensive and largely successful efforts to undermine the effectiveness 
and independence of oversight institutions (Manzetti 2003, 337-340). Argentina’s 
privatization process was riddled with corruption that was so blatant that it was widely 
obvious even in the absence of official oversight. The profile of the corruption issue was 
raised by the country’s aggressive investigative journalists, notably Horacio Verbitsky, 
whose account of the administration’s corruption (Robo para la Corona), became a best-
seller (Manzetti 2003, 340). The range of corruption scandals associated with Menem’s 
administration included money laundering, bribery, kickbacks, and illicit arms trafficking 
(Waisbord 2004). During the early years of Menem’s term, public concerns over 
corruption were muted by more urgent priorities, inflation in particular. As inflation 
faded from the list of top concerns and the economy weakened, public tolerance for 
corruption dwindled, and by the end of the decade the issue was one of the three most 
commonly cited in polls assessing Argentina’s top concerns (along with crime and, above 
all, unemployment).  The impact of reports of official wrongdoing was intensified by 
Menem’s penchant for a luxurious, often apparently frivolous lifestyle. Several specific 
events also elevated the profile of the corruption issue; in particular, the resignation of 
Domingo Cavallo in 1995 over complaints about corruption in the privatization process 
(Manzetti 2003), and the murder of journalist and photographer José Luis Cabezas while 
investigating a businessman with close ties to the government.  
 
This unfavorable environment was accompanied by internal division within the 
Peronist party. Despite his growing unpopularity, Menem maintained his intention to run 
for a third term in 1999, and began attempting to lay the groundwork for a reelection 
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effort following his party’s defeat in the elections of 1997.   Over the following months, 
factions sympathetic to Menem clashed with adherents of the heir apparent to the party’s 
leadership, Buenos Aires governor Eduardo Duhalde; internal rivalries within the party 
also led to spending races at the national and provincial level that worsened the country’s 
fiscal standing (Corrales 2002a, 2002b). The weakly routinized party structures and 
immense personal authority of the president, which had been crucial to maintaining 
partisan unity and policy momentum during the initial implementation of market reform, 
became a severe hindrance to the party’s internal cohesion and electoral prospects as 
Menem attempted to cling to power. 
In the face of massive resistance to his reelection bid, both within the PJ and 
among the public as a whole, Menem’s efforts to manipulate his party and the Argentine 
judiciary into allowing him to retain the presidential nomination eventually failed. Not 
until May 1999, six months before the election, did the party nominally unite around 
Duhalde. The internal tension between Duhalde and Menem continued to fester 
throughout the campaign, with the president’s support for his party’s nominee often 
appearing questionable at best.  As a result, Duhalde faced a difficult electoral picture – 
alongside deep public discontent with economic conditions,  his campaign was hampered 
by internal conflicts generated by Menem’s desire to maintain unquestioned leadership of 
the PJ. And, despite his conflicts with Menem, Duhalde still faced the problem of being 
negatively associated with the deeply unpopular leader in the public mind.   
Argentina’s troubled Peronist leadership also faced a resurgent opposition. One 
source of opposition came from a previous ally,  Domingo Cavallo, who had broken with 
the administration following Menem’s administration, launching accusations of 
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corruption, and was now campaigning for president at the head of a personalistic political 
party .  While not a realistic contender for the presidency, Cavallo’s campaign offered the 
potential to contest the PJ’s claims of credit for economic stability, and threatened to 
draw away some right-leaning voters from upper economic sectors that Menem had 
attracted to the party in 1995. 
The primary opposition, however, was the Alianza, a coalition of the two parties 
that had split the anti-Menem vote in the 1995 elections, and had recently united to hand 
Menem his first electoral defeat in the legislative elections of 1997.  
 
 
Argentina’s Opposition: The Alliance for Work, Education, and Justice 
 
The alliance between the venerable UCR and the newly formed FREPASO 
resulted from a mix of common principles and political convenience.  Both partners in 
the coalition shared a prior emphasis on issues of governance and democratization, a fact 
that promoted the adoption of those issues as a central electoral theme.  However, both 
parties also displayed strong internal divisions, and the relationship between the two was 
always uneasy; in part because of ideological diversity, and in part because of differences 
in the nature of the two parties that created inherent inequities and tensions within the 
coalition.  As such, the primary force that held the Alianza together was opposition to 
Menem’s personal leadership, and a shared belief that cooperation was the means to 
achieving effective opposition in the prevailing political context.  In order to illustrate the 
nature of the coalition and the origins of the political message that it successfully rode to 
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power, it is necessary to briefly examine the profile and historical background of each of 
the coalition’s partners. 
 The Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) had its origins in the late nineteenth century.  
The UCR initially emerged to contest the exclusionary nature of Argentina’s turn of the 
century political system, which was entirely dominated by the agricultural oligarchy.  Its 
support base consisted primarily of urban professionals, small business owners, and some 
dissident members of the rural elite (Ollier 2001, 30; McGuire 1995, 205). The UCR’s 
initial strategy was one of armed insurrection.  Amid growing pressure for reform and 
openness, Argentina’s conservatives enacted a series of electoral reforms in 1912 that led 
to increased voter participation and promoted fair and transparent vote-counting.  As 
Argentina’s political system opened, the Radicals shifted their approach from violence to 
party building, and triumphed in the 1916 elections under Hipolito Yrigoyen, one of the 
party’s founders.  From this point on, every elected President in Argentina has been either 
a member of the UCR or the Peronist party (McGuire 1995, 224). 
 In 1930, amid growing political conflict and the onset of the Great Depression, 
Yrigoyen was overthrown by the military.  During the decades that followed, Argentina 
oscillated between free elections, restricted or unfair elections, and outright military rule.  
The Radical party remained at the forefront of politics throughout this period, while 
suffering substantial internal divisions; among them, the victory in unfair elections of 
1931 and 1938 of dissident UCR candidates with the backing of conservative parties, and 
a split in the late 1950s between factions led by the left-leaning Arturo Frondizi and the 
more conservative and anti-Peronist Ricardo Balbín (McGuire 1995, 213; Ollier 2001, 
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34). Throughout this tumultuous period, the UCR in its various forms maintained its 
identity as the primary representative of the country’s middle class. 
 With the transition to democracy of 1983, the UCR entered a new era.  In the first 
elections following the military’s abdication of power, and in the midst of economic 
crisis, Raúl Alfonsín soundly defeated the Peronist candidate, Italo Luder.  Alfonsín 
represented a left-leaning and more mobilizational wing of the party, and had obtained 
the nomination by defeating the centrist Fernando De la Rúa (who was closely linked to 
Balbín), in a primary.  The contest between De la Rúa and Alfonsín foreshadowed a 
similar battle over the leadership and direction of the party that emerge during the late 
1990s. 
With Argentina emerging from the shadow of military rule, Alfonsín’s strong 
showing owed much to perceptions that he, and his party, would be a stronger advocates 
for democratic consolidation than the Peronists (McGuire 1995, 221).  Alfonsín largely 
met public expectations in this regard; despite his eventual decision, under military 
pressure, to offer amnesty for most of the human rights violations committed by 
Argentina’s military, by 1988 the public still gave Alfonsín high marks for promoting 
democratic stability and human rights (McGuire 1995, 228).  However, the economic 
failures of Alfonsín’s government overshadowed his democratic successes, leading both 
to defeat in the legislative elections of 1987, and the presidential elections of 1989.  In 
1989, the UCR candidate, Eduardo Angeloz, promised a shift of course toward economic 
liberalization and away from Alfonsín’s heterodox approaches (McGuire 1997,  215); 
voters instead opted en masse for the populist appeals of Carlos Menem. 
 81
 With Menem’s policies producing positive initial results,  relative perceptions of 
the UCR’s capacity for economic management reached low point during the early 1990s. 
The UCR then went on to discredit itself further in the public eye by apparently 
abdicating their role as opposition party.  The decision by the UCR to not contest 
Menem’s economic policy (understandable, in light of public support for the president 
and the government’s recent victory) was followed by Alfonsín’s agreement with Menem 
on a set of principles for constitutional reform that would allow the President to pursue 
reelection.  While Alfonsín had managed to elicit significant concessions on presidential 
power in exchange for legalizing reelection, the deal was nonetheless viewed by many as 
an abdication of the role of political opposition and as a surrender to Menem’s hegemonic 
inclinations. 
The impact of this agreement – dubbed the “Pacto de Olivos,” after the 
presidential residence in the Buenos Aires suburb of the same name – was immediate and 
dramatic.  In the ensuing presidential election of 1995, the UCR fell to an all time low in 
support, with its candidate, Horacio Massacessi, winning just 17% of the vote, For the 
first time in its history, the UCR had failed to finish among the top two contenders in a 
presidential election.  Supplanting the UCR as the second force in the presidential 
election  - and making significant inroads into the UCR’s traditional middle class base - 
was a newly formed party: the Frente Grande, soon to become known as FREPASO 
(Frente por un Pais Solidario) (Fidanza 1997, Gervasoni 1997). 
  
FREPASO’s origins stemmed from divisions within the Peronist party following 
the accession of Menem.  In 1990, a group of eight leftist leaders within the PJ, alienated 
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by Menem’s sudden shift toward free market orthodoxy, formed a dissident bloc within 
the party. Among this “Group of Eight” was Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez, then a young 
legislator from Buenos Aires, who would eventually become one of FREPASO’s two 
most prominent leaders, and the vice-president in the Alianza government that took office 
in 1999.  Later that year, Menem’s decision to provide amnesty to military leaders 
accused of human rights violations impelled the dissident faction to break with the 
Peronist party entirely (Ollier 2001, 24).  From this early stage, the party demonstrated a 
dual preoccupation with critiques of orthodox neoliberalism, and emphasis on issues of 
governance and democracy.   While criticism of the free market economic model initially 
was the central focus, over the next few years, the governance theme would increasingly 
supplant the economic message in the party’s rhetoric (Novaro and Palermo 1998, 
Ostiguy 1997, 28).   
 Initial results for the new party in the elections of 1991 were unimpressive 
(Novaro and Palermo 1998, 90) Between 1991 and 1995, the emerging center-left bloc 
incorporated other representatives from Argentina’s two main parties, as well as various 
smaller parties and independent movements. In 1993, the new force adopted the name 
“Frente Grande,” and ran in legislative elections; their modest showing of 14.8 in the 
capital was sufficient to earn the young party three seats in the national legislature. 
 The party’s electoral fortunes and national profile soon received an enormous 
boost in the form of the Pacto de Olivos.  The agreement between Radical leaders and the 
Menem government provided the Frente Grande with both a clear mission - opposition to 
Menem’s hegemonic tendencies  - and also provided the party with a set of disaffected 
voters. The party’s performance in ensuing elections clearly demonstrated the extent to 
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which the anti-Peronist opposition vote had been splintered. In 1994, the Frente took 13% 
of the vote in elections for a constituent assembly to reform the constitution, and reached 
36% of the vote in the city of Buenos Aires (Novaro and Palermo 1998, 94). That same 
year, Álvarez formed a political alliance with another disaffected Peronist, José Octavio 
Bordón, and the party adopted the FREPASO label.  Bordón won an open internal 
primary election to become FREPASO’s presidential candidate in 1995. FREPASO’s 
29% in that election vaulted it well ahead of the Radicals, who fell to their worst ever 
showing. Following the election, conflicts with the party’s leadership led Bordón to 
abandon the party and to return to the PJ ranks; despite this, FREPASO retained much of 
its newfound stature and positive public image. 
 
Despite their rapid ascent to the head of the Argentine opposition, FREPASO 
faced several obvious weaknesses during the late 1990s.  Their party’s support was 
concentrated heavily in middle class sectors within the city and suburbs of Buenos Aires, 
and they had little national presence (Novaro and Palermo 1998, 125); even in their 
breakthrough election of 1995, at the subnational level FREPASO was only able to win 
control of a single municipio, while the UCR captured five governorships and 461 
municipios (Ollier 2001, 65).   In the wake of the UCR’s decline, some opposition 
support in the country’s interior had migrated to provincial parties rather than to 
FREPASO.  The party also suffered from a serious structural disadvantage relative to the 
country’s two major parties – in the place of organization and institutions, FREPASO 
relied largely on the media to build and maintain its public profile, and its appeal was 
based largely around the personalities of its major leaders; in particular, Chacho Álvarez 
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and Graciela Fernández Meijide, a human rights activist whose son had been 
“disappeared” during the military regime (Novaro 2002, 40-43; Ollier 2001;  Malamud 
2005). In the eyes of many, FREPASO had successfully completed an early period of 
“easy” development; but the strategies and assets to reach that point would likely be 
insufficient to increase the party’s vote much further (Novaro 2002). 
Concern over these weaknesses was heightened by the results of the 1996 
elections for chief of government of Buenos Aires, in which the FREPASO candidate 
(Socialist Norberto LaPorta) was soundly defeated by the UCR’s Fernando De la Rúa. De 
la Rúa was one of the prominent Radicals that had retained credibility and stature by 
opposing the Pacto de Olivos, and had a well established public image as a leader. These 
factors tended to neutralize two of FREPASO’s most important advantages: the stature of 
their leaders and their association with contestation of Menem’s hegemonic tendency.  
The ability of the UCR to defeat FREPASO on what should have been the newcomers’ 
most favorable turf (the capital) cast doubt on the ability of the new party to consolidate 
itself as the primary opposition force in advance of the upcoming national elections for 
the legislature and the presidency.  
The UCR, meanwhile, faced problems of its own   In addition to their victory in 
Buenos Aires, the party had made something of a comeback elsewhere in the country, 
performing well in some provincial elections.  However, despite having partially revived, 
the UCR still was saddled with negative public perceptions.  The economic failures of 
Alfonsín’s tenure still generated persistent distrust of the Radical’s ability to govern 
successfully. At the same time, the party’s acceptance of the Pacto de Olivos continued to 
reflect poorly on the party’s credibility and commitment to opposition.  The UCR also 
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faced major internal divisions – in particular, over the degree to which the party should 
adhere to Menem’s free market policies – that threatened their ability to unify around a 
successful opposition campaign. In the views of many Radicals, the slight recovery 
following the 1995 debacle represented only a temporary deactivation of persistent 
problems. (Novaro 2002, 47). 
 
Given the circumstances facing Argentina’s two opposition parties, discussion of 
an alliance was inevitable.  Those discussions began shortly after the elections of 1995.  
The prospect of a UCR-FREPASO alliance held clear potential benefits for both parties, 
as it addressed their major needs.  For FREPASO, an alliance with the Radicals would 
immediately provide institutional structure, mobilizational capacity, and national 
presence, the absence of which whose absence had impose a ceiling on the party’s rise.  
For the Radicals, unification with FREPASO would renovate their party’s faded image as 
a source of credible opposition, and allow them to piggyback onto the messages that had 
fueled FREPASO’s rapid rise to prominence.  
At the same time, serious obstacles existed to the creation of such an alliance, and 
the nature of the two parties raised major questions about the cohesion and sustainability 
of such a coalition once formed. Significant ideological differences existed, both between 
the two parties, but also within the parties themselves. Moreover, the differing 
organizational capacities and strategies of the two parties ensured that any marriage of 
the two forces would be unequal, with the UCR’s institutional strength and national 
presence giving it an advantage in internal political contests. As a result of this concern, 
some members of FREPASO believed that the party should continue to develop on its 
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own, rather than incorporate into a coalition where it would be a disadvantaged partner.  
However, most of the party’s leadership – and Chacho Álvarez in particular – concluded 
that the immediate concern with providing an effective opposition to Menemism was of 
utmost importance, and that the only way to accomplish this goal was with an alliance of 
the center-left.  
In August of 1997, two months before legislative elections, the two parties agreed 
to join forces in most of the country (in some provinces where the UCR had maintained 
considerable strength, the two parties remained independent). Dubbed the Alliance for 
Work, Education, and Justice (or “Alianza”), the new coalition immediately became the 
top contender for the upcoming poll.  The election results confirmed this perception, as 
the Alianza won a substantial victory, defeating the PJ by 46 to 36 percent, and ending 
the PJ’s string of six consecutive election victories.  The Alianza extended their victory 
into territory that had been considered Peronist strongholds, most notably with the victory 
of Graciela Fernández Meijide in elections for senator from the province of Buenos 
Aires.  The rapid and clear success of the Alianza coalition represented the first true 
electoral defeat that Menem had suffered since taking office, and temporarily quieted 
many of the internal doubts over the wisdom of the coalition agreement. However, 
serious tensions remained beneath the surface, and would come to the fore on several  
occasions during the period leading up to the presidential elections of 1999. 
 One potential source of conflict was the selection of the coalition’s presidential 
candidate.  In the aftermath of her Senate victory, Fernández Meijide was the clear 
frontrunner for FREPASO, and led in national opinion surveys (Novaro 2002, 56); 
however, the Radicals also presented a formidable potential candidate in De la Rúa.  With 
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the formation of the Alianza, both sides agreed that the presidential formula would be 
decided by means of a primary election to be held in November 1998.  After a campaign 
characterized by emergence of intra-coalition tensions (with Álvarez at one point 
accusing De la Rúa’s administration in Buenos Aires of “structural corruption” (Novaro 
2002, 69) the Radical candidate triumphed in the elections by a wide margin, obtaining 
63% of the vote.  The election result was widely viewed as consequence of the 
superiority of the UCR’s political machine over the weakly institutionalized FREPASO, 
and highlighted internal inequities within the coalition. The formula would consist of De 
la Rúa and Álvarez as presidential and vice presidential candidates, with Fernández 
Meijide relegated to the position of candidate for the governorship of the province of 
Buenos Aires.  
  
Origins of the Alianza’s Message 
 
A prominent concern faced by the UCR and FREPASO – both separately and in 
their alliance - was the nature of their proposed opposition alternative to Menemism.   In 
particular, throughout the 1990s the parties of the Alianza were constantly preoccupied 
by the question of whether and to what extent the opposition should promise changes 
from Menem’s free market economic policies.   This question was a source of 
disagreement within each party: in both FREPASO and the UCR, some factions believed 
that the central focus of opposition should be an attack on the negative consequences of 
the economic model such as unemployment and exclusion, with a shift of economic 
policy as a proposed remedy; others preferred to deemphasize economic critiques, or to 
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explicitly promise economic policy continuity, believing that the opposition’s central 
focus should instead be governance-related issues of honesty, integrity, and 
accountability. Over time, the governance-centered critique attained clear ascendance in 
both the Radical and FREPASO discourse; as such, it also formed the heart of the 
message adopted by the newly created Alianza. 
 For FREPASO, the movement from an economic policy critique to a governance-
centered critique began relatively soon after the party’s initial foundation, and was driven 
to a great extent by the responses of the party’s top leaders and their advisers to 
immediate political conditions and election results, rather than by the ideological 
principles of the party’s activists and component organizations. The initial impetus for 
FREPASO’s formation was rejection of Menem’s economic policies; the emergence of 
the dissident “Group of Eight” was a direct response to the perception that Menem’s 
sudden shift to neoliberal orthodoxy was a betrayal of genuine Peronist principles.  
Governance issues had also played a role in the party’s early identity, particularly with 
regard to the issue of human rights; Menem’s offer of amnesty for human rights abuses 
helped trigger the dissidents’ formal break from the party.  However, the central focus of 
their message was a criticism of Menem’s shift to neoliberalism, and their strategy 
revolved around the idea that such a criticism would draw support from Peronist voters 
who had become disaffected as a result of this shift. 
    The early electoral results generated with this message, however, were decidedly 
meager.  Within a year after their break with the PJ, it was clear to the leaders of the new 
opposition movement that attempts to draw away Peronist voters discontented with 
market reforms were not bearing fruit (Ostiguy 1997, 27; Novaro and Palermo 1998, 97-
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98).  With Argentina’s economy displaying impressive levels of stability and generating 
increased public optimism, it appeared unlikely that attacks on the economic model 
would suffice to elevate the new party to the head of the opposition.  At this juncture, the 
Pacto de Olivos offered the Frente a new opportunity, as it opened up space for a new 
opposition force to fill the representative space left by the Radicals’ abdication of a 
forceful opposition role.   However, the typical UCR refugee, rather than being motivated 
by opposition to the economic model, was instead a middle class voter opposed to 
Menem’s autocratic and apparently corrupt style of governance. (Gervasoni 1998; 
Novaro and Palermo 1998, 107) 
 As a result of the failure of their initial approach, and the opportunities presented 
by the Pacto de Olivos, between 1993 and 1995 the Frente Grande experienced  a 
significant change in their political rhetoric and a dramatic improvement in their electoral 
performance.  By 1993, the Frente’s main leaders had acknowledged the public’s 
favorable inclinations toward the country’s newfound economic stability, and adopted a 
measured tone when criticizing the economic policies of Menem’s government.  Reacting 
to the public mood, in 1993 Chacho Álvarez went as far to assert that “Even this stability 
with social injustice is preferable to instability.” (Novaro and Palermo 1998, 95). This 
shift toward accommodation with Menem’s market reforms exacerbated some internal 
tensions within the party, leading to the departure in 1994 of one of the Frente Grande’s 
founders, Fernando “Pino” Solanas, who was an advocate for more traditional leftist 
economic ideology. 
 In  place of economic policy critiques, Álvarez’s discourse increasingly 
emphasized “liberal democratic and  republican values like transparency, subjection to 
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the law, and balance of powers.” (Novaro and Palermo 1998)  The main target of this 
message were not the disaffected Peronists that the Frente had initially set out to 
represent, but discontented Radical and independent voters, particularly from the middle 
classes. (Novaro and Palermo 1998, 96; Ostiguy 1997, 28).   Polls showed that the 
attitudinal characteristics of Frente Grande voters reflected this change; voters for the FG 
were associated more strongly with institutional and ethical issues than with rejection of 
market reform (Novaro and Palermo 1998, 107). The combination of FREPASO’s 
change in tone and the discontent generated by the Pacto de Olivos had immediate 
electoral repercussions, and the clarity of the links between the Frente Grande’s new 
message and its strong performance in the 1994 constituent assembly and 1995 
presidential elections tended to defuse the internal conflicts created by the ideological 
shift (a tendency evidenced, for example, by the relatively scant number of supporters 
that accompanied Solanas in his departure from the party) (Ollier 2001; Novaro and 
Palermo 1998, 95).  
By the time of the formation of the Alianza, FREPASO’s dominant political 
identity revolved firmly around issues of governance.  The social democratic discourse 
that had accompanied the party’s formation persisted, but with less emphasis.  For 
activists and lower level leaders in the party’s component organizations, socioeconomic 
issues retained primary importance, and the party’s shift away from these issues 
generated concerns (concerns that were only partially and temporarily assuaged by 
electoral success) (Novaro 2002, 45). However, FREPASO’s structure allowed its top 
leaders considerable autonomy from these activists and groups, and  offered them a great 
deal of flexibility in crafting a message to appeal directly to voters via the media (Novaro 
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2002, 43). As a result, internal divisions regarding FREPASO’s newly pro-market stance 
did not did not significantly impede the party’s shift toward a governance-entered 
reformism.   
 
Within the UCR, the question of the preferred nature of the anti-Menem 
alternative was similarly significant. During the Menem era, the UCR was divided into 
two camps in terms of economic policy ideology. A faction favoring a return to more 
statist economic policies was headed by Raúl Alfonsín. On the other side, Alfonsín’s 
previous and future eventual rival for party leadership, De la Rúa, was associated with the 
most conservative wing of the Radical party, favoring adherence to free market policies 
and objecting more to the to the method of implementation of Menem’s reforms than the 
content (Novaro 2002, 47).  The UCR displayed a similar division at the level of the mass 
electorate.  The UCR vote included a substantial sector committed to traditional state-
centered prescriptions, while another segment of the party’s voters supported the basic 
precepts of liberalism (Novaro and Palermo 1998, 105). As was the case for FREPASO, 
the tendency that supported economic policy continuity and emphasized governance 
gained ascendance during the 1990s. 
Both of these tendencies within the UCR had substantial historical roots.  The 
Radical concern with governance issues can be traced back to its origins: Andrés 
Malamud (2005) notes that the founders of the UCR, Leandro N. Alem and Hipolito 
Yrigoyen “conceived of their political mission as a crusade on moral values and 
administrative transparency, rather than as the pursuit of substantive policies.” This 
discourse, with its emphasis on so-called “civic republican” values, would remain part of 
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the UCR’s identity throughout its history, later serving in part as a vehicle for appeals 
based on socioeconomic and cultural divisions between Peronists and Anti-Peronists. 
(Ostiguy 1997).  From the late 1920s on, the UCR also adopted economic positions that 
were generally statist and populist in nature.  The extent to which the Radicals should 
take up leftist positions was a source of division for the party for much of the 20th 
century; however, by the 1980s, the mainstream view of the party accorded closely with a 
state-centred and inward focused economic strategy that Carlos Waisman (1999) 
characterizes as “neomercantilism.”  
Raúl Alfonsín’s successful campaign for the presidency in 1983 embodied both 
the civic republican and neomercantilist tendencies of his party. Alfonsín’s surprising 
victory over the Peronists can be traced in part to perceptions of the UCR’s greater 
commitment to democratic norms. Despite his eventual decision, under military presure, 
to offer broad military amnesty in human rights cases,  in general Alfonsín’s efforts to 
promote democratic stability were viewed as successful.  By contrast, the disastrous 
consequences of his heterodox approach to Argentina’s economic crisis cast the UCR in a 
negative light both in terms of their economic policy ideology and in terms of basic 
managerial competence.   Following the UCR’s defeat in the 1989 presidential elections, 
the party faced an internal division over to what sort of posture to adopt in response to 
Menem’s economic and political measures.  In the 1995 elections, the UCR maintained 
its official opposition to the peso-dollar convertibility, but in the aftermath of the election 
most Radical leaders accepted the plan (Levitsky 2001, 63).  
 This struggle for preeminence within the UCR was affected profoundly by 
Alfonsín’s decision to affirm the Pacto de Olivos.  The association of Alfonsín with the 
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pact lowered his stature relative to those Radical leaders who had opposed the agreement. 
Among those who opposed the Pacto, the most clearly “presidenciable” was De la Rúa, a 
representative of the party’s conservative wing.  The rivalry between De la Rúa and 
Alfonsín  throughout the 1980s and 1990s paralleled the divisions within the UCR over 
economic ideology, with De la Rúa representing a posture of adherence to free market 
norms and an emphasis on the UCR’s civic republican ideals, in contrast with Alfonsín’s 
economic leftism.  De la Rúa’s decision to oppose the Pacto, followed by his success in 
the 1996 elections for mayor of Buenos Aires placed him at the head of the possible UCR 
presidential candidates for 1999, and helped shift the party’s economic posture in a 
centrist direction.  
 
The Alianza’s Second Generation Reformism 
 
Given this parallel evolution of FREPASO and the UCR toward a second-
generation reformist discourse, the eventual message adopted by the Alianza was 
predictably similar in nature.  Despite the presence of leaders and factions within both 
parties that were disposed to a more radical critique, the Alianza’s economic message 
stressed that the party would not challenge the main elements of Menem’s free market 
revolution: peso-dollar convertibility, privatization, and international economic 
integration.   
The new coalition’s commitment to the existing economic model was made clear 
shortly after the Alianza’s formation, and prior to their first electoral victory.  Several 
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days after the initial announcement of the Alianza agreement, José Luis Machinea, the 
coalition’s future economy minister, declared to the press: 
 
We agree to maintain the privatizations, the economic opening, obviously 
with fiscal equilibrium, and with convertibility. Not because we believe that it is 
the best model in the world, but because any attempt to change course would 
create more costs than benefits  for the country (Seman 2000, 67)... no one is 
disposed to return to disequilibrium in public accounts, to close the economy, or 
to expand the state.  (Clarín, Aug. 7 1997) 
 
The following month, at a conference of the Argentine Industrial Union in Bariloche, 
during a debate with economic policy figures from other parties, Machinea explicitly 
agreed that the main reforms of Menem’s administration would not be challenged.  
Machinea went on to assert, however, that “90 percent of the second generation reforms” 
(Clarín,  Sept.19 1997) still awaited completion.  
The degree to which the Alianza’s position represented a consensus with the main 
outlines of Menem’s structural adjustments and offered a second generation reformist 
agenda comes across clearly in the two major official policy documents of the Alianza: 
the “Carta a los Argentinos,” a statement of the Alianza’s policy positions put forth by 
the Coalition’s five most important leaders in October 1998, and El Gran Cambio, a 
summary of the electoral platform for the 1999 presidential ticket of De la Rúa and 
Álvarez, produced by the Instituto Programática de la Alianza.   
In regard to the convertibility plan, the Carta a los Argentinos declares that “as 
part of the effort to maintain stability, the Alianza is resolved to maintain convertibility,” 
and asserts that price stability is an essential condition of any economic policy intended 
to improve the quality of life of Argentines. Similarly, El Gran Cambio praises the 
positive effects of the convertibility plan in terms of fiscal discipline and macroeconomic 
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stability, and declares that “the Alianza is committed to defending the value, internal and 
external, of our currency.”  In reference to privatization, the Carta a los Argentinos 
asserts that  “the Alianza considers juridical security essential, and thus will respect the 
privatizations.” El Gran Cambio makes no reference to revising existing privatizations or 
resisting future ones, promises that the Alianza will respect all of the state’s contracts, 
and simply states that an absence of state enterprises is an insufficient condition for 
growth.  On the issue of international trade, the Carta a los Argentinos promises that “the 
Alianza will consolidate integration into international trade,” while El Gran Cambio 
argues that there is no question of “whether Argentina needs more or less opening to 
international trade; more or less foreign investment. Argentina needs more of both 
things.” Both documents strongly and repeatedly stress the party’s commitment to 
promoting exports as central to the country’s development; El Gran Cambio cites a 
doubling of exports as a goal.   
Absent from the documents is any significant proposal to increase the size or role 
of the state.  To the extent that the official policy statements offer any criticisms of the 
fundamental elements of Argentina’s neoliberal shift, they tend to consist of claims that 
reform was implemented imperfectly; in other words, that the benefits of free market 
reform depend in part on how that reform is accomplished. In its discussion of economic 
integration, the Carta a los Argentinos states that “globalization is not the problem, but 
rather how we respond to the challenges that it presents.” This general tone exemplifies 
the Alianza’s reaction to economic liberalization:  in place of questioning whether or not 
liberalization should occur, the party’s rhetoric calls attention to the method by which it 
has between has been pursued. Alongside this essentially accommodating response to 
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structural reforms of the previous decade, the Alianza’s manifestos present the party’s 
own socioeconomic agenda in two general ways: as a series of extravagant promises of 
improved social and economic performance, and as a set of limited (and often very 
vague) policy proposals along second generation reformist lines.  The promised outcomes 
are ambitious: the Carta a los Argentinos announces that the Alianza government intends 
to achieve a 6% unemployment rate, and an annual growth rate of 6%,  and an investment 
rate of 30% of GDP, while El Gran Cambio promises that an Alianza government will 
move Argentina into the top 20 countries worldwide in rankings of human development. 
The Alianza’s proposals for how to achieve these goals consist of a recitation of 
the priorities associated with the second-generation reformist agenda. El Gran Cambio 
describes the role of a state in the market economy as essentially involving market 
completing (in Pastor Jr. and Wise’s terminology) functions: “The state will play a role of 
utmost importance, perfecting the functioning of markets, assuring their transparency, 
making them more competitive, and in doing so, making them more efficient.” The Carta 
a los Argentinos formulates the state’s role similarly:  
 
“The private sector should maintain its primordial role in investment. 
Confidence and credibility are needed to fortify private initiative.  For this it is 
necessary to...guarantee juridical security, preserve macroeconomic equilibria, 
and create a long term horizon of predictability.” (Carta a los Argentinos) 
 
 
According to this view, the primary role of the state is not as an active participant in the 
economy, but rather as a neutral and efficient enforcer of laws and regulations, a guardian 
of competition, and a guarantor of macroeconomic stability.   
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Beyond this minimalist conception of the state’s role, the Alianza’s official policy 
statements do promise a government role in encouraging certain economic changes; in 
particular, promoting increases in exports, and bolstering the competitiveness of small 
and medium enterprises relative to larger firms.  As is the case with many of the 
Alianza’s proposed policy goals, the exact means by which these ends are to be achieved 
are left vague. 
In accordance with second generation reformist prescriptions, both the Carta a los 
Argentinos and El Gran Cambio emphasize the importance of the “human capital” issues 
of education and health care.  The Carta a los Argentinos devotes over 1,800 words to a 
section on education, making it second in length only to the section on economic 
development among the major issues mentioned in the document, and describes 
education as a “central element of the transition.” Despite this emphasis on the topic, the 
party’s manifestos do not present a clear picture of how their approach to education 
would differ from that likely to be taken by the incumbent government.    As in other 
socioeconomic policy areas, the Alianza’s proposals with regard to education generally 
take the form of generic promises of improvement (with few specifics on how those 
improvements will be achieved), as well as proposal of additional programs (with little 
indication of where the resources to fund the new programs will come from). Promises on 
the topic of health care are similarly ambitious and unspecific.  In substantive terms, the 
manifestos do mention a general problem of health care and educational funding being 
spent disproportionately to social priorities and need; however, they offer little detail as 
to where and how funds would be reassigned. 
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 Some policy areas provide exceptions to this pattern of sweeping promises and 
vague proposals. For example, both El Gran Cambio and the Carta call for a greater 
degree of reliance on progressive tax structures to meet the country’s fiscal needs, a clear 
and somewhat politically risky statement of policy intentions.  
Nonetheless,  a more typical - and particularly indicative- example is El Gran 
Cambio’s description of the Alianza’s policies with regard to labor market issues.  
Employment was a central preoccupation of the Argentine public during the 1999 
campaign, and was one of the three goals included in the Alianza’s name. “Full 
employment” is the first of the main goals outlined in El Gran Cambio however, the 
policy proposals intended to achieve this goal are predictably sparse. El Gran Cambio 
begins by attacking the contention that unemployment is an unavoidable consequence of 
globalization and the need to maintain investor confidence. In supporting the claim that 
Argentina can move beyond this tradeoff, the document cites four main factors: An 
overall strategy for ensuring economic growth, strengthening of regional economies, 
expansion of infrastructure, and support for small and medium enterprises. The first three 
of these pillars are fairly neutral goals, rather than policy positions (few political parties 
would be opposed to economic growth, stronger regional economies, or improved 
infrastructure), while a method by which an Alianza government would bolster small and 
medium enterprises to such an extent that they could have a significant impact on overall 
employment rates is never plausibly outlined. 
When the document moves on to discussing labor relations as a factor in 
employment, its vagueness appears calculated. The document notes that economic 
development needs to be “accompanied by labor relations that harmonize with the 
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proposed objectives.” In terms of actual policy reforms, the only description provided is 
that “modernization of labor legislation should consist of the elimination of norms that 
impede or make difficult the adaptation of production to new technologies and the 
conditions of the global market.” Despite the centrality of this policy area to the 
Argentine political context, El Gran Cambio does not mention which norms would be 
eliminated, or what changes would be made in labor law.  This notable omission may 
reflect a belief that the specific policies generally associated with labor in the second 
generation reformist agenda (in particular, flexibilization measures) would prove 
unpalatable to much of the Alianza electorate– a belief validated by public opinion 
surveys3. 
To some extent, the reliance of the Alianza’s programmatic materials on  
repetition of promises rather than substantive policy statements reflects a problem 
inherent to the idea of second generation reformism itself: the fact (discussed in the 
previous chapter) that many second generation reformist prescriptions consist of little 
more than statements of desired policy outcomes,  rather than clear mechanisms for 
achieving those goals. (Navia and Velasco 2003). However, notable absences, such the 
lack of explicit statements as to how health and education funding might be reallocated, 
or which labor regulations would be altered,  suggest that the party’s aversion to clear 
policy proposals also may have represented a desire to avoid indicating in advance who 
the likely winners and losers would be under an Alianza government.  Rather than spell 
out how the Alianza would resolve the difficult tradeoffs involved in making economic 
policies amid tight fiscal constraints, their rhetoric often relied on assertions that the 
                                                 
3
 In an April 1999 survey by Romer, prospective Alianza voters disagreed by 40%-27% with the assertion 
that labor market flexibilization would reduce unemployment. 
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perceived tradeoffs were (as El Gran Cambio puts it) “false options,” that could be in 
large part resolved by a change in the style of governance. 
In this regard, one of the commonly employed rhetorical gestures by which the 
Alianza’s manifestos attempt to bridge the gap between the extravagance of promised 
results and the relatively limited nature of the policy proposals meant to achieve them is 
the assertion that more attention to the quality of institutions, and the integrity of 
governance, would produce improved results (even within a relatively similar policy 
framework). In keeping with the second generation reformist tone of the Alianza’s 
message, references to the importance of institutional quality and governance abound 
throughout their manifestos.  The Carta a los Argentinos describes the fundamental task 
of the Alianza as “organizing the nation as a modern democratic republic.” The opening 
section of the document includes a promise that every executive appointee will declare 
their wealth and income to be registered in a public database, as well as a broader 
promise to “restore the independence of powers.”  The introduction identifies the main 
failings of the Menem administration’s tenure as fundamentally economic and social in 
nature, citing difficulties in obtaining stable and well paid employment, and inequality of 
opportunities in access to social services.  However, the letter ascribes these inequalities 
not to a flawed economic strategy, but rather primarily to weaknesses of governance: in 
addition to unequal educational opportunities, the culprits mentioned are the unequal 
influence of interest groups on public decisions, a weak and inefficient state, and 
corruption.  An improvement in the quality of governance and institutions, then, is 
expected to lead to improvement in social welfare and standards of living. This broad 
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claim that quality of governance is linked to socioeconomic outcomes recurs throughout 
the discussions of specific policy areas in both of the Alianza’s manifestos. 
In sum, the Alianza’s policy statements contain few clear and explicit statements 
of socioeconomic policy proposals. To the extent that clear policy promises exist, they 
generally involve declarations of support for the fundamental outlines of Menem’s 
structural reforms.  Statements describing the Alianza’s purported changes of policy 
primarily consist of promises of improved performance and emphases of the priority 
placed on policy areas fitting the second generation reformist agenda, with only vague 
indications of how those goals and priorities will be attained.  Institutional and corruption 
issues are stressed throughout; those issues are depicted as a priority in their own right, as 
well as representing an ostensible means to improved socioeconomic outcomes. 
 
The 1999 Presidential Campaign 
 
The Alianza’s acceptance of the neoliberal model and emphasis on governance 
issues were reflected in the party’s overall discourse throughout the 1999 campaign. At a 
meeting of economists in May 1999, Machinea reiterated the promise to maintain 
convertibility (Clarín, May 12 1999). Later that month, following a sudden drop in the 
Argentine stock market and comments by George Soros that the peso was overvalued, De 
la Rúa joined Menem and Duhalde in declaring that altering peso-dollar parity was off 
the table (Clarín, Sept. 22 1999). Concerned about possible associations with the 
instability of the previous Radical government, De la Rúa continued to press this point in 
his campaign; declaring in a June speech in La Rioja “I maintain, one peso, one dollar. I 
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maintain, I am stability,” and later appearing in a commercial to pronounce the same 
unequivocal message: “With me, one peso, one dollar.” The Alianza was similarly 
forthright in its approach to the issue of privatization. In a joint declaration in April, De la 
Rúa and Álvarez reaffirmed their commitment to the privatization of public services, but 
criticized the method by which Menem’s privatizations had been undertaken, promising 
stronger regulations and greater defense of consumer interests (Clarín, Apr. 3 1999).  
While the Alianza’s leaders drew attention to the issues of poverty and social 
exclusion during the campaign, they mostly refrained from specifics about how those 
problems would be addressed, instead relying on promises of a higher standard of 
government. In their campaign messages, the Alianza maintained their tendency to argue 
that improvements in the quality and efficiency of governance offered the solution to 
Argentina’s problems.  In May, responding to an interviewer’s question of how the 
Alianza could deal with the country’s fiscal shortfalls without provoking negative social 
reactions, Machinea criticized a recent cut in the education budget, and instead argued 
that the problem could be addressed by reducing inefficient and unnecessary bureaucracy 
and fighting tax evasion. (Clarín, Apr. 9 1999).  In a June 12 statement, De la Rúa linked 
increases in poverty to Menem’s corruption, arguing that corruption had led Menem to  
make decisions in favor of powerful interest groups (Clarín,  June 13 1999). At an April 
rally in San Juan, after calling attention to the social shortcomings of Menem’s tenure, 
Álvarez described De la Rúa’s promise as founded on “a new type of leadership” based 
on honesty and transparency, and touted the challenger’s “strength and energy so that the 
weak have a moral referent and the playing field is not tilted toward the powerful.” De la 
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Rúa, according to Álvarez, would “lead by daily example, and not sell paradises like the 
‘salariazo’ and the ‘productive revolution.’” (Clarín, Apr. 18 1999).  
 
Observers of the Argentine campaign of 1999 invariably characterized the 
Alianza’s message as one that stressed primarily continuity with existing economic 
policy, emphasized issues of corruption and accountability to draw distinctions between 
the opposition and the incumbent party, and promised improved socioeconomic outcomes 
not on the basis of a shift in economic strategy, but rather as a result of better 
government. Isidoro Cheresky notes that in 1999 “the economy was not a theme of 
significant differentiation” (Cheresky 2003, 33) and characterizes the Alianza’s message 
as “limited to formulating a minimal promise of moralization of public life and of generic 
improvement in standards of living.” (Cheresky 2003, 22)  Similarly, according to 
Marcos Novaro, the differentiation between the inncumbent and challenger was “focused 
on corruption;” and while socioeconomic issues (like unemployment and unequal access 
to education) were discussed during the campaign, these issues never became significant 
points of distinction between opposition and government (Novaro 2002, 63).Hernan 
Charosky describes the Alianza’s message as one of “rupture plus continuity,” with the 
former involving “an attitude toward administrative transparency and institutional 
legality,” and the latter involving the continuation of an economic policy based on peso-
dollar convertibility (Charosky 2002, 204).  A prominent newspaper commentator 
summed up De la Rúa’s promise as simply “the same as Menem, minus corruption.”4 
Aside from the observations of outside political analysts,  a series of interviews with 
political analysts, pollsters, and insiders connected to the Alianza and the 1999 election 
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revealed unanimous agreement with this depiction of the Alianza’s message as continuity 
in the economic realm combined with promised changes in governance. 
 The Alianza’s emphasis on governance issues over economics as a means of 
differentiation,  and its substitution of promises of clean government for clear policy 
proposals,  were reflected in the attitudes and perceptions of the Argentine public. Public 
opinion polls taken during the 1999 campaign demonstrated that the improved image the 
Alianza enjoyed over Duhalde and the current government was in large part a result of 
perceptions of corruption. For example, in a survey taken in July 1999 by Catterberg & 
Asociados5 in the traditionally Peronist stronghold of the province of Buenos Aires, 
voters identified Duhalde over De la Rúa by clear margins as the candidate with greater 
understanding of the problems of the public (46%-21%) and as offering a program of 
government with concrete solutions (37%-29%). De la Rúa, however, enjoyed a 
substantial advantage on the question of honesty (43%-25%). This was enough to 
translate into a one point lead in vote choice in the same poll.  A similar pattern appears 
in a nationwide survey taken by Estudio Graciela Römer in April of 1999: De la Rúa was 
cited by 38% of respondents as possesing the most “honesty and strength against 
corruption“of any candidate, compared to 23% for Duhalde.  When asked which 
candidate would best be able to create jobs, respondents chose Duhalde by 35% to 31%. 
Other nationwide surveys revealed a similar pattern. (Clarín, July 11 1999, Clarín, Aug. 
31 1999). 
 These attitudinal patterns carried over into vote choice, with the Alianza 
performing strongly among voters who were preoccupied with issues of corruption. In the 
April 1999 Römer poll, voters who believed that honesty and strength against corruption 
                                                 
5
 Data provided by Alejandro Catterberg 
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was the most important characteristic for the new president supported De la Rúa by 55% 
to 38%, while those who were most concerned that new president possess an ability to 
create jobs favored Duhalde by 48% to 40%.  The 10.1% of respondents that viewed 
corruption as the single most important problem facing the country were nearly three 
times as likely to vote for the Alianza as the PJ, supporting De la Rúa by 56.6% to 18.9% 
over Duhalde (who fell to third place behind Cavallo among those voters). Among the 
50.5% of the public who considered unemployment the single most important problem 
the race was far closer, with De la Rúa leading Duhalde by 48.9% to 41.5%. The 
Alianza’s deemphasis of economic policy differences, and its reliance on governance 
issues to distinguish itself from both Menem and Duhalde, clearly resonated with 
Argentine voters, who viewed the corruption issue as De la Rúa’s biggest strength, and 
for whom concern over corruption was linked to support for the opposition. 
 
While not representing as dramatic a transformation as the Peronist party’s 
adoption of neoliberal orthodoxy under Menem, the Alianza’s conciliatory posture 
toward the free market nonetheless was a considerable departure for a coalition that 
consisted of a long-existing party traditionally associated with “neomercantilist” 
economic strategies (Waisman 1999, 103), and a new party that owed its original 
formation largely to internal Peronist divisions over Menem’s shift to neoliberalism and 
whose component organizations and activists predominantly hailed from the left side of 
the political spectrum.. The Alianza’s adoption of this second generation reformist 
posture was not entirely smooth.  In defining the Alianza’s message, conflicts emerged 
between the old rivals Alfonsín and De la Rúa; Alfonsín, initially named head of the 
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Instituto Programática de la Alianza, favored policy positions and ideologues allied with 
the traditionally leftist and populist sectors of his party, while De la Rúa (along with 
Álvarez) leaned toward policy makers and principles with more of a pro-market bent. The 
dispute was eventually resolved with Alfonsín’s decision to resign both from the IPA and 
from the process of formulating the party’s program (Novaro 2002, 64; Semán 2000).   
The Alianza’s centrist positioning also moved the party well away from the 
preferences of most of FREPASO’s activists and lower-level leaders (Novaro and 
Palermo 1998). While FREPASO’s top leaders displayed a tendency to support De la 
Rúa’s relatively conservative postures (Novaro 2002, 69), there were limits: for example, 
when the idea of naming hardcore neoliberal Ricardo López Murphy to the economy 
ministry was floated by De la Rúa, Graciela Fernández Meijide rejected him as “worse 
than Roque Fernández” (Menem’s economy minister at the time). (Pousadela 2003, 143) 
Despite these frictions, in the course of the campaign, the relative autonomy of the 
Alianza’s leadership, combined with the short term electoral pragmatism of both leaders 
and supporters, ensured that any internal divisions were insufficient to impede the 
Alianza’s firm adoption of a second generation reformist message 
 
To the extent that any major candidate offered campaign promises to address 
economic discontent by altering the economic model, it was Eduardo Duhalde, despite 
his role as the candidate of the governing party and heir of Menem’s  reforms.  In contrast 
with the Alianza’s message, Duhalde centered his appeal on questions of poverty and 
exclusion, and offered criticisms of Menem’s economic policy far more audacious than 
anything the Alianza dared to propose (Novaro 2002, 63). Although Duhalde promised to 
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maintain convertibility and respect prior privatizations, he nonetheless presented himself 
as an advocate of a new economic model, a strategy that served as a means of distancing 
himself from the unpopular president. While primarily involving rhetorical gestures and 
symbolic appeals, Duhalde’s promises of economic change also included some specific 
proposals. In June of 1999, Duhalde triggered a minor furor by suggesting a moratorium 
on the payment of Argentina’s foreign debt (Pousadela 2003, 145). In late August, 
Duhalde put forth an economic plan that proposed a pact between labor and business, a 
yearlong guarantee against firings,  and cuts in the value added tax, among other 
measures (Clarín, Aug. 30 1999). In his efforts to broadcast an economic message in line 
with traditional Peronist rhetoric, Duhalde in a May 21 speech criticized Menem for 
failing to make good on his 1989 promise of a “salariazo,”  and on another occasion 
expressed pride at having originally helped formulate Menem’s 1989 campaign 
statements on the coming “productive revolution” (Clarín, May 22 1999). While not 
proposing to overturn the main reforms of the Menem administration,  by invoking the 
populist promises that Menem had made in his 1989 campaign and later abandoned,  
Duhalde nonetheless attempted to return his party’s message to themes that had 
predominated prior to Menem’s conversion to neoliberalism. In a September 25 speech, 
Duhalde argued forcefully that Peronism had departed from its roots, attacking:  “those 
that believe that Peronism should be the party that speaks for multinational corporations” 
and “those that believe in an empty Peronism, without commitments or doctrine.”  
(Clarín, Sept. 26 1999) 
 In effect, both Duhalde and De la Rúa attempted to adopt the mantle of  
”change” (Clarín, May 30 1999) and to link their opponent to the unpopularity of the 
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Menem administration.  During the early days of the campaign, both the De la Rúa and 
Duhalde campaigns centered their appeals around opposition to Menem’s intention to run 
for a third term; only after Menem’s reelection efforts had clearly fizzled did the two 
contending parties turn their the bulk of attacks toward each other. Even then, it was clear 
that Menem represented a foil for both sides (although Duhalde’s position was more 
complicated, given his need to maintain support from Menem’s loyalists as well as 
differentiate himself from the unpopular aspects of Menem’s tenure).  In addressing a 
massive rally at the conclusion of his campaign on October 21, Duhalde directly attacked 
the Alianza’s preference for continuity:  
 
”On Sunday, there will be many Argentines trying to express their 
dissatisfaction. They will want to change the government. But the Alianza doesn’t 
want to change anything. We are the change.”  (Pousadela 2003, 134)  
 
While both the candidate of government and the candidate of opposition raised 
the banner of change, the nature of the proposed change differed greatly.   The Alianza 
promised that a change in the quality of government would produce improved results 
even with only minor policy changes, while the candidate of the ruling party proposed a 
more fundamental change of course in economic policy. This pattern came to the fore 
throughout the campaign. In May, Graciela Fernández Meijide argued that Duhalde 
would represent little more than continuation of Menem’s corruption, referring to him as 
“the same dog in a different collar.” (Clarín, May 29 1999). In October, Duhalde adopted 
the exact same expression to characterize the Alianza, in this case arguing that the 
Alianza’s economic policy was simply an extension of Menem’s model. (Clarín, Oct.11 
1999).  In August, Duhalde proposed that the two parties adopt an “ethical pact,” and 
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treat corruption as a “question of government” rather than a partisan issue; but the 
Alianza’s leaders refused to adopt any sort of consensus approach (Pousadela 2003, 146), 
and later floated the threat that an Alianza government would investigate corruption in 
Duhalde’s administration of the province of Buenos Aires (Clarín, Sept. 11 1999).  In 
each case, the candidates were intent on maintaining their ability to draw distinctions in 
the issue area in which they believed they could most effectively separate themselves 
from the unpopular incumbent; for the Alianza the distinction revolved around corruption 
and governance, while for Duhalde it revolved around economic policy.   
 
In the end, the Alianza’s version of “change” triumphed by a wide margin at the 
polls (Table 3.1).  In the election, held October 24,  De la Rúa obtained 48% of the vote, 
well above the threshold necessary to avoid a runoff election;  Duhalde drew 38%, with 
Cavallo  managing 10%. While not unexpected, the size of the Alianza’s victory was 
notable given the fact that a Peronist government had never before been defeated at the 
polls. The Alianza’s presidential victory was broad and sweeping, with De la Rúa and 
Álvarez winning in 19 out of 23 provinces, as well as the capital. Only in two provinces 
did Duhalde win by more than two points, including a 60%-32% triumph in Menem’s 
home province of La Rioja (a possible indication of the extent to which Duhalde, despite 
his best efforts, remained identified with the administration of his predecessor).    
Although the Alianza dominated in the presidential election by capitalizing on the 
Argentine public’s widespread distaste for Menem, this success did not translate into 
similar dominance at the subnational level. Although the Alianza attained a slim majority 
in the lower house, the Peronists maintained a majority in the Senate, and retained the 
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governorships of crucial provinces – most notably the province of Buenos Aires, where 
Graciela Fernández Meijide was defeated by the Menem’s former vice-president Carlos 
Ruckauf,  after a particularly ill-tempered  campaign. While the Alianza’s performance in 
the presidential election provided a clear indication of the public’s appetite for change, 
their relatively weaker showing elsewhere on the ballot suggested that much of their 
support did not represent durable partisan loyalty, and the persistence of opposition 
strength in the legislature and provincial governments would pose significant future 
problems for the Alianza’s eventual administration.  
 
Table 3.1-Argentine Presidential Election, Oct. 1999 
Candidate % 
Fernando De la Rúa (Alianza) 48.5 
Eduardo Duhalde (PJ) 38.1 
Domingo Cavallo (AR) 10.1 
Other 3.3 
  
 
Chapter 4: Peru 
 
Introduction 
 
Political competition in Peru during the 1990s took place in an environment in 
which political parties had receded as important actors, and politics was dominated by 
individuals.   In the other two countries examined in this study, the campaign messages 
and partisan identities of incumbent parties and their second generation reformist 
challengers emerged through a combination of historical legacies and contemporary 
influences; in Peru, by contrast, political organization and political loyalties in the era of 
market reform were largely improvised and impermanent. Within this context of weak 
and fragmented representative institutions, the figure of President Alberto Fujimori 
dominated political life.   
Within five years after taking office, Fujimori and his administration imposed a 
sweeping and rapid package of market reforms, controlled inflation, put down a brutal 
insurgent movement that had paralyzed the country,  and installed a new constitution. 
The style of governance that accompanied these achievements was openly autocratic, a 
tendency most forcefully demonstrated by the 1992 autogolpe in which Fujimori 
disbanded the Congress and adopted dictatorial powers. Fujimori’s dominant position 
was confirmed and reinforced by his overwhelming reelection to the presidency in 1995. 
By the midpoint of his tenure, the continuing marginalization of opposition parties, the 
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executive’s extensive capacity to employ state resources for political purposes, and the 
president’s personal popularity presented a daunting challenge to potential opponents.  
Shortly after Fujimori reached the zenith of his power, two trends emerged that 
would debilitate the regime’s image and set the stage for the political battle of the 2000 
elections. First, the economic picture began to sour, as growth and optimism were 
replaced by economic stagnation, growing unemployment, and public disenchantment. At 
the same time, Fujimori initiated efforts to pursue a constitutionally prohibited second 
reelection; the openly abusive and undemocratic elements of this campaign provoked 
widespread public disapproval.  The opposition that eventually emerged to challenge 
Fujimori in 2000 attained viability largely due to discontentment with economic 
conditions and the employment situation; yet, the opposition refrained from challenging 
the specific economic policies that had produced those outcomes, instead focusing its 
criticisms on the institutional shortcomings and undemocratic aspects of the Fujimori 
administration. The following chapter examines the basis and evolution of pro-Fujimori 
and anti-Fujimori sentiment in Peru during the 1990s, and outlines the process by which 
the opposition alternative in the 2000 elections took shape. 
 
Failed Leadership, Party System Weakness, and the Rise of Fujimori 
 
 Alberto Fujimori came to power in a context of economic crisis, party system 
collapse, and rampant political violence. In the ten years since the restoration of 
democracy, Peru’s two presidents had resoundingly failed to produce sustainable 
economic growth or economic stability. During the first two years of the term of 
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Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985) of the centrist Acción Popular party, the 
implementation of orthodox stabilization programs produced a restrained recovery, with 
the country’s GDP registering respectable growth rates of 4.4 and 4.5 percent (Pastor Jr. 
and Wise 1992, 90). The recovery faltered in 1982, and  in 1983 the economy contracted 
by 12% (due to multiple factors, including the effects of El Niño and a surge in political 
violence). By the end of Belaúnde’s term in 1985, the country’s GDP per capita was 
significantly below its 1980 level, and real wages had declined by approximately 35% 
(Kenney 2004, 22; Pastor Jr. and Wise 1992, 91).   
 In the aftermath of the failure of orthodox approaches, Belaúnde’s succesor – 
Alan García, of the populist Alianza Popular Revoluciónaria Americana (APRA) opted 
for a heterodox approach involving price, exchange rate, and interest rate controls, wage 
increases, and reduced debt service. Again, initial results were positive: growth rates in 
1986 and 1987 were 9.5 and 7.8 respectively, inflation declined, and average wages 
increased significantly (Pastor Jr. and Wise 1992, 90-94). Once again, the recovery was 
short-lived; the economy contracted by 13.9% in 1988 and 19.2% in 1989, and inflation 
exploded, reaching 2775% in 1989. An ill-advised effort to nationalize the banking sector 
only worsened matters. By 1990, real wages had fallen to less than half of their 1980 
levels (Pastor Jr. and Wise 1992, 94). 
 Along with their economic failures, Peru’s two post-transition governments failed 
to curb an extremely violent and rapidly growing internal insurgency. The Maoist 
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement, which had maintained a low profile since 
its founding in 1970, exploded on the scene with a series of attacks that led to the deaths 
of dozens of soldiers and civilians. In 1983, the group’s violent activities (primarily 
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directed at civilians) produced a total death toll of 2,807 among insurgents, security 
forces, and noncombatants; the death toll peaked in 1984 at 4,319. Insurgent violence 
subsided somewhat in the following years, but returned to its previous high levels at the 
end of the 1990s. (Kenney 2004, 26) 
 The economic and security failures of the Belaúnde and García administrations 
exacted severe costs on their support, and contributed to an overall breakdown in 
democratic representation. Both Belaúnde and García saw their approval ratings plummet 
from over 70% to under 30%. Their parties suffered a similar decline; in 1985, Acción 
Popular’s percentage of the vote for the lower house of Congress fell to 8.4% (from 
38.9% in 1980), and the incumbent party failed to field a presidential candidate. In 1990, 
APRA’s congressional vote, which had reached 50% in 1985, fell to half of that level, 
and its presidential candidate failed to qualify for a second round runoff. The precipitous 
declines of the two governing parties were paralleled by an overall decline in the party 
system. The country’s two important center and right parties, faced with declining 
support, combined forces with a personalistic movement dedicated to economic 
liberalism and headed by author Mario Vargas Llosa; the alliance, named FREDEMO 
nominated Vargas Llosa as its presidential candidate in 1990. At the same time, a leftist 
alliance which had gained close to a third of voter support in 1985 and 1986 splintered 
due to internal divisions, leading to a sharp decline in support for both of its main 
factions. The dramatic failures of the two major parties catalyzed a tendency toward 
increasing disconnection between parties and citizens that had emerged as a result of 
demographic changes and the breakdown of corporatist modes of representation.6 
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 For additional discussion of the collapse of the Peruvian party system, see Cotler (1995), Tanaka (1998), 
and Kenney (2004, 39-77) 
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Overall, the percentage of Peruvian voters identifying as “independent” rather than 
expressing party loyalty reached 80% by October 1990 (Kenney 2004, 47) 
 Under these circumstances, the 1990 presidential election was contested between 
two outsiders. Vargas Llosa, at the head of FREDEMO, argued that economic 
liberalization provided the only solution for Peru’s woes, and led in surveys of voter 
preferences for much of the campaign. His eventual opponent, Alberto Fujimori, was a 
political unknown; the son of Japanese immigrants, and engineer, and a university rector, 
he ran at the head of an improvised electoral movement known as Cambio (Change) 90. 
Despite his low public profile, Fujimori benefited from perception that he was an 
apolitical, or anti-political outsider. His slogan called for “honesty, technology and 
work,” and he avoided making clear policy proscriptions or ideological statements; the 
only significant exception to the overall programmatic emptiness of his campaign was his 
pledge to avoid the free market shock therapy being proposed by Vargas Llosa.  
Fujimori further benefited from his ethnic background.  His Japanese heritage, 
while not common, distinguished him from the essentially European political elite, and 
Asian immigrants generally had a positive reputation as hardworking and productive. 
Accordingly, the candidate was able to present himself to the public as a chance to elect 
“un presidente como tú”  (a president like you).  Fujimori also benefited from clandestine 
assistance from Alan García , who employed APRA’s clientelistic networks on 
Fujimori’s behalf in the hopes of weakening internal rivals within his own party 
(Cameron 1997; Levitsky and Cameron 2003, 7). Bolstered by this support, Fujimori 
edged into the runoff by taking second place; once established as a national figure, he 
trounced Vargas Llosa by 56.5 to 33.9% in the second round. 
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Fujimori in Power 
  
Fujimori took office having offered little more to the public than vague populist 
and anti-political rhetoric, along with a promise to avoid neoliberal structural adjustment. 
The personalistic nature of his campaign ensured that his party fared far worse in the 
legislature than in the presidential race; only 22 percent of the elected senators and 17 
percent of deputies were members of Cambio 90 (Cameron 1997, 49). Lacking a strong 
policy mandate and in a weak legislative position, the new president quickly adopted two 
tendencies that would define his presidency: a shift in favor of rapid, radical economic 
liberalization, and an authoritarian approach to governance. 
 Almost immediately following Fujimori’s election, it became clear that the 
president had opted to abandon his campaign promises and opt for an IMF sponsored 
austerity and structural adjustment program. Fujimori’s limited legislative support posed 
some potential problems for this policy shift; in addition to APRA and the parties of the 
left, market reforms were opposed by a significant faction within his own party (Kenney 
2004, 127). With legislative support for his policy agenda being uncertain and conditional 
at best, Fujimori decided to largely ignore his party, and to continue his attacks on 
political parties and the political system as a whole.  
Instead of seeking legislative allies, Fujimori opted to forge links with the 
military. Three of his initial cabinet ministers were drawn from the Armed Forces, and 
one was from the state intelligence service (the SIN) (Kenney 2004, 127).   On the day of 
his inauguration, Fujimori replaced the generals of the navy and air force with loyal 
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supporters, and one year later introduced legislation giving the president tighter control 
over the appointment of top military officers (Cameron 1997, 52). Throughout the first 
years of his term, Fujimori bolstered his support within the Armed Forces and attempted 
to remove officers who were viewed as disloyal. The primary link between the president 
and the military was the head of the SIN, Vladimiro Montesinos. Montesinos, a lawyer 
and former officer,  had become an indispensable advisor and associate of Fujimori 
during the 1990 campaign, when he assisted the then candidate with a defense against tax 
fraud allegations (Cameron 2006, 272-274). After assuming office, Fujimori relied on 
Montesinos and the SIN to “co-opt and control the armed forces.” (Cameron 1997, 21; 
Obando 1998, 199-200). Fujimori’s efforts to fortify ties to the military were in part 
defensive; via Montesinos, he had been warned of military plans for a possible coup prior 
to his inauguration. However, the cultivation of the military also represented an effort to 
develop a base of support outside of the political system in the absence of reliable 
legislative backing. 
While consolidating his control of the Armed Forces, Fujimori forged ahead with 
efforts to pursue drastic market reforms.   In August 1990, shortly after assuming office, 
Fujimori announced a package of harsh austerity policies; colloquially refereed to as the 
“Fujishock,” the adjustment measures included a devaluation and tax increases, and 
resulted in up to a 3000% increase in the prices of basic necessities (Weyland 2003, 116; 
Olarte 1993). When these measures failed to curb inflation, Fujimori turned to the 
orthodox neoliberal economist Carlos Boloña as economy minister in February 1991 
(Wise 2003b, 185), and launched a massive program of structural reforms that included 
liberalization of trade, deregulation, large scale privatization of state owned enterprises, 
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and reform of the tax system. The immediate effects of this program were an increase in 
unemployment, a drop in wages, and a persistent recession (Olarte 1993); however, 
inflation was brought under control, an achievement that would prove key to Fujimori’s 
popularity (Carrión 2006).  Aside from its economic outcomes, the switch to neoliberal 
orthodoxy helped enable Fujimori to add important elements of the business and financial 
elite to his base of supporters; alongside the military, these economic elites would be a 
pillar of his support until late in the decade.  
Fujimori’s initial reforms did not encounter substantial legislative hurdles, in part 
because the largest party in the legislature was the pro-liberalization FREDEMO. 
However, beginning in the second half of 1991, relations between the legislature and the 
executive began to worsen, as APRA adopted an increasingly confrontational posture, 
and the legislature displayed resistance to Fujimori’s demands for enhanced powers. 
Fujimori responded by continuing his attacks on the political class and politicians in 
general. In April 1992, matters came to a head when Fujimori, with the backing of the 
armed forces, announced the dissolution of Congress and the Supreme Court and claimed 
the ability to rule by decree.  Fujimori justified the coup in general terms by arguing that 
the current political class was incapable of preventing “chaos and corruption,” and did 
not identify with the interests of the nation (Kenney 2004, 204).  The most specific 
justification for the autogolpe (self-coup) was the need to pursue firmer measures against 
the still rampant Sendero Luminoso insurgency. Regardless of its justification, the coup 
was overwhelmingly popular- 80% of the public supported the action (Kenney 2004, 
206), and the president’s approval rating increased from 53% to 81 % (Carrión 2006, 
129).  
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Having won widespread public support with his assumption of dictatorial powers, 
Fujimori quickly produced several concrete accomplishments to back up his promises. In 
September 1992, antiterrorist police arrested Sendero Luminoso leader Abimael Guzmán 
in a Lima safe house. Over the next few months, nineteen out of twenty two members of 
the Central Committee of Sendero Luminoso were also captured. The loss of its 
leadership greatly debilitated the organization; by 1994, the number of Sendero attacks 
had dropped to its lowest level since 1981 (Degregori 1997, 189-190). Fujimori’s 
triumphs in the realm of security were accompanied by economic improvement; 
beginning in 1993, the economy returned to strong rates of growth (6.4% in 1993 and 
13.1 in 1994) and foreign direct investment boomed, while inflation remained low (Wise 
2003a, 185). 
Despite Fujimori’s dramatic victories following the coup, his government faced a 
pressing need to return to something resembling democratic politics. At the time of the 
coup a strong majority of Peruvians indicated that they would withdraw their support for 
Fujimori’s action if he failed to make good on his promise to restore democratic 
institutions within eighteen months (Kenney 2004). Perhaps more significant was 
external pressure from the United States and the international financial institutions, who 
warned that a failure to return to democratic procedures could lead to a cutoff of aid, 
loans, and investment (Cameron 1997, 67-68). As a result of these imperatives, the 
government  initiated efforts to sustain Fujimori’s powers within the context of electoral 
competition. The centerpiece of these efforts was the promotion of a new constitution. 
In 1992, elections were held for a constituent assembly. The 1992 elections 
further weakened the already tottering traditional party system. With Fujimori’s prestige 
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at an all time high and his attacks on the political class resonating with the majority of the 
public, the major traditional parties boycotted the 1992 Constituent Assembly elections. 
Fujimori’s movement captured 44 out of 80 seats in the assembly (Cameron 1997, 67), 
and a total of 85% percent of the vote went to either Fujimori’s own supporters or 
independent candidates (Levitsky and Cameron 2003, 9).  The constitution that the 
assembly eventually produced allowed for presidential reelection and expanded the 
powers of the presidency; it also eliminated the Senate, creating a unicameral assembly. 
In general, the new constitution represented a strengthening of executive and majoritarian 
powers (Weyland 2006, 24). The constitution was narrowly adopted by 52%-48% in a 
nationwide referendum in October 1993 (Schmidt 2000, 103). 
 Having secured the right to run for reelection, Fujimori turned his attention to the 
elections of 1995. Although the president’s popularity had remained consistently high, 
the constitutional referendum of 1993, along with municipal elections that same year, had 
suggested a weakening of support for Fujimori among the poorer and more rural districts 
of the country’s interior. Fujimori’s government, flush with the revenues of privatization 
and economic growth, launched extensive programs of social spending in politically 
important areas. Authority for dispersing the bulk of the spending was concentrated in the 
newly created Ministry of the Presidency, allowing Fujimori and his inner circle 
considerable discretion in the allocation and targeting of funds.  Armed with these 
clientelistic resources, Fujimori’s government effectively rebuilt the president’s support 
among the poor prior to the election (Roberts and Arce 1998, Kay 1996). 
 Given the weakness and overall discrediting of the political parties, opposition 
hopes for the 1995 election predictably coalesced around a high profile individual: former 
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United Nations Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar. Pérez de Cuellar was a highly 
respected figure, and was considered by many to be the only candidate capable of 
defeating Fujimori (and enjoyed a lead over Fujimori in some preliminary polls, although 
he quickly fell behind once the incumbent began campaigning in earnest). Pérez de 
Cuellar accepted the nomination of a new party, the Union por el Perú, which had been 
created the previous year; he distanced himself from the traditional political parties. His 
party’s legislative slate included representatives from a variety of viewpoints across the 
political spectrum, and his message was essentially second generation reformist in nature. 
Pérez de Cuellar’s campaign explicitly accepted the neoliberal reforms of Fujimori. His 
criticisms of the incumbent focused primarily on the issue of democratic institutions, 
Fujimori’s authoritarian tendencies, and “the fairness of the electoral system itself.” 
(Schmidt 2000) 
 Fujimori campaigned on the basis of sustaining the accomplishments of his first 
term, arguing that changing course could reverse the economic and national security 
progress of the past five years. He toured the country extensively, inaugurating public 
works (a tactic that was used frequently throughout his term), and called for a political 
system in which political parties would no longer have a significant role (Schmidt 2000, 
108). The president quickly built a strong advantage on the basis of his personal 
popularity, economic optimism, government largesse, and the weakness of .the 
opposition. As in his campaign against Vargas Llosa, Fujimori benefited from the 
perception that his opponent was a member of the elite, and out of touch with the 
common people; Peruvian voters overwhelmingly selected Fujimori over his challenger 
when asked which candidate was “closest to people like you.” (Schmidt 2000, 107) As a 
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consequence, Pérez de Cuellar had difficulty expanding his appeal beyond the urban 
middle classes.  
 As expected, Fujimori won the 1995 election in the first round by a crushing 
margin, obtaining 64.4% of the vote to Pérez de Cuellar’s 21.8 percent. The best showing 
for a candidate of the traditional parties was APRA’s 4.1%. Confounding many 
expectations, Fujimori’s victory was similarly impressive in the Congressional contest. 
Despite the fact that his movement remained essentially an improvised, personal electoral 
vehicle, the party obtained 67 out of 120 seats in the newly unicameral legislature. The 
three most important parties of the 1980s managed only 6% of the combined 
Congressional vote (Schmidt 2000, 114-115)7. Five years after Fujimori had initially 
challenged Peru’s political parties, the 1995 elections seemed to be the final nail in their 
coffin. 
 In the aftermath of the election, Fujimori’s position atop the Peruvian political 
system appeared unassailable. His less democratic sources of power - links with the 
security forces and powerful economic actors, as well as the use of state resources -  had 
been bolstered by a new constitution, a powerful electoral mandate,  and the apparently 
successful completion of the major tasks at which previous presidents had utterly failed.  
His assault on Peru’s opposition parties had essentially routed them from the field of 
battle.  
Under these circumstances, the president and his circle turned their attention to 
efforts to secure Fujimori a constitutionally prohibited third term.  Over the course of the 
next five years, the president’s increasingly brazen attempts to monopolize power would 
                                                 
7
 While the presidential vote was largely viewed as accurate, irregularities in the legislative vote raised 
suspicions of fraud; see Schmidt (2000) and McClintock (1999, 336). 
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generate increasing resistance, while a weakening economy (and the declining salience of 
past successes) would create new political openings for the opposition. Given the utter 
disarray of the Peruvian opposition, the precise nature of an alternative political 
movement that could take advantage of these openings, and pose a viable challenge to the 
regime’s perpetuation, was not immediately clear.  
 
Fujimori’s Decline, Democratic Decay, and the Rise of the Opposition  
 
 Newly armed with a reliable legislative majority, Fujimori almost immediately 
began laying the groundwork for his reelection effort. Over time, the reelection project 
would require (in the words of Catherine Conaghan) “a comprehensive assault on the 
autonomy of all institutions that had legal jurisdiction over elections.” These efforts 
involved both ensuring that relevant positions would be occupied by Fujimori loyalists, 
as well altering institutional rules to to remove potential roadblocks to presidential 
reelection (Conaghan 2001, 4). As the legal barriers to amending the 1993 constitution 
were high, a first step was the passage by Fujimori’s legislative majority of a “Law of 
Authentic Interpretation” declaring that the 2000 election would represent a first 
reelection, rather than a second. When three judges on Peru’s Constitutional Tribunal 
rejected this law as unconstitutional, the Fujimori majority voted to remove them from 
office on transparently dubious grounds (McClintock 2006, 251; Conaghan 2001, 6) in 
1997. When opponents of reelection mustered a petition of over a million signatures for a 
referendum to overrule the president’s plans, the National Election Board (JNE) initially 
ruled that the referendum could take place without Congressional approval. In response, 
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Fujimori’s administration altered the rules governing appointments to the JNE. When the 
issue came to a vote again in 1998, several recently named members (and at least one 
recently bribed member) voted to require Congressional approval; as expected, the 
referendum initiative was denied by the pro-government legislature (McClintock 2006, 
251-252).  The Fujimori administration further undercut any possible effort to impede 
reelection through extensive efforts to undermine the autonomy of the judiciary,  enacting 
measures to ensure that “pliant political appointees controlled all crucial points in the 
administration of justice.” (Conaghan 2001, 7; see also Levitsky 1999, 79; Crabtree 2001, 
294). 
 Fujimori’s efforts to undermine judicial independence and electoral integrity were 
accompanied by efforts to control the mass media. Through a combination of bribery and 
intimidation,  Montesinos and his cronies exerted substantial influence over the content 
of much of Peru’s print and broadcast media. The most prominent example of 
intimidation was the stripping of the Peruvian citizenship of businessman Baruch Ivcher 
after his Frecuencia Latina television channel began airing reports critical of Montesinos 
and the SIN (Conaghan 2001, 8). Other attempts to influence press coverage included 
wiretapping of journalists, harassment of journalists via politically motivated tax fraud 
investigations, and extortion. Along with threats, Montesinos offered carrots in the form 
of bribes. Writers for Peru’s prensa chicha – cheap tabloids with a lower class target 
audience- were rewarded for inventing or publicizing scandalous allegations against 
regime opponents and praising the government.  The bribery effort also extended to 
highly prominent media outlets and figures such as the daily newspaper Expreso, and talk 
show host Laura Bozzo (Mauceri 2006, 58; Fowks 2000, Conaghan 2001, Conaghan 
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2005).  While the independent and anti-government media was never truly silenced, the 
ability to compel favorable coverage and dispense attacks on opponents through 
corruption of the press became a linchpin of Fujimori’s efforts to retain power. 
 A similarly important element of Fujimori’s reelection strategy was control of 
state resources. In part, this control involved the ability to employ the state security forces 
for political ends (including electoral publicity and harassment of opponents). 
Discretionary use of spending remained an important weapon in the regime’s political 
arsenal, allowing Fujimori to build public support through social spending and coopt 
potential opposition challengers. Following the 1995 election, the government further 
increased spending, and tightened its hold over spending authority, taking control of 
assistance programs that had previously been administered at the local level. (Crabtree 
2001, 296; Mauceri 2006, 52). Beyond the direct impact of government spending, 
Fujimori took advantage of the compliant media to amplify perceptions of his 
government’s generosity.  Peruvian voters were treated to continual images of the 
president touring the country to inaugurate schools, roads, and other public works 
projects in poor areas, and receiving the adulation of the projects’ beneficiaries. 
  
Due to unfavorable changes in the political context, Fujimori would need to call 
on all these resources to maintain his grip on power. The most pressing challenge to the 
government was economic: beginning in 1996, Peru’s economy entered a period of 
decline.  GDP growth, which had averaged around 9 percent between 1993 and 1995, 
averaged only around 4% between 1996 and 1998, and only 1% in 1988; unemployment 
and poverty rates, which had only been slightly improved by the growth of the early 
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1990s, ceased their decline (McClintock 1999, 336). The economic slowdown was 
worsened by the 1998 effects of the Asian financial crisis and El Niño. As a result, public 
approval of Fujimori’s economic policy dropped steadily, from a peak of just over 60% 
in 1995 to roughly 20% in 1998. Approval of the government’s performance on 
employment, which had never exceeded 27%, fell to 6% by 1999; approval of the 
government’s performance on inflation, which had reached 64% in 1994, fell to 20% by 
1998 (despite the fact that inflation had remained low). (Carrión 2006) Overall, the 
economic downturn and increasing public discontentment took a toll on Fujimori’s 
political support. 
 Alongside the worsening economic picture, the government’s authoritarian 
tendencies generated increasing public consternation. While the autogolpe of 1992 had 
been effectively justified by Fujimori as a necessary measure to combat terrorism and 
sideline corrupt and ineffective politicians, the government’s tireless efforts to pursue a 
third term at the expense of any institutional constraints proved to be a much harder sell. 
In surveys, a majority of voters rejected Fujimori’s postulation for a third term and 
between 1996 and 1998, from 60 to 77 percent of the public expressed support for a 
referendum on the possibility of a second reelection. The government’s brazen attempts 
to subvert electoral and judicial authorities in order to approve reelection and forestall 
any such referendum were met with widespread public anger (Carrión 2006, 142-143; 
Levitsky and Cameron 2003, 15). A further source of public concern regarding 
democratic governance was the increasingly public role of Vladimiro Montesinos. As the 
nature of the Fujimori regime’s links to the military and intelligence services received 
more scrutiny, the unofficial presidential advisor featured prominently in a series of 
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scandals, and his outsized influence on the government became a subject of considerable 
discussion. In 1992, following the autogolpe, Lima residents had classified Fujimori’s 
government as “democratic” rather than “dictatorial” by 52 to 34 percent; in a similar poll 
in June 1998, 63 percent opted for “dictatorial” and only 27% for “democratic.” (Schmidt 
2000, 122).  
 Thus, Fujimori approached his third bid for the presidency facing vulnerabilities 
on two fronts: a weakening economy and increasing perceptions of authoritarianism and 
abuse of power. The political opposition that eventually emerged to confront Fujimori 
capitalized on the economic discontent, but focused its criticisms on governance issues. 
  
The Anti-Fujimori Opposition  
 
 In the aftermath of the 1995 elections, the Peruvian opposition was in disarray.  
The country’s traditional parties had been reduced to political insignificance, while the 
personalistic movement behind Pérez de Cuellar (the country’s most well known and 
prestigious political figure aside from the president) that supplanted the partisan 
opposition had been soundly defeated, granting Fujimori an unequivocal popular 
mandate. Organized civil society continued to decline, as Fujimori’s efforts to undermine 
autonomous organizations exacerbated the ongoing effects of the post-debt crisis social 
and economic transformation. Much of the mass media was susceptible to government 
influence or outright control. The presidency maintained tight links with important 
sectors of the business elite, and retained a firm grip on the instruments of state power 
and the state’s financial resources.  
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 Even as the government’s public image deteriorated sharply, the nature and 
prospects of the opposition that emerged to confront Fujimori were shaped by the 
realities of the executive’s personalization, centralization, and deinstitutionalization of 
power, and by the associated weakness of autonomous political and social organizations.  
The reemergent opposition to Fujimori took several forms. At the level of civil society, 
the government’s assault on the rule of law led to the rise of pro-democracy organization 
and mobilization; these efforts were viewed positively by the much of the public, but 
were largely ineffectual, in part due to the restricted nature of the social base from which 
they were drawn and the lack of supporting partisan organizations.  Over time, the 
government’s tendencies toward centralization generated strong opposition in the 
country’s interior, both from increasingly aggressive regional “frentes” and from some 
provincial political leaders. Finally, Fujimori’s economic and political strategy, in the 
context of the economic decline of the late 1990s, led to increased disaffection on the part 
of significant sectors of the Peruvian population: wage-earning workers, the middle class, 
and eventually the upper class and some of the business elite. 
 While the increasing levels of social opposition to the regime offered potential 
opportunities for political opposition, Peru’s political parties did not experience a 
resurgence; the last half of the 1990s was characterized by continued party decline. As a 
result,  any political alternative that could emerge to challenge Fujimori would have to be 
(as in the case of Pérez de Cuellar’s challenge) a personalistic movement behind an 
individual leader with a substantial national profile. Fujimori’s government fought to 
prevent the emergence of such a leader, through attempts to co-opt potential challengers, 
and through massive campaigns of harassment and defamation against the two most 
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threatening challengers who initially arose to contest the 2000 election. Despite the 
regime’s best efforts, the diffuse and diverse strands of opposition eventually did 
consolidate around a single leader: Alejandro Toledo, an economist and past presidential 
candidate who rose from relative obscurity to the position of opposition standard bearer 
within the few weeks preceding the April 2000 contest. The message employed by 
Toledo, and by the previous claimants to opposition leadership, was second generation 
reformist in nature. 
 
The Opposition: Social Organizations 
 
 In the aftermath of Fujimori’s election triumph, many initial efforts at organized 
public opposition revolved around issues of human rights and democracy. In this regard, 
several events were crucial in provoking organized protest and activism. In 1995, 
following the convictions of ten Peruvian military personnel for the kidnapping and 
murder of nine students and a professor from Lima’s “La Cantuta” university, the 
Fujimori government put forth a sweeping amnesty law for crimes by the military 
committed in the course of fighting subversion. The law, which was passed by the 
compliant legislature in July 1995, became a focus of protest by human rights groups. 
However, this mobilization was limited in its scope and effectiveness; although the 
amnesty itself was rejected by the vast majority of Peruvians (Pajuelo 2004, 67), the 
immediate impact of protest was restrained by the relative marginalization of the 
opposition movement and the overwhelming popularity at the time of both Fujimori and 
his war against Sendero. 
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 A more serious upsurge of protest was provoked by Fujimori’s campaign for 
reelection; in particular, by the government’s removal of dissenting members of the 
Constitutional Tribunal. Further discontent was generated by the other indications of the 
government’s authoritarian character, including the emergence of suspicions surrounding 
the role and influence of Montesinos, revelations that the government had engaged in 
wiretapping of political opponents (including Javier Pérez de Cuellar), and the 
government’s campaign against Baruch Ivcher. In response to the government’s attack on 
the institutions of democracy, protest mobilizations among youth and students (and law 
students in particular) attracted substantial following in Lima (Planas 1999, 20-21). This 
movement was greeted with widespread public approval; unlike the discredited political 
class, the students were viewed as a fresh, honest, and sincerely well-intentioned 
movement by much of the public, and were a less apt target for vilification by the 
government.  The emerging student movement was accompanied by high-profile 
dissidence among intellectual and cultural figures; the symbolic ritual of washing the 
Peruvian flag, which became a widespread symbol of discontent during the last days of 
Fujimori’s government, had its origins in this movement.   
Alongside the growth of organized and public opposition among students and 
intellectuals, pro-democracy members of the political elite began to increasingly organize 
and coordinate in opposition to the regime. The main umbrella organization that emerged 
was dubbed the Foro Democrático (Democratic Forum). It included representatives from 
across the political spectrum, and incorporated many leaders from the pre-1990 political 
elite (Levitsky 1999, 82-83). In 1997 and 1998, the Foro, with student organizations 
providing much of the legwork, mounted a campaign to submit Fujimori’s reelection 
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plans to a popular referendum. Despite the enormous constraints posed by Fujimori’s 
domination of state institutions and the relative enfeeblement of social organizations, the 
referendum campaign managed to gather over 1.4 million signatures, well ahead of the 
legal requirement of 1.25 million. 
Notwithstanding its achievements, the nascent pro-democracy movement suffered 
from several fundamental weaknesses that prevented it from posing a credible threat to 
the regime. The movement was largely concentrated in Lima; pro-democracy 
organizations had little presence in the interior of the country. The movement was also 
generally unrepresentative in social terms – fundamentally drawn from the middle class 
and upper middle class, the citizens’ and student organizations never penetrated into the 
poor majority. As a result, while the students’ public image may have been positive 
overall, their capacity to mobilize mass support was limited. A prodemocracy march in 
1998, with Fujimori’s popularity at low ebb, only attracted 6,000 to the Plaza de Armas. 
The Foro Democrático was similarly hampered by its unrepresentativeness in class terms, 
its lack of connection to any broader political organization, and by its association with the 
unpopular political leaders from the pre-Fujimori elite. The limitations of the democracy 
movement were made clear by the inability to produce a larger scale public mobilization 
after the government killed the referendum initiative through legal and legislative 
machinations; following the failure of the referendum drive, the movement essentially 
fizzled (Levitsky 1999, 83).  The prodemocracy social movement that emerged in 
response to Fujimori’s authoritarian actions established a strong public profile and helped 
set the tone for the content of the more formidable political challenges to Fujimori that 
emerged in 2000; nonetheless, like the Pérez de Cuellar campaign of 1995, its inability to 
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mobilize support outside of its narrow social and geographic base rendered it essentially 
ineffective. 
Outside of the relatively elite-centered movement for democratization, organized 
opposition to Fujimori emerged from several other sources.  Much of the economic 
burden of Fujimori’s economic policies had been borne by the wage-earning working 
class who were “hard hit by more flexible labor rule and the expansion of of temproary 
and other precarious forms of employment,” (Tanaka 2003, 229) and industrial wages 
had stagnated (Solfrini 2001); as a result, organized labor adopted an increasingly 
combative posture toward the government during Fujimori’s second term. However, the 
impact of labor opposition was vitiated by the precipitous decline of unionization and 
union influence, a trend that resulted from the combination of economic transformation, 
anti-union labor legislation, and political violence (with the government and Sendero 
Luminoso being jointly responsible for the last factor).  Between the early 1980s and 
1995, unionization levels fell from 18% to 8% (Levitsky 1999, 82). In 1998 (the low 
point of Fujimori’s popularity) the number of strikes was the lowest in the country’s 
recent history, and less than one tenth of the number recorded in 1990 (Solfrini 2001, 67). 
While contributing to the overall mobilization of opposition against Fujimori, organized 
labor was largely marginalized as an actor in its own right during the 1990s. 
 A more potentially threatening opposition force emerged outside of Lima, in the 
form of regional frentes. These regional civil society movements engaged in a variety of 
actions, including protests marches and strikes.  In general, they were formed in response 
to the government’s zealous attempts to centralize political and administrative authority; 
although the specific grievances around which they mobilized varied from region to 
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region. One of the more important regional fronts, the Patriotic Front of Loreto, 
mobilized primarily in response to the government’s resolution of a border dispute with 
Ecuador in which a square kilometer of territory was conceded; aside from the nationalist 
reaction to the (relatively trivial) the territorial concession, the perceived lack of 
consultation and concern for local sensibilities associated with the transfer provoked a 
more generalized opposition within the Amazon province.  Other regional fronts 
mobilized around different issues: the important southern provinces of Cusco and 
Arequipa centered around development policy: the Frente Regional de Cusco mobilized 
to oppose privatization efforts, while the regional movement in Arequipa was 
spearheaded by business interests that were bearing the brunt of the country’s recession8 
(Planas 1999, Pajuelo 2004).  The varied regional movements eventually formed a 
unified Coordinadora Nacional de Frentes Regionales, intended to promote a common 
agenda; however, the organization’s effectiveness was hampered by differing regional 
priorities and demands, as well as the limited and impermanent nature of their associated 
social mobilizations (Pajuelo 2004, 57). 
 The growth of regional movements underscored a weakness in Fujimori’s 
political strategy from 1995 on, which focused its clientelistic and mobilizational 
attentions primarily in Lima. Recognizing the limited geographic reach of his own 
Cambio 90/ Nueva Mayoria movement and the potential for threats from emerging 
leaders in the country’s provinces, Fujimori established a new national movement, 
dubbed Vamos Vecino (Let’s Go, Neighbor), and headed by a former APRA leader, to 
contest municipal elections in 1998.  Relying (as in 1990) in part on APRA’s old 
patronage networks, and making extensive use of state resources, the government 
                                                 
8
 Interview with Carlos Vargas of ONPE, Feb. 2004. 
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coopted the support of many independent mayors, and Vamos Vecino rapidly extended 
its reach across the country, winning 596 out of 1622 district mayor’s races and 76  out of 
194 provincial mayor’s races. (Roberts 2006, 95; Degregori 2001, 96-97). Despite this 
effort, the government’s extension into the countryside remained relatively shallow, 
based more on direct clientelism than on durable organizations; during the 2000 election, 
Fujimori downplayed the young regional organization in favor of a newly created 
national movement  (Roberts 2006, 96). As a result, the country’s interior represented a 
potential opportunity and an essential resource for any successful opposition effort. 
 By 1998, the emerging opposition from pro-democracy, labor, and regional 
movements was reflected in broader public discontentment, with the Peruvian middle 
class having soured on the government to a greater extent than other sectors (Balbi and 
Gamero 2003, Carrión 2006).  At the same time, while Fujimori maintained the backing 
of important sectors of the business community until the very end, splits emerged within 
this sector during the late 1990s. While Fujimori maintained the support of the financial 
sector and large primary exporters, smaller and medium enterprises, businesses that 
produced for the domestic market, and business interests located outside Lima (in 
particular, in Arequipa) tended to break with the regime. With the country’s neoliberal 
reforms and economic stability apparently entrenched, the elements of the business 
community that were relatively less favored by the government and did not directly 
benefit from clientelistic ties became less inclined to tolerate the increasing arbitrariness 
and corruption of the government, and began to agitate for the implementation of second 
generation reforms. Some important business leaders went as far as to run as candidates 
in opposition political movements for the elections of 2000.   
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 Thus, by the late 1990s, social opposition to the Fujimori government had 
emerged from a variety of sources. Initial anti-government and prodemocracy 
mobilizations among students and the political elite were accompanied by (relatively 
marginal) support from organized labor, and were paralleled by an upsurge of regional 
movements pressing for attention to local demands. The decline of the economy and the 
government’s increasing authoritarian tendencies prompted growing opposition from the 
middle class, as well as from some sectors of business. Given the continued absence of 
meaningful political party organizations, as the elections of 2000 approached it remained 
an open question whether and how a political alternative could emerge to tie together 
these diffuse threads of anti-government sentiment and pose a meaningful challenge to 
the Fujimori regime in the electoral arena.  
 
The Opposition: Politicians and “Parties” 
 
 As a result of the marginalization and public rejection of the country’s main 
political parties under Fujimori, the options for a challenge to his push for reelection were 
somewhat limited. Any credible challenger would have to attain a national profile 
independently of party backing. The two most prominent such figures in Peru (Vargas 
Llosa and Pérez de Cuellar) had already been trounced in previous elections. 
Nonetheless, political openings remained; in the absence of a substantial partisan 
organization, Fujimori’s dominance at the national level had not translated to similar 
dominance at the subnational level (Roberts 2006, 95). Even in the context of his 
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crushing victory of 1995, Fujimori’s candidate for mayor of Lima had gone down to 
defeat in that year. The candidate who won the 1995 mayor’s race in Lima, Alberto 
Andrade, was the most prominent opposition contender to the presidency for most of 
Fujimori’s second term. 
 Andrade was a former member of the conservative Popular Christian party (PPC) 
and mayor of the wealthy Lima district of Miraflores. For the 1995 election, he broke 
from his party, forming a personalistic, largely non-ideological movement called Somos 
Lima (We are Lima); the movement would later be renamed Somos Perú. On the basis of 
strong performance within the more affluent sectors of the capital, he defeated Fujimori’s 
choice,  Jaime Yoshiyama, with 52.5 percent of the vote (Barr and Dietz 2006, 76).  
Despite the fact that Fujimori’s overwhelming popularity had extended to the middle and 
upper classes in 1995, his lack of a national organization had left possibilities open for a 
well known politician with a record of material achievements and a base of local support.  
 Recognizing the potential challenge from subnational leaders, Fujimori acted to 
strip regional and municipal governments of autonomy and resources.  A 1993 decree law 
reduced the taxation power of municipal governments, and shifted the authority to 
allocate central government funds to individual districts away from provincial 
governments and to the central government. Control of the popular Vaso de Leche social 
program in Lima was also shifted to the central government (Barr and Dietz 2006, 71-
73). The combined impact of these changes was a sharp limitation of the ability of the 
leaders of provincial governments and large cities to establish clientelistic networks of 
their own, or to engage in high profile public works projects that would compete for 
attention with Fujimori’s own intensely publicized public works.  
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Despite these obstacles, Andrade proved to be an effective mayor, aggressively 
pursuing projects that would have a visible impact on the quality of life in Peru’s 
sprawling and chaotic capital city.  Andrade won reelection in 1998 with 58.8 percent of 
the vote, once again obtaining his strongest support in wealthier areas but also performing 
well in more lower class districts (Barr and Dietz 2006, 74; Degregori 2001, 178). The 
victory, against another chosen candidate of the Fujimori goverment, established Andrade 
as the most formidable potential challenger to Fujimori in 2000 As the declining 
economy sapped Fujimori’s approval in 1998 and 1999, Andrade pulled ahead of the 
incumbent in nationwide surveys of vote choice for the upcoming elections. 
  In response to the challenge, the Fujimori administration turned the power of the 
central government, and its allies in the mass media, against Andrade. In addition to 
continued efforts to transfer spending and decision-making authority from the mayor to 
the central government, the government-controlled tabloid press launched fierce assaults 
against Andrade, accusing him (among other things) of corruption and of connections 
with Alan García. A central theme of the attacks was Andrade’s supposed lack of 
connection with, or sensitivity to, the needs of the poor. Tabloid headlines derided the 
mayor as a  pituco (snob), and savaged him for his past affiliation with the conservative 
PPC. Andrade’s efforts to clean up the historic center of the capital and cut down on the 
proliferation of irregular street vendors were a particularly frequent target; according to 
the tabloid account, Andrade was guilty of brutal repression and of depriving poor 
limeños of their means of subsistence in order to make the colonial district more palatable 
for wealthy tourists. Surveys in Lima showed that these depictions of Andrade as an out-
of-touch elitist resonated with a large percentage of the public (Degregori 2001, 178-
 138 
179).  While the government’s attacks on Andrade were given extensive attention, 
Andrade’s own campaign events were largely ignored by the submissive broadcast 
media. In addition to Andrade’s difficulties with the media, his campaign events also 
faced direct harassment at the hands of the state.  As his movement was entirely 
dependent on his personal image, the impact of the government’s campaign of 
defamation, combined with an economy that began to improve during 1999, soon did 
away with Andrade’s early lead in the polls. 
 As Andrade’s campaign began to falter, the anti-Fujimori opposition turned its 
attention to another independent candidate: Luis Castañeda Lossio, former head of the 
Peruvian Social Security administration (IPSS). Having built a reputation as an effective 
and honest administrator within Fujimori’s government, Castañeda left to form his own 
political movement, Solidaridad Nacional. As in the case of Somos Perú, Castañeda’s 
movement was a personalistic, uninstitutionalized electoral vehicle.  Like Andrade, 
Castañeda initially led Fujimori in electoral polls, but faded in late 1999 as the 
incumbent’s popularity improved and the challenger was targeted with a smear campaign 
comparable to that directed against Andrade. Among other things, Castañeda was 
accused of being cowardly, mentally unstable, corrupt, and pro-terrorist. (Degregori 
2001, 156-163).  Like Andrade. Castañeda’s position in surveys deteriorated to the point 
that by early 2000, a first round victory by the incumbent over either of the two main 
opposition contenders appeared feasible (Tanaka 2003, 232). 
 With the full brunt of the government’s force being borne by the two opposition 
front-runners, a new candidate emerged in the last weeks of the 2000 campaign; once 
again, at the head of an unstructured, ideologically vague, and personalistic movement:  
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Alejandro Toledo, an economist who had first appeared on the public stage as a candidate 
in the 1995 elections. While Andrade had built his public profile on achievements at the 
municipal level, and Castañeda had done so as an administrator within Fujimori’s 
government, Toledo’s public notoriety was largely a function of his personal image and 
biography. In contrast with the almost universally European ethnicity of the Peruvian 
political elite,  Toledo’s features reflected strong indigenous roots, and his background 
was similarly unconventional.  He had grown up poor, and worked shining shoes in the 
city of Chimbote as a child. After having won an essay contest and attracted the attention 
of a Peace Corps volunteer, he eventually received a scholarship to study in the US. After 
doing graduate work at Stanford, he became an economist for the World Bank. In 1995, 
he entered the presidential campaign at the head of an improvised movement dubbed 
“País Posible” (Possible Country). In 2000, he tried again, with the movement renamed 
“Perú Posible.” For virtually all of the 2000 campaign, Toledo languished in a distant 
fourth place behind Fujimori and the two main opposition figures. As Castañeda and 
Andrade both drifted out of contention in the campaign’s final days, Toledo’s campaign 
rapidly drew support from throughout the anti-Fujimori opposition, experiencing a 
vertiginous rise that inspired comparisons to Fujimori’s own unexpected surge ten years 
before.  
Toledo’s rapid rise was in part a matter of fortuitous timing: as the previous 
opposition leaders were driven out of contention under the government’s continual 
attacks, anti-Fujimori voters needed a new place to turn.  Toledo, a relatively well known 
figure who had maintained a low profile throughout most of the campaign, was the most 
logical choice. As Toledo’s numbers surged during the final weeks of the campaign, the 
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government-linked tabloids and media initiated a sudden barrage of attacks and smears; 
at that point, however, there was not enough time to gradually debilitate the new 
candidate, as had been done to Castañeda and Andrade. Furthermore, the repeated use of 
media to attack the latest and most recent threat had become so obvious that the attacks 
themselves increasingly lacked credibility; a strong majority of the public anticipated the 
initiation of a campaign of defamation against Toledo, and recognized the headlines for 
what they were (Taylor 2001, 10).9 
Beyond his fortunate timing, Toledo had several personal characteristics that 
made him a potentially formidable challenger. His unique biography positioned him to 
win support from a variety of groups that had become disenchanted with the Fujimori 
government. Toledo’s academic and professional credentials as an economist reassured 
the urban middle classes and the sectors of the economic elite that had turned against 
Fujimori in response to the government’s authoritarian tendencies, and who would be 
central to any viable challenge. On the other hand, his indigenous heritage and provincial 
origins helped him appeal to the movements and social groups in the interior of the 
country who rejected the centralizing tendencies of the Fujimori government and resented 
the traditional dominance of interests in Lima; when Toledo spoke of the need for 
decentralization, his personal profile lent the statements more credence. Having risen 
from poverty, Toledo was not saddled with the perception of elitism and insensitivity that 
had been critical weaknesses for Fujimori’s previous opponents (Vargas Llosa and Pérez 
de Cuellar) and that the government had fostered through its attacks on Andrade. Even 
more than Fujimori, Toledo could present himself to the Peruvian voter as “un presidente 
                                                 
9
 Ironically, at least one of these mostly ineffective tabloid attacks – the claim that Toledo had fathered an 
unacknowledged daughter out of wedlock – was later proven accurate. 
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como tú.”  During his campaign, Toledo, switched rapidly from one identity to another 
depending on the audience he was addressing. At a rally in Chorrillos, Lima on January 
28, Toledo defied Fujimori to mount a campaign against him,  declaring “I am a 
stubborn, rebellious Indian and they won’t intimidate me!” The following day, he raised 
funds and promoted his candidacy at a $100 per plate dinner and conference of business 
leaders and supporters,  held in a hotel in the affluent Lima financial district of San 
Isidro. (La República, Jan. 29 2000 and Jan. 30 2000). 
Throughout the months preceding the presidential election, the main opposition 
candidates faced calls to form a unified candidacy to challenge Fujimori.10  Given the 
government’s massive resources, a united opposition seemed to many to offer the best 
chance of preventing a first round victory by Fujimori, or even enabling an opposition 
victory in the first round. Negotiations among the top three candidates persisted until the 
final months of the campaign however, no agreement could be reached). Aside from the 
personalities of the three candidates, the failure to consolidate behind a single opposition 
option can be traced in part to the and to an electoral system that favored a fragmented 
opposition, and that (in combination with the shifting fortunes of the three main 
candidates) offered each of the top three challengers a plausible possibility of reaching 
the second round. (Tanaka 2001, 92-93; Tanaka 2003, 235-236).  
 Ideological differences, on the other hand, were definitively not a source of 
opposition disunity – among the major opposition candidates, significant differences in 
campaign messages were almost nonexistent. The extent of the consensus among the 
opposition was such that in November 1999, almost all of the registered opposition 
                                                 
10
 For example, a November letter from prominent political figures and scholars called for a unified 
candidacy with a second generation reformist and pro-democracy identity (La República, 11/19/2000) 
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movements, including the three major challengers, came together to sign an Acuerdo de 
Gobernabilidad (Pact of Governability) that outlined a set of commonly shared priorities 
and commitments. The main themes of the agreement were “commitments to restore 
democratic institutions, to reactivate the economy and increase employment, to increase 
spending on human capital, to advance decentralization, and to reform the armed forces.” 
(Schmidt 2002, 348). While promising to generate improved economic performance, 
none of the opposition parties expressed opposition to the free market policies that had 
been established under Fujimori. All of the significant opposition to Fujimori during the 
2000 election campaign can be viewed as second generation reformist in nature.  
 In the following section, I examine the campaign messages and policy positions 
of Peru’s second generation reformist opposition in more depth.  Observations are drawn 
from two official documents: the Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad, representing the shared 
positions of the various opposition contenders, and the ten-point “Ideario” (program) of 
Alejandro Toledo’s Perú Posible, the party that eventually became the standard bearer for 
the anti-Fujimori opposition as a whole. 
  
 
 
 
Second Generation Reformism and the Peruvian Opposition in 2000 
 
 The opposition campaigns for the Peruvian election of 2000 were not 
characterized by a strong emphasis on explicit policy proposals.  The self-promotion 
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efforts of opposition candidates focused on their personal images or past 
accomplishments.  Their criticisms of the incumbent government centered on the 
antidemocratic and centralizing character of the Fujimori administration, and on the 
failure to generate strong employment performance; to address the former, they promised 
a more accountable style of government; in regard to the latter, detailed and specific 
proposals for improving the economic situation were generally avoided.  The text of the 
Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad, signed in November by fourteen opposition movements in 
all (including the three most important), reflects these tendencies.  The Acuerdo’s 
promises additionally testify to the ideological diversity of its signers, who ranged from 
the center right PPC to the populist APRA and the socialist Partido Unificado 
Mariateguista headed by leftist deputy Javier Diez Canseco. 
 The Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad contains seven points, of which five involve the 
definition of policy positions. Two of the main points (points two and three) address 
economic and social policy, while the other three are related to governance issues: 
democratization and the rule of law, reform of the armed forces, and decentralization. 
 In the introduction to the section on economic policy, the Acuerdo generally 
promises “economic policies that place priority on the generation of employment and the 
reactivation of production, consumption and imports” based on a “social market economy 
at the service of human beings,  through the establishment of sectoral policies that 
equally support the rights of property and the rights of the consumer.”  In terms of 
specific proposals, the economic policy statement offers mainly vague generalities. Its 
first point stresses the employment of monetary and tax policies that maintain fiscal 
equilibrium and “rationalize” public spending, as well as increasing production and 
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consumption,  and promoting saving, investment and decentralization. Little indication is 
provided as to how these varied goals will be achieved; the Acuerdo broadly calls for 
increased efforts among government, workers, and business to “define medium and long 
term sectoral policies”  to increase productivity and competitiveness and increase exports. 
In slightly more specific language, the economic policy statement calls for the 
promotion of private investment, and stresses continued adherence to the privatization 
agreements of the 1990s (along with a promise to promote the interests of domestic 
investors in privatization processes, and to guarantee adequate service delivery at 
reasonable rates).  In a nod to the left, the Acuerdo leaves open the possibility of a 
renegotiation of foreign debt, but specifies that this would only be undertaken in 
cooperation with creditors.  
Point Three, dedicated to social policy, is similarly second generation reformist in 
nature. Rather than emphasizing redistribution, the Acuerdo calls for “a social policy that 
places a priority on investment in human capital and intends to assure equality of 
opportunities.”  Along these lines, the first two sections of Point Three stress the 
importance of free and universal education and access to health care, and promise to 
increase the “professionalization, quality, and remuneration” of workers in both sectors. 
The Acuerdo calls for a “mixed and pluralistic” pension system that would combine a 
guaranteed minimum pension with opportunities for workers to invest pension funds. In 
regard to labor policy, the Acuerdo promises to guarantee the rights of workers and 
enforce International Labor Organization standards. Social assistance programs receive 
one sentence; a pledge that the state will continue
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aid, and a general promise of greater participation of beneficiaries in the administration of 
the programs.  
In general, the socioeconomic agenda outlined in the Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad 
accord with typical patterns of second generation reformist economic policy rhetoric: in 
terms of economic policy, rather than a statement of policy proposals, it presents an 
outline of basic principles (economic stability, a free market economy with a human face, 
international economic integration, and acceptance of privatization with more attention to 
the process) and a statement of general goals. In terms of social policy, human capital 
investment is emphasized more than redistribution. On the whole, the two points provide 
little indication that an opposition government’s economic and social policies would 
contrast significantly with those of the incumbent government. 
 
Far more direct and forceful statements of intent are provided in the sections of 
the Acuerdo that focus on governance issues: democracy, the rule of law, civil-military 
relations, and decentralization of power. In the document’s first point, the signers commit 
to “support the construction and establishment of a democratic government of national 
unity” that will “reconstruct the bases of the rule of law.” They specifically promise to 
restore respect for human rights, including adherence to decisions of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (an institution whose judgments had been condemned and 
rejected by Fujimori as undermining Peruvian national security and national sovereignty). 
The signers pledge to respect the autonomy of the judiciary and cease state intervention 
into judicial matters, and specifically to restore the members of the Constitutional 
Tribunal that had been removed to make way for Fujimori’s reelection. The Acuerdo 
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commits the new president not to seek reelection (even though permitted to by the 
Constitution), and calls for increases in transparency and the restoration of an oversight 
role for the legislature. The Acuerdo also calls for the armed forces to remain outside of 
politics and their internal personnel matters to be conducted in accordance with neutral 
and meritocratic regulations; and calls for the activities of the National Intelligence 
Service to be restricted to national security matters, and to operate under legislative 
oversight. In contrast with the vague and general nature of the economic and social policy 
promises of the Acuerdo (most which could have conceivably have been made by the 
incumbent as well), statements regarding democracy, the state security apparatus, and the 
rule of law are direct and clear, and calculated to draw as sharp a contrast as possible with 
actions undertaken by Fujimori’s government. 
Another governance-related element of the Acuerdo involves decentralization and 
state reform issues. In this regard also, the document is intended to draw clear contrasts 
between opposition and incumbent. Although some of the rhetoric in this section consists 
of general calls for improved government effectiveness, there are several specific 
promises: the convocation of regional elections to create autonomous provincial 
governments, respect for the autonomy of municipal governments, and an increase in the 
functions and resources assigned to municipalities. Again, these statements represent a 
direct repudiation of actions taken by Fujimori to concentrate power within the central 
government.  
The text of the Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad provides a snapshot of the political 
opposition to Fujimori prior to the 2000 election. Its social and economic positions are 
both heterogeneous and vague, incorporating messages from across the political spectrum 
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while offering neither a coherent policy agenda nor a notable contrast with existing 
policy; they primarily consist of promises of continued support for the existing free 
market and globalized economic model, with minor adjustments to make the model more 
humane. In contrast, the document’s positions on governance issues are explicitly stated 
and intended to draw sharp contrasts between the government and the opposition.  On 
issues of democracy, the rule of law, and decentralization, the opposition shares a clear 
common agenda and offers a clear alternative to the status quo. 
 
Alejandro Toledo’s own policy positions, embodied in his ten-point “Ideario” for 
Perú Posible, are if anything even more neutral and diffuse than those presented in the 
Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad. Perú Posible’s official policy statement deliberately 
underscores this non-ideological aspect .   Perú Posible, according to its Ideario,  “does 
not adhere to any political or economic ideological dogma.” Rather, for the party’s 
militants,  “doing political work means obtaining concrete results for individuals and 
society.” This emphasis on results over ideology is in some ways reminiscent of the 
rhetoric of Fujimori, who frequently depicted himself as a worker or a manager rather 
than a politician; this similarity is underscored by Toledo’s claim that the party “is 
composed of people from diverse social and economic extractions who are not 
professional politicians.” 
Although the non-ideological, personalistic, and apolitical aspects of Toledo’s 
message bear some resemblance to those employed by Fujimori, the Ideario nevertheless 
stakes out differences between government and challenger; as with the Peruvian 
opposition more broadly, this differentiation is established in second generation reformist 
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terms. The Ideario stresses the importance of democracy and the rule of law (the first 
policy area that it addresses), calling for respect for the Constitution and the separation of 
powers, and emphasizing the importance of freedoms of expression and the press. 
Accountability and integrity of governance, beyond their importance as goals in their 
own right, are depicted as a means to achieving improved economic outcomes and 
standards of living; five paragraphs of the Ideario are devoted to the connection between 
institutions and socioeconomic well-being. : 
 
Perú Posible maintains the conviction that democracy, good government, and 
honest, transparent, and responsible administration, constitute the indispensable 
foundation for achieving sustainable development....the indispensable 
requirements for sustained economic growth and enduring social development are 
the strength of institutions, independently of the duration of governments and of 
their political identity. (Toledo, “Ideario”) 
 
As is typical in second generation reformist messages, the claim that improved 
governance will translate into improved standards of living seems intended to 
compensate for a dearth of specific proposals.  In terms of economic ideology, the Ideario 
affirms the principles of the free market economy and fiscal austerity, stating that “The 
private sector...constitutes the principal protagonist of economic growth and 
accumulation of wealth” and calling for a “small and strong” state that is oriented toward 
promoting both domestic and international investment. Significant differences from the 
free market policies of the incumbent are difficult to identify.  The Ideario notes that 
small and medium sized enterprises should be a higher priority in economic development, 
and calls for a social policy that places a high priority on “social investment- not 
spending – in programs of health, education, and nutrition.” The Ideario stresses the need 
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for decentralization, arguing that the benefits from the natural resources and “human 
ingenuity” of the provinces should remain in their location of origin, and that the 
provision of social services should be shifted from the national to the subnational level. 
Beyond these statements, the purported policy plans of Perú Posible are expressed in 
terms of largely empty and vacuous generalizations, e.g.: 
 
... state policy decisions that affect the future of the population in general 
should focus on a vision that is prospective, shared, and has a defined direction 
that serves in the construction of a modern and prosperous country that provides 
well-being to present and future generations... our party offers the country 
experience in the application of techniques of strategic planning that promote the 
sustainable development of our natural and social environment, as well as in the 
formulation and management of projects that lead to this kind of development. 
(Toledo, “Ideario”). 
 
On the whole, the messages of the political parties that emerged to challenge Alberto 
Fujimori, and of the opposition’s eventual leader Alejandro Toledo, eschewed criticisms 
of the economic policies of incumbent government. Instead, the opposition promised an 
end to abuses of power, a renewed respect for institutional and constitutional norms, and 
a reversal of the government’s centralizing tendencies.  
The opposition’s emphasis on governance issues to draw contrasts between 
incumbent and challenger was reflected in the attitudes and evaluations of voters in 
surveys. A survey taken in Lima following the first round of elections showed that voters 
rated Fujimori ahead of Toledo in terms of his plan of government and ability to solve 
concrete problems by fourteen and fifteen points respectively, and preferred Fujimori by 
narrower margins for ability to create jobs and defend the poor. By contrast, Toledo’s 
biggest edge in issue evaluations was a five point advantage over Fujimori with regard to 
which candidate would better respect democratic institutions (APOYO, April 2000).  
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Another poll, taken nationwide, pointed to a similar trend: those who voted against 
Fujimori were roughly twice as likely to cite governance issues (too much time in power 
for the incumbent, authoritarianism, and corruption) as economic concerns as the primary 
reasons for their choice (Datum International, March 2000). In the same poll, voters were 
asked what their primary concern was regarding the possibility of Fujimori remaining in 
the presidency. Among voters who favored the opposition, the most commonly cited 
concern was the government’s authoritarian or dictatorial tendencies. Among those that 
favored Fujimori, the most commonly mentioned concern was continued unemployment 
(Datum International, March 2000).  
 
The Elections of 2000 and Their Aftermath 
  
Due in large part to the Fujimori government’s tactics, the 2000 election 
eventually came to revolve almost entirely around the question of democracy versus 
authoritarianism. During the last months of the campaign, Fujimori pulled out all the 
stops in order to secure reelection, and the opposition’s rhetoric increasingly focused on 
the government’s anti-democratic character, and on accusations of a tilted electoral 
playing field. Although Fujimori’s candidacy had long been a foregone conclusion, it was 
not officially announced until January of 2000, just four months before the election. The 
president’s “party” was dubbed Peru 2000. As with Fujimori’s initial political movement, 
the inclusion of the election year in the party name clearly indicated its provisional and 
temporary character.  
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The lack of nationwide organization or permanent structure of Fujimori’s 
movement played a significant role in the campaign, as it obliged the government to 
resort to fraud to secure sufficient signatures to place the party on the ballot (Roberts 
2006, 96). In February 2000, El Comercio, the daily newspaper most associated with the 
Peruvian middle and upper classes, published an expose detailing the falsification of 1.2 
million signatures for the party’s inscription.  The scandal resulted in a wave of 
international criticism (McClintock 2006, 258), further undermined Fujimori’s support 
among more affluent and educated voters,  and focused the domestic debate firmly on the 
issue of the propriety of the upcoming elections. In response,  Montesinos mounted a 
campaign of defamation against El Comercio in the headlines of  the tabloid press 
(Degregori 2001, 174).11 
State power was employed against the opposition in other ways, both openly and 
covertly. In late 1999, the government organized a massive advertising and publicity 
campaign based around the slogan “Peru, país con futuro,” (Peru, a country with a 
future). The campaign was viewed by the opposition as a thinly veiled pro-reelection 
initiative, and the numerous paintings of the slogan that appeared in large letters on 
public buildings used the same lettering and color scheme as that adopted by Fujimori’s 
Peru 2000 party (Conaghan 2001, 11). Food assistance programs were manipulated to 
pressure recipients to support Fujimori and participate in his rallies, gifts were provided 
to poor voters in exchange for political loyalty, and campaign workers were paid with 
state funds (Taylor 2001, 6-7). Along with the manipulation of the media to attack 
                                                 
11
 The signatures scandal and ensuing publicity were important in turning much of the economic elite of 
Lima against Fujimori; another factor in this regard were a series of land invasions in Lima in the months 
prior to the election that appeared to be tolerated by the government.  
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opposition candidates, the major broadcast TV outlets tended to ignore the opposition, 
while providing extensive and positive coverage to Fujimori. 
The government’s brazen abuse of state resources for electoral purposes became 
the central focus of opposition campaigning, and provoked intense debate over the 
possibility that the eventual balloting itself would be fraudulent. In the absence of 
substantive debates over policy, the opposition message focused largely on the integrity 
of the process, and the connection between doubts about the fairness of the election and 
the overall authoritarian tendencies of Fujimori’s government. Fujimori, for his part, ran 
a campaign that was equally devoid of policy content: his movement never bothered to 
present any sort of plan of government for his next administration, and he avoided 
participating in debates or forums with the other candidates (Tanaka 2003, 237). In the 
absence of any clear policy agenda, Fujimori’s message focused intently on the major 
achievements of his term (defeating inflation and terrorism) and on the construction of 
public works, along with personal denigration of his opponents and warnings that any  
change would undermine progress and could return Peru to the chaos of the late 1980s. 
 
Going into the April 9 election, polls suggested that Fujimori would be unable to 
win a majority in the first round, resulting in a runoff against Toledo. Initial exit polls 
conducted on election night seemed to bear this out; the major polling firms found Toledo 
to be leading by three to five points, creating a widespread public impression that 
Fujimori had lost. However, a quick count of actual ballots by the highly respected 
nongovernmental organization Transparencia showed Fujimori leading by approximately 
49 to 41 percent over Toledo. As the official tallies came in with the incumbent’s totals 
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hovering around 50%, international observers and domestic critics called into question 
the integrity of the contest. On the night of the election and the following days Toledo’s 
supporters mounted massive demonstrations (the biggest in Peru’s recent history) that in 
some cases verged into violent confrontations with the authorities.  
 
Table 4.1 – Peruvian Presidential Election, April 2000 
Candidate       % 
Alberto Fujimori (Perú 2000) 49.8 
Alejandro Toledo (Perú Posible) 40.3 
Alberto Andrade (Somos Perú) 2.7 
Other 3.9 
 
 
With the government under increasing pressure, the heavily politicized (and 
deeply mistrusted) electoral oversight board (ONPE) finally announced that Fujimori had 
fallen just short of 50%, taking 49.8% to Toledo’s 40.3%, and that a second round would 
be necessary (Table 5.1). While the official results were not far from Transparencia’s 
quick count, the suspiciously close nature of Fujimori’s failure to meet the 50% threshold 
was widely assumed to have been arrived at in part through fraud; having intended to 
manipulate Fujimori’s vote to just above 50%, the government had instead been forced to 
arrive at a result just below 50% due to the growing international doubts and domestic 
protests (Taylor 2001, 12-23; Conaghan 2001). 
Fujimori’s inability to triumph in the first round did not end the debate over the 
fairness of the process; the opposition, now completely united behind Toledo, continued 
to argue that the playing field for the second round (scheduled for May 28) was far from 
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level.  Over the next few weeks, Toledo’s campaign demanded that the government take 
measures to ensure an equitable election, including the end of discriminatory and 
manipulated media coverage, cessation of political use of state resources,  and outside 
oversight of ONPE and its computerized tabulation process. With the election rapidly 
approaching and the government refusing to cede, the opposition called for a delay; the 
government firmly rejected this demand. In the face of official intransigence, Toledo 
finally decided to boycott the runoff. In the May 28 balloting, Fujimori received 52% of 
the vote to Toledo’s 18%; 31% of the ballots were spoiled or left blank. (Conaghan 2001, 
Taylor 2001). The announcement of Fujimori’s victory was met with protests,  and over 
the coming months, the opposition continued to mobilize. In late July, as Fujimori was 
being inaugurated, Toledo and other opposition figured organized a “March of the Four 
Suyos” (named after the four regions of the Inca empire), in which tens of thousands of 
protesters converged on Lima. While the march was intended to be peaceful, violent 
clashes broke out, along with a fire that killed six security guards (evidence that emerged 
later pointed to government complicity in initiating the violence) (Conaghan 2001).  
Despite the fact that the elections were viewed as fraudulent by as much as half of 
the population, the anti-Fujimori opposition’s prospects were questionable. The protests 
organized by Toledo during the electoral dispute and the resulting conflict had cost him 
support from some of his supporters, (APOYO Informe de Opinión,  June 2000), as had 
his decision not to contest the election. The United States government, which had 
eventually adopted a critical position toward the elections, similarly grew more 
suspicious toward Toledo as a result of his post-election actions. As such, continued 
mobilization seemed to be a dead end; however, with the regime’s bases of institutional 
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power still intact, other options seemed limited. At the same time, Fujimori’s government 
had been clearly weakened by the election dispute, and took office under a cloud of 
disrepute. 
In September 2000, a single event triggered the complete collapse of the political 
edifice that had been constructed in Peru over the past decade. As had been the case in 
1990, Fujimori’s presidential victory had not been accompanied by a legislative majority; 
Peru 2000 only received 42% of the vote for Congress. In this case, rather than an 
autogolpe, the solution was bribery: Montesinos took advantage of the amorphous and 
weak nature of Toledo’s movement by bribing Perú Posible legislators to switch parties. 
Montesinos had conducted innumerable similar transactions during decade as the power 
behind the throne.  However, in September 2000, a video of Montesinos bribing a Perú 
Posible legislator to change sides was provided to leaders from the Frente Independiente 
Moralizador, a small opposition party. Within three days of the tape’s public 
presentation, Fujimori fired Montesinos, announced the elimination of the SIN, and 
called for new elections in which he would not be a candidate (Cameron 2006, 276-
277).12  In the following months, additional evidence (including many more such videos) 
surfaced, revealing the extent of Montesinos’ corruption. In the absence of the bribes and 
blackmail that had held it together, the regime quickly unraveled. Fujimori resigned from 
office and fled to Japan in November, and a transitional government was established, 
with new elections slated for 2001. 
 
                                                 
12
  In the preceding months, evidence had surfaced linking Montesinos to an illegal transfer of arms to the 
FARC rebel movement in Colombia.  It was widely believed that this revelation had cost Montesinos 
support from backers within the US, and provoked opponents to move against him (interview with Gustavo 
Gorriti, Lima, Feb. 2004).  
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While the second generation reformist opposition campaign against Fujimori had 
been insufficient to overcome the government’s subversion of the electoral process, the 
elections of 2000 were nonetheless critical in weakening the regime to the point of near-
collapse. By denying the government a first round majority and a legislative majority, by 
forcing Fujimori into increasingly more blatant and disreputable machinations to 
maintain power, and by establishing a unified opposition around issues of good 
government that won the support of close to half of the Peruvian public, the opposition 
movements of 2000 helped ensure that Fujimori would be unable to continue governing 
according to the method established during the previous decade. Alejandro Toledo had 
become the unquestioned standard-bearer for this second generation reformist opposition 
challenge - a challenge that was poised for successful completion in the upcoming 
election of 2000.
  
Chapter 5: Mexico 
 
Introduction 
 
 In Mexico, as in Argentina and Peru, a second generation reformist opposition 
movement emerged to successfully challenge an incumbent party that had pursued 
sweeping market reforms.  As in Argentina and Peru, initial optimism and positive 
performance had led to the incumbent party’s reelection in the mid 1990s, and economic 
decline since then had opened up new spaces for the opposition.  However, the Mexican 
case differs from the other two cases in several important ways.   
 Unlike in Argentina and Peru, the incumbent party – the PRI - had not been 
elected in the aftermath of the economic crisis of the 1980s, but had ruled continuously 
since 1929 (and in recent decades, had presided over repeated economic crises). As a 
result, the election of 2000 was not only a referendum on the preceding administration, 
but on the PRI’s entire history in government. Mexico’s process of market reform also 
differed from the neoliberal adjustment packages of Carlos Menem and Alberto Fujimori. 
While Argentina and Peru pursued rapid, dramatic liberalizations, Mexico’s liberalization 
was more gradual, extending over two decades; it also left some key sectors untouched 
(in particular, the symbolically important and economically crucial energy and oil 
industries, which remained in state hands). A third major difference was the nature of 
Mexico’s opposition. Unlike in Argentina, where opposition parties formed an alliance, 
 158 
or Peru, where opposition voters transferred their support from one leading figure to 
another, Mexico’s opposition remained divided at the time of the election, both at the 
leadership level and at the mass level. The division in the anti-PRI opposition 
corresponded with a diverging visions of political and policy change. The National 
Action Party (PAN) promoted a vision of change that was essentially second generation 
reformist, while the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD) espoused a view that was 
nationalist and economically leftist. In Mexico, the central question of this comparative 
study – why the most important opposition movement was second generation reformist in 
character,  rather than representing an economically leftist viewpoint – was determined 
via an explicit choice by Mexico’s opposition voters between two contrasting 
alternatives.  
 
 In the following pages I describe the nature of the PRI, its rule, and its decline. I 
then provide a profile of the two major opposition parties, including their origins, the 
evolution of their identity, and their prior efforts to shake the PRI’s grip on the Mexican 
state.  I then examine the PAN’s 2000 electoral strategy and second generation reformist 
message, draw contrasts with the 2000 message of the PRD, and describe the campaign 
and its outcome. 
 
The PRI 
 
The 2000 elections were preceded by a long period of decline for the Partido de la 
Revolución Institucional.  From its founding as the the Partido Nacional Revoluciónario 
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in 1929 through most of the 20th century, the PRI dominated Mexican politics, 
maintaining control of the legislature for 68 years, and control of the executive branch for 
71. Although initially founded as an elite political vehicle, in the decade following its 
creation the PRI a adopted the main characteristics that it would retain throughout most 
its long period of hegemony: a catch-all ideological identity, a corporatist structure, and a 
reliance on clientelism and control of state resources to build social support, co-opt 
potential opponents, and maintain a monopoly on power. 
 The PRI incorporated a range of ideological tendencies, and its ideological 
direction oscillated over time. Under Lázaro Cárdenas (1934), who reorganized the PRI 
(under Cárdenas known as the Party of the Mexican Revolution, or PRM), into a mass 
party, populism and nationalism prevailed.  Cárdenas’ most prominent initiatives with 
enduring influence included land reform and nationalization of industry (in particular, the 
oil and railroad industries). Cárdenas’ successor, Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) 
adopted a more moderate orientation; he was followed by the strongly pro-business 
Miguel Alemán (1946-1952). This pattern of ideological alternation would continue 
through the coming decades, as Mexico’s powerful PRI presidents came and went in 
orderly fashion; with each president placing his stamp on the country’s policy direction 
while maintaining some of the policies of his predecessors. Political competition and 
ideological factionalism were largely contained within the bounds of the ruling PRI 
 The PRI’s hegemonic and all-encompassing position within Mexican politics 
rested on several pillars. Fundamentally, the party’s dominance was based on control of 
state resources; throughout most of its period of control, there was no effective distinction 
between the PRI and the Mexican state. The PRI exercised a monopoly over government 
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jobs and patronage, drew freely on the state budget to finance political campaigns, and 
forged extensive and long-lasting clientelistic links with both the poor and with business 
interests. The party devoted considerable effort to justifying and legitimating the Mexican 
party-state through propaganda and symbolism, depicting the PRI as uniquely embodying 
the ideals of the Mexican revolution. Major media outlets were among the government’s 
most reliable clients, and loyally supported the PRI.   
The PRI’s unchallenged grip on the state apparatus was paralleled by its dominant 
position in social organization. The main social sectors in Mexico, including workers and 
peasants, were organized and mobilized primarily through corporatist organizations 
controlled by the PRI, whose leaders were primarily concerned with ensuring their 
organizations’ compliance with government priorities. When facing a challenge from 
potentially independent leaders or organizations, the PRI typically employed the vast 
state resources at its disposal to co-opt the most influential leaders of potential 
challengers, bringing them into the system.  Although the incorporation or buying off of 
potential opposition was the PRI’s preferred approach, the regime was willing to resort to 
violent repression of social organizations when it appeared necessary, most prominently 
in the case of a 1968 massacre of student demonstrators in Mexico City. 
 An additional political asset of the PRI was its considerable capacity and 
willingness to engage in electoral fraud and abuse. The party’s control of the state, 
combined with electoral laws that disadvantaged the opposition, may have been sufficient 
on their own to preserve PRI dominance; nonetheless, election fraud was commonplace 
and extensive. Tactics employed by the PRI included “stuffing ballot boxes, intimidating 
potential opposition supporters, disqualifying opposition party poll-watchers, relocating 
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polling places at the last minute, issuing multiple voting credentials to PRI supporters and 
organizing multiple voting.” (Craig and Cornelius 1995, 255) Beyond efforts to subvert 
the balloting process, the PRI also frequently manipulated the counting of votes. Even in 
the absence of electoral fraud, the PRI’s other advantages would likely have sufficed to 
maintain its dominant position (Klesner 2005, 107); however, the party needed electoral 
victories to be as wide as possible in order to validate its claim to represent the entire 
Mexican public. The PRI’s total control of the institutions that administered elections 
guaranteed impunity for manipulations of the electoral process. 
The PRI’s ability to control the state, its domination of social organization, and its 
capacity for fraud, made Mexico a model of authoritarian stability amid modernization. 
Even as other Latin American countries were thrown into political turmoil by the social 
changes associated with modernization and the rise of Cold War-era ideological 
polarization, Mexico’s PRI presidents peacefully and predictably succeeded each other at 
six year intervals, the country experienced an economic boom, and a substantial middle 
class emerged.  Despite Mexico’s apparent prosperity and stability, tensions began to 
appear during the 1960s.  The PRI’s corporatist representative structures, established to 
reflect the social profile of Mexico during the 1930s, became increasingly less viable in 
the face of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and the PRI’s sectoral organizations 
gradually became less effective at mobilizing reliable electoral support.     
Weakening economic performance beginning in the 1970s also undermined 
support for the PRI. Under these conditions, a 1976 economic crisis that forced a 
devaluation of the peso posed the most pressing threat to the party’s dominance since the 
1930s.  Facing increased social pressures and declining legitimacy, the PRI responded 
 162 
with a set of electoral reforms that eased the process of registering independent parties 
opened up additional spaces for the opposition in Congress. The discovery of massive oil 
reserves in 1977 provided short term breathing room for the Mexican economy and for 
the PRI.  However, the reprieve would prove to be only temporary; the collapse of oil 
prices in 1982, and the country’s ensuing debt default, devaluation, and economic 
catastrophe triggered a profound crisis for the governing party. In the following years, the 
party would face the challenge of drastically reorienting the country’s economic model in 
the context of rising demands from an increasingly organized social and political 
opposition. 
 
The PRI in the Neoliberal Era 
 
While previous decades had seen a slow but steady erosion of PRI support and 
increase in political competition, during the 1980s the shift away from PRI hegemony  
accelerated dramatically. To some extent, the sudden emergence of meaningful 
opposition represented the culmination of the social changes and electoral reforms 
described above. The rise of political competition was also to a great extent triggered by 
recent developments: the debt crisis, and the market reforms that followed it.   In the 
elections of 1988, the first in which the PRI for the first time faced a credible challenger 
for the presidency, the Mexican political system was shaken to its core.   
 
Under Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), the PRI embarked upon a process of 
economic liberalization that would continue well into the next decade and transform the 
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country’s economy. Despite the inevitable social unrest associated with a shift to the 
market under conditions of economic decline and surging poverty, the relative strength 
and adaptability of the PRI’s corporatist and clientelist machinery prevented widespread 
upheaval.  Nonetheless, the move toward neoliberalism triggered increasing internal 
dissension within the PRI, as the long-existing balance and mutual tolerance among the 
party’s varied ideological factions frayed. Traditionalists viewed the move toward the 
free market and international economic integration as a betrayal of revolutionary ideals of 
nationalism and populism. Moreover, the party’s policy shift was associated with the 
empowerment of a class of pro-reform technocrats at the expense of the party’s 
traditional leadership (often referred to as the “dinosaurs”). The growing internal friction 
ensured that the party’s traditional, top-down method of selecting the next president – the 
dedazo, in which a president chose his successor – would be less tolerable. 
When demands for increased internal democracy and more attention to the poor 
were met with resistance from the party’s top leadership, a dissident movement 
(described in more detail in the following section) broke with the party to contest the 
1988 elections. Headed by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the son of the revered former president 
Lázaro Cárdenas, the new opposition rapidly gained public support, and represented an 
unprecedented electoral threat to the PRI.  The PRI responded to the unwelcome 
emergence of electoral competition with electoral fraud. When early election results from 
early in the elections showed strong performance for the opposition New Democratic 
Front (FDN), the computer counting the results mysteriously crashed; when it came back 
on line, the PRI had a commanding lead. In the end, the official numbers gave the FDN 
32% of the vote to a bare 51% majority for the PRI.   
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While an accurate vote count may well have given the PRI a (narrower) victory, 
the official figures were largely discounted by opposition supporters, and Cárdenas’ 
insistence that the PRI had robbed his party of a victory obtained widespread credence.  
The combined opposition – primarily the FDN, and the center right National Action Party 
(PAN), which was Mexico’s most established opposition party - also captured an 
unprecedented 48% of the seats in Mexico’s lower house of Congress. Having barely 
managed a majority in a clearly fraudulent election, the PRI’s claim to universal 
representativeness was definitively shattered. Although the party maintained formidable 
political resources due to its continued grip on the state apparatus, the party’s future 
would be determined in an environment in which genuine electoral competition was an 
unavoidable reality, in which the party’s legitimacy had been dramatically compromised, 
and in which PRI victories would be greeted with public suspicion. 
 
The challenge of responding to these new circumstances fell to Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari (1986-1994). Salinas was a representative of the newly influential technocratic 
wing of the party, having received a Ph.D. from Harvard and first entered government in 
1982. Salinas pushed ahead with liberalization, reversing past land reform policies, 
accelerating privatization, lowering barriers to investment and trade, and pressing for 
acceptance of the North American Free Trade Agreement (the last being viewed as a 
means of permanently locking neoliberal policies in place, in addition to being an 
important policy goal in its own right).  The ability to persist with market reforms while 
maintaining public support was boosted by strong economic performance achieved 
during Salinas’ term.  By 1994, nominal GDP per capita had increased by over 70% 
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relative to 1984, foreign investment had surged, and inflation had been reduced to single 
digits (González Gómez 1998, 43). 
Beyond drawing on overall public satisfaction and optimism to rebuild the PRI’s 
damaged prestige, Salinas employed social spending as a means of reconnecting with the 
party’s lower class base,  in particular through the National Solidarity (PRONASOL)  
social spending program. PRONASOL was both extensive and politically targeted; its 
spending was disproportionately concentrated in areas in which the PRD (the leftist party 
that had succeeded the FDN of 1988) was most competitive. Decisions over the 
allocation of PRONASOL funds were made independently by the executive, without 
influence from traditional PRI bosses (let al.one from opposition leaders); the program 
was thus intended to both strengthen the PRI relative to the opposition, and to strengthen 
the hand of the president and the new technocratic elite relative to the PRI 
“dinosaurs.”(Fox 1994, Dresser 1991) While the central government’s efforts to 
undermine the PRD threat relied on clientelism, local competition for political supremacy 
sometimes involved violence – between 1989 and 2000, hundreds of PRD activists were 
victims of political murders (Levy and Bruhn 2006, 93).  
The antagonistic relationship between the PRI and the PRD contrasted with the 
ruling party’s approach to the other major opposition party, the center-right PAN.  Under 
Salinas, the PRI cultivated a legislative alliance with the business-oriented PAN to assist 
with the passage of its market reform policies. Partly as a condition for this cooperation, 
and partly because it was perceived as necessary to restore legitimacy to the Mexican 
political system, the PRI under Salinas agreed to the implementation of additional 
electoral reforms; the new measures enhanced the ability of minority parties to gain 
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legislative representation, and (perhaps most importantly) weakened the PRI’s control 
over the administration of elections. Recognizing that another dubious election would be 
devastating to the PRI and potentially undermine the efforts made since 1988 to rebuild 
social confidence in the party, the Salinas government took pains to make the 1994 
election the most transparent and fair contest in Mexico’s history. Although the PRI 
continued to benefit from access to financial resources that far outstripped those of the 
other parties, as well as favorable media coverage, the 1994 presidential election was 
widely perceived as fair.  
Thanks to the economic recovery, the president’s positive image, and the  
effectiveness of efforts to disarm the PRD, a credible vote count was in the PRI’s interest. 
The party had already made a strong comeback in the 1991 legislative elections, and had 
reason to be optimistic about 1994.  Salinas’ government had apparently successfully 
passed the daunting tests presented by the aftermath of the 1988 shock, through a 
combination of continued market reform, effective use of clientelism to secure contested 
lower class votes, the increasing personalization of political authority relative to 
traditional bosses and party structures, and electoral reforms to satisfy opposition 
demands for more open competition. In the run up to the election, the country was shaken 
the January 1 uprising of the Zapatista insurgent movement in Chiapas, and by the 
assassination of two major PRI figures (including the party’s presidential candidate). 
Nonetheless, the PRI’s replacement candidate, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, was 
elected with 48.8 percent of the vote, 23 points ahead of his nearest rival, Diego 
Fernández de Cevallos of the PAN. 
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Zedillo’s honeymoon was short-lived. Within a few days of his inauguration, 
Mexico was struck by a major economic crisis. Vulnerabilities within the Mexican 
economy that had been successfully concealed during the election period, in particular a 
growing current account deficit, became painfully clear. In less than three months, the 
value of the peso declined by almost a third (Levy and Bruhn 2006, 173). The effects of 
the crisis were devastating:  the Mexican economy contracted by 6.2 percent in 1995, 
(González Gómez 1998, 53),  industrial wages dropped by more than 30% over two 
years, and unemployment surged (Magaloni 1999, 207-208). By 1997, the economy had 
resumed growth, but by the end of the decade this growth had not yet made up the ground 
that had been lost since 1994. 
As a result of the crisis and the ensuing loss of public faith, the electoral 
environment turned strongly against the PRI. The combined effects of the newly open 
electoral system and the punishing impact of the economic collapse opened the door to 
unprecedented opposition gains in the midterm elections of 1997. For the first time in the 
country’s modern history, the PRI lost its majority in Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies, 
with the resurgent PRD taking second place. Additional electoral reforms put in place 
prior to the election had reinforced the independence of the Federal Election Institute 
(IFE), reduced the biggest party’s overrepresentation in the legislature, and greatly 
leveled the financial playing field between government and opposition (Domínguez 1999, 
8).  The 1997 election result clearly demonstrated the meaningful impact of these 
changes. 
Recognizing the changed political environment, the increasing public demands for 
democracy, and the need to renovate the party’s image (Bruhn 2004, 125), the PRI 
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altered its candidate selection process for the 2000 presidential elections. In place of the 
outgoing president’s anointment of a successor, the party held its first contested primary 
election. After a hard-fought contest, the nomination fell to Francisco Labastida, a former 
cabinet minister and state governor who was acceptable to both the technocratic and 
political wings of the party (Bruhn 2004, 126).    Despite the PRI’s declining public 
support and the party’s possible need for a fresher image, their candidate was a 
representative of the PRI’s political mainstream and its partisan establishment. As such, 
Labastida faced an electoral task that would be far different from any in his party’s 
history: defending the PRI’s record in an environment of widespread social 
discontentment, and facing an opposition with a realistic prospect of ending the PRI’s 
seven-decade control of the executive.  
As of 1997, however, it was not clear which opposition would be more likely to 
pose such a challenge.  As had been the case since 1988, Mexico’s opposition was 
divided between two major parties.  The two contenders offered very different visions, 
and had developed a fundamental rivalry in their pursuit of the anti-PRI vote. 
 
 
The Opposition I: The Party of Democratic Revolution 
 
As Levy and Bruhn (2006, 97) have noted, the rise of the leftist Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (PRD) was a cause as well as a consequence of Mexico’s 
increased political openness and competition during the late 1980s. The party’s origin 
stemmed from divisions within the PRI over the party’s embrace of market reform 
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policies under De la Madrid.  In 1985 and 1986, prominent politicians from the left wing 
of the PRD led the formation of a dissident bloc within the PRI that became known as the 
Corriente Democrática (CD). The most notable of these leaders were Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas, and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, a former labor minister and PRI party head. 
The CD’s grievances toward the PRI leadership involved both ideological 
differences and discontentment with the party’s internal practices. The leftist wing of the 
PRI had objected to the specific policies undertaken by de la Madrid; they rejected 
privatization, free trade, and the shrinking of the state, believing these to be departures 
from the ideals of the Mexican Revolution  (Bruhn 1997, 76). Instead, they maintained 
that Mexico’s response to the economic crisis should focus primarily on attending to the 
social needs of the masses.  The CD’s first manifesto emphasized the importance of 
national sovereignty, and depicted the country’s foreign debt (and the overwhelming 
priority that the de la Madrid government placed on debt repayment) as the primary threat 
to that sovereignty (Bruhn 1997, 80). Alongside these policy and ideological differences, 
the CD criticized the post-crisis PRI for lack of internal democracy, exclusion of 
dissenting perspectives,  and alienation from its social bases.   The dissidents within the 
PRD held that the party’s shift toward neoliberalism and ostensible abandonment of its 
revolutionary principles was linked to the increasing importance of technocrats within the 
party and the stifling of dissenting viewpoints (Bruhn 1997, 84-86).  An increased 
emphasis on social participation was seen as necessary to correct the party’s drift away 
from its popular bases, and any challenge to the party’s newly adopted neoliberalism 
would require a more inclusive and open process for selecting De la Madrid’s successor 
(Bruhn 1997, 80-81, 87; Craig and Cornelius 1995, 259). 
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The nationalistic and populist character of the CD’s founding principles reflected 
important historic tendencies within the PRI, tendencies that could be traced to the tenure 
of Lázaro Cárdenas.  The conflict between these tendencies and the more market-oriented 
elements of the PRI was not new; however, the economic crisis, the adoption of drastic 
market reforms, and PRI’s shift toward a technocratic identity sharpened these conflicts 
considerably (Bruhn 1997, 84-85). During the years that followed the CD’s 
transformation into a viable opposition party, the party’s message would evolve 
depending on political circumstances. However, the primary concerns and principles 
present at its founding persisted: questioning of free-market orthodoxy, a focus on 
attending to the social needs of the popular sector, calls for national sovereignty and 
economic self-determination, and an emphasis on social participation remained 
consistently fundamental to the PRD’s electoral appeal. 
The PRI leadership responded to the CD’s challenge with open hostility (Bruhn 
1997, 92-96) and a complete rejection of the dissidents’ demands for internal democracy. 
With the party’s presidential nomination process left firmly in the hands of De la Madrid, 
the CD faction saw no other option but to abandon the party, formally breaking with the 
PRI in 1987 (Bruhn 1997, 98; Craig and Cornelius 1995, 259).  Having broken with the 
party to declare his own candidacy, Cárdenas attracted the support of a range of non-PRI 
political organizations, first accepting the nomination of a small opposition party, and 
going on to attain the support of several small independent leftist parties and former PRI 
allies (Craig and Cornelius 1995, 277; Bruhn 1997, 103-112).  These organizations 
formed a coordinating group called the New Democratic Front (FDN), at whose head 
Cárdenas contested the 1998 elections.  
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While the FDN was technically a conglomeration of political organizations, the 
1988 opposition challenge clearly was centered on the figure of Cárdenas rather than the 
groups that composed his electoral front. Cárdenas gained a vastly higher vote total than 
the FDN’s combined parties had in the previous election, and performed strongly in some 
areas that had previously lent little support to the opposition (Craig and Cornelius 1995, 
277). Cárdenas’ personal prestige, in part derived from associations with his father, 
helped compensate for his organization’s lack of resources and funding (Bruhn 1997, 
124-125). As his campaign gathered public momentum and polls showed him to be the 
most supported opposition candidate, Cárdenas became the primary option of voters for 
whom anti-PRI sentiment was the overriding determinant of vote choice. 
 
The party’s powerful and unprecedented challenge to the PRI in the disputed 1988 
elections cemented Cárdenas at the head of Mexico’s increasingly relevant opposition. 
Following the 1988 elections, Cárdenas and some other leaders of the FDN called for the 
formation of a new party, to be named the Partido de la Revolución Democrática.  
Several of the parties that had thrown their support to Cárdenas in the 1988 election did 
not adhere to the new party; however, the new party maintained a considerable diversity 
of internal actors, including former representatives of small left-wing parties and ex-
priistas, as well as social movement activists (Levy and Bruhn 2006, 98). 
The PRD immediately faced major challenges in moving beyond its identity as a 
vehicle for protest votes in the 1988 election and a establishing itself as a viable and 
sustainiable opposition party. A central problem was the party’s dependence on the figure 
of Cárdenas for its identity and public profile. To some extent, the party relied on 
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Cárdenas personal image in place of a clear ideological platform (Levy and Bruhn 2006, 
98-99), and in the years following their arrival on the scene the party went on to perform 
poorly in subnational elections in which Cárdenas was not on the ballot (Craig and 
Cornelius 1995, 278). Under Salinas, the PRI concentrated on suppressing the PRD; at 
the same time, the ruling party accepted victories by the PAN (which had recognized 
Salinas’ victory and collaborated with his economic reform agenda).  The PRD was 
further hampered by the efforts of the Salinas administration to undermine the party’s 
organization and mobilization efforts through social spending in politically competitive 
areas (Bruhn 1997, 219-221, 260-266), as well as by localized repression and political 
violence.  Finally, Mexico’s economic recovery undermined the appeal of the PRD’s 
attacks against the PRI’s shift to neoliberalism (Bruhn 1997, 217-223).  
Buoyed by the popularity both of Salinas and of his economic policies 
(Domínguez and McCann 1996, 131-133), the PRI had recovered from the crisis of 1988 
to resoundingly win the midterm elections of 1991; the PRD fell to 8.3 percent of the 
vote. More than 20% of Cárdenas’ 1988 voters returned to the PRI in 1991, while many 
others voted for the parties that had abandoned the FDN after 1988. (Craig and Cornelius 
1995, 278). The PRD again fared poorly in the 1994 presidential elections, with Cárdenas 
falling to third place and garnering just 16.6% of the vote; polls showed that 20% of 
Cárdenas’ supporters from 1988 cast their vote for the center-right PAN (Domínguez and 
McCann 1996,  207). Despite having mounted the most successful challenge to the PRI in 
history, the PRD appeared to have become primarily a regional party (Craig and 
Cornelius 1995, 278), and Cárdenas had clearly lost his position as the primary standard-
bearer for anti-PRI opposition.  
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 In the midterm elections of 1997, however, the PRD rebounded.  With social 
dissatisfaction running high in the aftermath of the peso crisis, the PRD capitalized on the 
opportunities presented by an increasingly open and fair electoral environment and a 
weakened incumbent party.  The newly contested position of Mexico City mayor offered 
a clear opportunity for the PRD to seize a prominent office, as the Federal District was 
one of the party’s primary electoral strongholds. Cárdenas rose to the occasion with an 
effective campaign that mobilized lower class and anti-regime voters (Lawson 1999) and 
defeated the PRI’s candidate by 20 points, apparently positioning himself well for a third 
presidential run in 2000. More unexpectedly, the PRD performed strongly in the national 
legislative election, winning 25.7% of the vote, edging out the PAN as the second largest 
opposition party in the legislature, and elevating PRD founder Muñoz Ledo to the head of 
the Congress (Bruhn 1999, 89). 
 Having attained instant success as an electoral protest movement,  and 
subsequently struggled to consolidate as a national opposition party, by the 2000 the PRD 
appeared to have established itself as a credible contender to unseat the PRI from its 71 
year hold on power. However, its claim to leadership of the anti-PRI opposition remained 
hotly contested by Mexico’s oldest and best-organized opposition party: the center right 
National Action Party (PAN). 
 
The Opposition II: The National Action Party 
 
In 2000, the Partido de Acción Nacional had a history of opposition almost as 
long as the PRI’s history of hegemony.  The party was founded in 1939 in response to the 
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nationalist policies of Lázaro Cárdenas. Cárdenas’ state-centered economic policies, land 
reform measures, and nationalization of major industries were rejected by much of 
Mexico’s economic elite and some middle class professionals; at the same time, the 
government’s anti-clerical posture alienated religious leaders.  The social ties that 
resulted from these initial divisions would be persistently central to the PAN’s identity;  
business interests and the Catholic church remained dominant influences on the PAN 
throughout the rest of the century . However, the role and relative importance of those 
actors varied over time. (Craig and Cornelius 1995, Shirk 2004, Mizrahi 2003). 
Although the PAN’s economic ideology differed intensely from that of Cárdenas’ 
PRM, the virtual exclusion of the party from electoral competition ensured that, from the 
beginning, their political challenge would revolve to a great extent on contestation of the 
hegemonic position of Mexico’s dominant party, and promotion of liberal democratic 
principles (Shirk 2004). In the following decades, the PAN’s positions on economic 
issues shifted in accordance with internal party dynamics, while a succession of PRI 
presidents implemented economic policies that varied in the extent to which they 
accorded with the PAN’s preferences.  Amid these shifts, the PAN’s commitment to 
more open electoral competition remained consistently central to the party’s identity.  
 Over the course of its sixty-year presence in the political opposition, the PAN’s 
approach to the problem of PRI dominance and the nature of its ideological message 
varied.   During its early years, recognizing the inevitable futility of any attempt to 
capture control of government, the PAN did not attempt to challenge the PRI directly at 
the national level, opting to contest the ruling party at the local level in PAN strongholds 
(Craig and Cornelius 1995, 271), and adopting the role of a principled opposition voice 
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while refraining from anti-system appeals- in effect, accepting the dominant position of 
the PRI at the national level for the immediate future. During the 1950s, amid frustration 
with lack of electoral progress, the party leadership began to take a more aggressive 
stance in response to the PRI’s electoral abuses; however, a more conciliatory tendency 
later took hold, as demonstrated by the party’s decision to recognize PRI presidential 
victories during the mid-1960s (Shirk 2004, 75).  In response to electoral reforms in 1946 
and 1963 that essentially required parties to demonstrate a national electoral presence, the 
PAN began to run candidates throughout much of the country; albeit with limited 
success; between 1964 and 1979, the PAN’s share of the vote in elections for federal 
deputies ranged from 9 to 15%, while the number of seats held by the PAN gradually 
increased.  The PAN first nominated a presidential candidate in1952, and finished second 
in every presidential election until 1988 (with the exception of 1976). During this period, 
the PAN firmly established itself as the most prominent and organizationally strong 
opposition party; however, its support remained regionally concentrated, and it never 
posed a genuinely threatening challenge to PRI control.   
During the 1970s, following the death of its founder, the PAN was split by 
ideological divisions. The factional struggles prevented the party from fielding a 
candidate in the 1976 presidential election; in that same year, the nationwide share of the 
vote for the party declined by almost 50% from the previous election. The party was 
revitalized during the 1980s, as support from business leaders (in particular, in the north 
of Mexico) surged in response to economic failures and the PRI’s disastrous 
nationalization of banks. The PAN became increasingly competitive in regional elections, 
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forcing the PRI to resort to obvious fraud to defeat a PAN candidate in the Chihuahua 
governor’s race in 1986 (and foreshadowing the contested presidential election of 1988). 
The PAN’s dominant ideology also shifted throughout the first decades of its 
history.  The decision of Cárdenas to select the business friendly Manuel Avila Camacho 
as his successor, and Avila Camacho’s overtures to the private sector, led some elements 
of the PAN’s entrepreneurial base to cast their lot with the PRI during the 1940s and 
1950s, refraining from political opposition in exchange for favorable treatment from the 
regime (Mizrahi 2003, 69). At the same time, Catholic activists increased their clout 
within the party. As a result of these changes, the PAN’s ideology underwent a shift to 
the left, with Catholic doctrines emphasizing social responsibility increasing in influence 
relative to free-market principles.  In the 1970s, the increasingly statist economic policies 
of PRI presidents generated a shift in the opposite direction.  Reactions against the 
populist administration of Luis Echeverría resulted in the increased influence of pro-
market leadership within the party.  Internal divisions resulting in part from this were 
behind the failure to nominate a presidential candidate in 1976.  However, the economic 
turmoil of the late 1970s and 1980s, and the ensuing decision of President José López 
Portillo to nationalize the banking system in 1982, and the galvanization of business 
support for the PAN (Middlebrook 2001, 22; Mizrahi 2003, 74; Shirk 2004, 100), and 
cemented economic liberalism at the forefront of the party’s identity.  
 As the PRI under De la Madrid and Salinas responded to the debt crisis by 
rapidly shifting Mexico toward a free market model, the PAN generally pursued 
accommodation with the PRI on economic issues.  As a result, the standard bearer for the 
anti-PRI vote in the 1988 elections was Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, at the head of the newly 
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formed leftist party that would later become the PRD. After Cárdenas’ controversial 
defeat in 1988, the PAN grudgingly accepted Salinas’ questionable victory, in return for 
the government’s promise to recognize future PAN victories at the state level, and 
implement additional electoral reforms. The PAN’s cooperation with the PRI regime 
supported the policy goals of important sectors within the party and the government’s  
reform concessions created new political openings for the opposition; however, the 
collaboration tended to undermine the party’s identity as standard-bearer for the 
country’s democratic opposition and the sole viable vehicle for electoral protest 
(Middlebrook 2001).  While a pro-PRI/anti-PRI divide would continue to dominate 
Mexican politics, the support of the anti-PRI electorate would now be contested. This 
competition for the support of voters for whom removing the PRI was the top priority 
was a central preoccupation for the challengers in the election of 2000. 
As the Mexican party system shifted to a three party structure during the 1990s, 
the PAN’s general message continued to demonstrate fundamental agreement with the 
neoliberal economic policies initiated by De la Madrid and dramatically advanced by 
Salinas as the PRI no longer enjoyed a substantial majority in Congress, this policy 
support from the PAN was important in the passage of key neoliberal reforms following 
the 1988 elections (Magaloni and Moreno 2003, 257).  Conservative views on social 
issues continued to pay a role in the party’s identity and discourse, but had limited 
salience in national level political competition. In the absence of economic policy 
differences, the party’s advocacy of democratic openness and participation served as the 
most fundamental distinction between the PAN and the PRI.  
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The electoral reforms and willingness of the PRI to recognize PAN victories in 
exchange for political cooperation led to a wave of successes for the PAN in state and 
municipal contests. Between 1988 and 1995, the PAN went from controlling zero 
governorships to controlling four; from 1988 to 1996, PAN municipal governments 
increased in number from 17 to 292. (Shirk 2004, 107, 110);   These victories enabled the 
party to add a new element to their campaign message by touting their successful 
governing experience and achievements at the subnational level. The PAN’s success at 
the local and regional level elevated the party’s overall profile and brought new leaders to 
prominence, and allowed PAN candidates to point to accomplishments in governance; 
this allowed the PAN to challenge the widespread perception, promoted by the PRI, that 
only the ruling party’s leaders had the necessary experience to govern effectively.  
   
While the PAN’s growing strength and the increased competitiveness of the 
electoral system offered new opportunities, the division of the opposition vote between 
PAN and PRD prevented the party from posing a major independent challenge to PRI 
control during the 1990s. In the 1994 election, the party’s candidate, Diego Fernández de 
Cevallos, finished a distant second with 26% of the vote; in the landmark 1997 legislative 
elections that ended the PRI’s majority control, the PAN received 27% of the vote, just 
one point ahead of the PRD, while the PRD captured control of the Mexico City mayor’s 
office, the second most important office in the country.  The new political environment 
provided an unprecedented opening for an opposition victory in the 2000 presidential 
elections; however, any successful PAN candidate would have to win back the mantle of 
the pro-democratic opposition leadership from the newly ascendant left. The profile and 
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electoral strategy of the candidate who captured the PAN’s nomination, Vicente Fox 
Quesada, were well suited to this task. 
 
As a businessman who entered PAN politics during the 1980s, and rose to 
prominence via a governorship in the 1990s, Vicente Fox’s career in some ways closely 
reflected the recent evolution of the PAN.   At the same time, his rise to the party’s 
leadership was built to a great extent on efforts and strategies that circumvented his 
party’s internal organizations and leadership in favor of an independent and personally 
driven campaign.   Fox, a high level executive for Coca-Cola before entering politics, 
was one of many business leaders who became involved in PAN politics during the 1980s 
(Shirk 2000, 29; Shirk 2004). Fox was first elected to Congress in 1988. In 1991 he ran 
for governor of the state of Guanajuato, losing to the PRI candidate in an election riddled 
with fraud.  Following negotiations between the PRI and PAN over the contested 
election, the PRI governor resigned, but was replaced as interim governor not by Fox, but 
rather by another PAN leader who had adopted a more conciliatory tone toward the 
Salinas administration. Over the next few years, Fox’s relations with both the ruling party 
and with his own party grew more conflictive, largely due to obstructions of his efforts to 
run for president (an intention first declared in 1992). (Shirk 2004, 122). After 
temporarily leaving politics as a result of these conflicts, Fox returned to win the 
governorship of Guanajuato in 1995. 
Following his election, Fox immediately began pursuing his goal of obtaining the 
PAN nomination for the presidency in 2000.  Faced with resistance to this ambition from 
the party’s leadership, Fox began pursing a strategy that avoided formal party channels 
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and involved cultivating a personal base of support. As governor, Fox used his position as 
governor to generate publicity and build his national and international profile (Shirk 
2004, 124). At the same time as he attempted to build an independent image, Fox strove 
to establish an independent financial and organizational base for his campaign with the 
formation of the “Friends of Fox,” a committee of his supporters and associates that 
raised funds and engaged in pre-electoral publicity on his behalf. As an autonomous, 
ostensibly nonpartisan organization, the Friends of Fox were able to incorporate 
supporters from outside the PAN (and from a broader range of ideological backgrounds) 
as well as ignore regulations limiting partisan campaign fundraising. 
By the end of the 1990s, Fox had risen to the position of undisputed front-runner 
for the PAN nomination, on the basis of his own self-promotion as well as failures and 
misjudgments on the part of his opponents within the party leadership. As a result, he 
faced no serious rivals to his nomination, and was formally nominated in an internal 
election in 1999.  Having achieved the first step in his pursuit of the presidency, Fox 
faced two remaining challenges: securing his position as the leader of the diverse 
electoral coalition that was united only by anti-PRI sentiment, and translating that anti-
PRI opposition into an electoral victory.  His campaign approached these goals in the 
same manner that he had obtained his party’s nomination: by relying strongly on his 
personal image and profile in addition to party organizations and partisan loyalties, and 
by emphasizing pragmatism and openness to a broad and heterogeneous sources of 
support. This approach would have consequences for the content of his campaign’s 
message, his capacity for electoral success, and the eventual prospects for effective 
governance following his victory. 
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The nature and content of democratic contestation in late 20th century Mexico was 
deeply influenced by the hegemonic position of the PRI.  The dominant party’s unbroken 
hold on the reins of government made voter evaluations of past performance and future 
prospects inseparable from their attitudes toward the PRI. The desirability of continued 
PRI rule, and the propriety of the methods by which that rule was sustained, assumed a 
central role in the political debate (Moreno 2003, 111-112). Domínguez and McCann 
(1996) have characterized Mexican vote choice during this period as following a “two-
step” process, in which the primary decision made by voters is whether they support or 
oppose the maintenance of the PRI in power. According to this view, after a voter’s anti-
PRI orientation has been determined, he or she chooses between the two major opposition 
parties according to factors such as ideological affinity, partisan identity, and strategic 
decisions as to which of the opposition parties has a better chance of unseating the 
incumbent.   
 The tendency of the pro-regime/anti-regime divide to dominate political 
competition greatly influenced the strategies of Mexico’s two main opposition parties 
throughout the 1990s. During the period of increased competition that followed the 1988 
elections, while concentrating much of their attack on the PRI, Mexico’s two main 
opposition parties also competed vigorously against each other for the loyalties of the 
anti-PRI vote. In 1988, much of this vote fell naturally to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the PRI 
dissident who represented the strongest and most prominent challenge to the PRI 
government. While the PAN maintained their commitment to fair elections, their record 
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of collaboration with the PRI during its shift to neoliberalism undermined their position 
as a challenger. Cárdenas’ position as the most potentially dangerous adversary of the 
PRI in 1988 helped him draw anti-PRI votes from across the political spectrum. 
(Domínguez and McCann 1996, 112). In the following few years, the weaknesses of the 
PRD and the popularity of Carlos Salinas (in large part a result of public optimism 
regarding his free market economic policies)  led to a decline in support for the PRD 
(Domínguez and McCann 1996, 129-134).  
In the 1991 legislative elections, the PRD fell to 8% of the vote, and polls showed 
that (in contrast with 1988) strategic anti-PRI voters were more likely to cross ideological 
lines to support the PAN, which garnered 17% (Domínguez and McCann 1996, 147). In 
the subsequent presidential election of 1994, the PAN retained its position as the 
strongest opposition party, winning 26% to the PRD’s 16%. Following the economic 
crisis of 1994-1995, the picture again changed. In the 1997 midterm elections, the PRD 
reclaimed the status of main opposition contender, behind Cárdenas’ strong campaign for 
the newly competitive Mexico City mayor post (Lawson 1999). In the aftermath of the 
peso’s collapse, the PAN’s collaboration with the PRI on economic policy became a 
liability, and the PRD became the primary vehicle for the anti-regime vote  
 During the twelve years of increasing political competitiveness that preceded the 
2000 elections, then, Mexico’s two major opposition parties competed for the support of 
voters whose top priority was removing the PRI from power. The two parties took turns 
at the head of the opposition, with the support of the anti-PRI vote alternating depending 
on campaigns and circumstances.  The ability of either party to claim the anti-PRI vote 
depended in part on the employment of an effective and convincing anti-government 
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message (with the potential for such a message depending both on the campaign itself 
and on the prevailing political conditions and attitudes); equally important, however, was 
fostering a perception that the party’s candidate was the most likely of the two contenders 
to unseat the PRI from power. Generating an effective anti-regime message and building 
a reputation as the most promising challenger were the most immediate concerns facing 
the main opposition candidates during the runup to the 2000 elections. 
 
 Having established himself early on as the presumptive nominee of the PAN 
largely through independent efforts, Vicente Fox was able to focus his subsequent 
campaign efforts on establishing himself as the first option among opposition voters.  His 
campaign approached this goal in several general ways.  He appealed directly to strategic 
voters, frequently arguing that anti-PRI voters, regardless of their ideological leanings, 
should vote for him as the best option for removing the ruling party from power.  To 
support this wide-ranging appeal, Fox ran a campaign that emphasized his personal 
image above partisan identity, was ideologically vague by design, and incorporated 
prominent advisors and supporters from across the political spectrum.  Instead of 
delineating policy differences with the incumbent government, the Fox campaign 
emphasized the issue of “change” in a generic sense, and overwhelmingly focused on the 
PRI’s long record of bad governance, and the necessity of ending its hegemony.  The 
policy positions that accompanied this rhetorical strategy were clearly second-generation 
reformist in character; this type of programmatic content accorded well with the 
ideologically indistinct and governance-centered nature of the campaign’s public rhetoric. 
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 The Fox campaign made appeals to the “useful vote” a central part of its message, 
arguing that votes for Cárdenas would be wasted, and would simply serve to perpetuate 
the PRI’s hold on power  (Bruhn 2004, 103; Reforma, May 4 2000).  Even after the 
possibility of a formal electoral alliance with the PRD had passed, Fox continued to stress 
the importance of a unified opposition, arguing that the anti-PRI forces should “unite 
around a leader of the whole opposition, that truly has the potential to win the 
election.”(Reforma, Mar.18 2000).  Seizing on survey results, as the election approached 
Fox depicted his own challenge as the only one with a chance to overtake the PRI; in 
response to a June opposition poll showing Fox trailing Labastida by four points and 
Cárdenas a distant third, Fox declared that the poll represented “an important message to 
PRD supporters, to all democrats and people of opposition, that it is clear that we need to 
unite” as well as “a very clear message to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas that he now has no 
possibility of winning.” (Reforma,  Jun. 6 2000).  With polls showing a close race 
between PRI and PAN candidates, Fox depicted Cárdenas’ continued defiant challenge as 
a betrayal of the anti-regime cause and his of own his own supporters (Reforma, May 29 
2000). A televised advertisement that appeared in June 2000 praised Cárdenas’ leadership 
of the anti-PRI movement  of 1988, then attacked Cárdenas for not supporting a 
movement in 2000 that was similarly intended to remove the PRI from the presidency 
(www.vicentefox.org.mx/pag_campana/, accessed April 2006). At one point, Fox 
asserted that Cárdenas’ refusal to throw his support behind Fox suggested “that he has 
been bought, and has returned to the PRI,” (Reforma, May 7 2000)   By depicting himself 
as the only opposition candidate with a chance to win, Fox argued that Cárdenas’ failure 
to join forces signified that he no longer represented the anti-PRI cause.  In the absence 
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of an opposition alliance at the level of leadership, Fox sought to build an alliance at the 
electoral level that would render Cárdenas’ challenge irrelevant by drawing away his 
supporters. 
 In order to attract anti-PRI support from a range of opposition voters, Fox’s 
campaign departed from the center-right, pro-business, and socially conservative postures 
associated with his party. Instead, the Fox campaign characterized itself as representing 
an ideologically varied movement whose sole purpose was to remove the PRI from 
office.  Fox emphasized the inclusive nature of his political movement in his public 
statements. In an April interview, he declared of his electoral movement:  
 
“Here, ideologies are not being fused. We are bringing in people from all sides, 
with the sole objective of attaining alternation in power.  People from the left, the 
right, and the center fit in this alliance, because the principal objective we have is 
to defeat the PRI...” 
(Reforma, Apr. 16 2000) 
 
A key element of Fox’s attempts to build a broad movement was the 
incorporation of prominent opposition figures from outside the PAN and from other 
ideological perspectives. Among the most important of the left-leaning supporters 
attracted by Fox were Jorge Castañeda, a prominent academic, commentator, and PRD 
advisor, and Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, who had served as Cárdenas’ director of 
communications in previous campaigns. Late in the campaign, Fox also attracted the 
support of Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, one of the original founders of the FDN, who had 
previously been attracting insignificant electoral support as the candidate of a small party. 
While not adhering to the PAN’s doctrine, advisors such as Castañeda and Aguilar Zinser 
justified their support for Fox on the assumption that elimination of the PRI’s monopoly 
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on power, and the corporatist political practices that inhibited the development of 
citizenship,  was a necessary condition for any other sort of positive social and political 
change. According to Fox’s spokesperson (and future wife) Marta Sahagún, the Fox 
campaign was open to allies from anywhere on the political spectrum, with the only 
disqualifiers being “dishonesty and corruption.”  (Reforma, May 31 2000) Beyond 
seeking out varied allies, Fox refused to be pinned down on his own ideological beliefs, 
at one point going so far as to describe himself as a candidate of the “center-left” (Bruhn 
2004). 
 As the preceding discussion suggests, in the absence of a unified and coherent 
ideological viewpoint, Fox’s campaign focused intensively on basic issues of governance 
and on the need to remove the PRI from power.  The simple promise of “change” became 
a mantra of his campaign, as reflected in the name of the electoral alliance under which 
he ran (Alianza por el Cambio, or Alliance for Change). The word ¡Ya! attained a similar 
totemic status, as part of Fox’s main campaign slogan “¡Mexico Ya!, which could mean 
either “Now” or “Enough;” in either case, the message was that 2000 election represented 
first and foremost a historic opportunity to break PRI dominance.  In adopting the banner 
of “change,”  Fox focused much of his campaign’s attacks not on Francisco Labastida 
himself, but rather on the PRI as a whole and its 71 year record of bad governance and 
corruption. A prominent campaign commercial depicted negative images and infamous 
PRI figures from Mexico’s recent history, accompanied by the traditional farewell song 
“Las Golondrinas,” and concluded with the simple message, “Adiós al PRI.” (Reforma, 
Mar. 15 2000) Another advertisement, entitled “PRInosaurios,” involved animated 
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dinosaurs with the heads of well known PRI figures coming to the rescue of Labastida’s 
campaign. (Reforma, May 15 2000).  
 The overwhelming focus on ending PRI dominance was explicitly adopted at the 
expense of any sort of programmatic alternative. In a 1997 interview, as he was initiating 
his campaign, Fox had asserted that he had no interest in being president, but that “It is 
my absolute and total responsibility...to remove the PRI from Los Pinos and achieve a 
true democratization for the country. Once this is achieved I will go home (Shirk 2004, 
175)”. Three years later, Fox’s narrow characterization of his political goals had evolved 
into the fundamental justification behind the PAN’s campaign for the presidency. In a 
May speech, Fox described the upcoming election as simply “a plebiscite to decide 
between alternation in power or more of the same, between paralysis or change. A 
plebiscite between the same [leaders] as always or an honest and professional 
government.” (www.vicentefox.org.mx/pag_campana, accessed April 2006)  
 As a candidate, Fox’s personal profile was well suited to this sort of non-
ideological and governance centered message.  Fox had built his image as a maverick, 
challenging the leadership of the PAN for their acceptance of Salinas’ victory and 
collaboration with his government; although his conflicts with his party may have had as 
much to do with personal political ambition as with commitment to democratic openness, 
they nevertheless afforded him credibility as a challenger of the ruling party.  A relative 
newcomer to the PAN and politics, Fox depicted himself as separate from those in the 
PAN who were concerned about conserving the party’s tradition and  “dogma and 
doctrine,” and as instead being part of a group with a “pragmatic” philosophy and a belief 
that “we must resolve the country’s problems quickly.” (Shirk 2004, 197). Fox’s 
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maverick tendencies and lack of concern for party hierarchy, tradition and doctrine 
created frictions within the PAN (Wuhs 2001, 145).  However, by launching his 
campaign early and establishing a substantial base of funding, public recognition, and 
support independent of the party, Fox had been able to stake an early claim to the PAN 
nomination that was so formidable that, despite the hostility of the party leadership, no 
serious challengers contested his candidacy  (Shirk 2001, 124-125, Mizrahi 2003, 143).  
Once Fox became the party’s standard-bearer, with his challenge to the PRI 
clearly thriving, the PAN hierarchy quickly fell into line behind his heterogeneous and 
pragmatic campaign message. One month before the election, PAN president Luis Felipe 
Bravo Mena commented:  
 
“All of [Mexican] society understands that what’s important aren’t ideological 
positions; the key in this election is whether we are going to have a democratic 
transition, or whether we will begin to regress toward authoritarianism, as the PRI 
wants.” (Reforma, Jun. 2 2000). 
 
Similarly, in an earlier statement, Bravo Mena had described an eventual PAN 
administration as a “government of transition, with the inclusion of a project of national 
unity that would obviously have to involve the participation of many actors and voices.” 
(Reforma,  Apr. 21 2000).  
To further separate Fox’s message from the traditional doctrine and ideology of 
the PAN, his campaign emphasized his personal image above party identity. As David 
Shirk notes: “Fox made tremendous efforts to market himself like a product: maximizing 
recognition of his face, his name, and his slogans, rather than familiarizing voters with 
the details of his policy agenda and party doctrine.” (Shirk 2004, 154) The centrality of 
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Fox’s persona to his public appeal was exemplified by his efforts to incorporate his 
picture into the official logo of his electoral alliance (an effort that was successfully 
challenged by the PRI as a violation of Mexico’s electoral code).  (Reforma Jan. 12, Jan 
13, 2000). In part this appeal was based on Fox’s personal charisma:  his height and 
rugged appearance (characteristics that Fox emphasized by ridiculing the short stature 
and high voice of Labastida), as well as his ability to adopt the mannerisms and image of  
an “everyman,” his privileged background notwithstanding (Shirk 2004, 153-155). 
Beyond projecting the image of a strong leader, Fox’s persona separated him from  
Mexico’s traditional political class, bolstering his claim to be an embodiment of change. 
Fox’s frequent references to his personal accomplishments as governor of Guanajuato 
further reinforced the personalistic character of his campaign 
Kathleen Bruhn summarizes Fox’s appeal as involving only two themes: “Fox 
(the man) and change (getting rid of the PRI). Fox was change. Change was Fox.  
Everything else could be filled in by the voter as he or she wished.”  (Bruhn 2004, 142) 
These were the fundamental elements of the Fox campaign: ideological vagueness and 
heterogeneity, an emphasis on the individual candidate rather than on partisan identity 
and doctrine,  a reliance on generic promises of “change” instead of specific proposals, 
and a definition of “change” that focused strictly on governance issues and the need for 
democratic transition, rather than involving any substantive reorientation of policies or 
proposals. While this sort of appeal limited the appearance programmatic elements in 
public rhetoric, like any political campaign, Fox’s 2000 challenge required a platform and 
a set of policy positions. The policy agenda that formed the basis for Fox’s campaign was 
clearly and explicitly second-generation reformist in character.  The fundamental 
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elements of second generation reformism – maintenance of existing neoliberal policies, 
marginal reforms to give the market more of a “human face,” and a strong emphasis on 
governance issues – accorded well with Fox’s overall campaign message. 
 
Vicente Fox’s Second Generation Reformism 
 
 It outlining the future direction of Mexican economic policy, both the public 
statements and the official party documents of Vicente Fox and the PAN emphasize the 
need to continue and deepen the free market policies undertaken by PRI governments.  In 
a speech at a conference in March 2000 in which he outlined his economic proposals, Fox  
declared that his administration would “complete the structural reforms necessary to 
make the economy more competitive,” and “support Mexico’s transition to a modern and 
competitive economy.” (www.vicentefox.org.mx/pag_campana ; accessed April 2006).13 
Fox’s policy manifesto (as posted on his campaign website under “Propuestas” during the 
2000 contest) describes the character of these reforms in more detail. Fox emphasizes the 
importance of economic stability as a priority, promising “strict fiscal discipline” and a 
monetary policy that would be anti-inflationary and controlled by an independent central 
bank.  The manifesto promises a “market-friendly” industrial policy, and calls for 
“completion of the reforms that were incomplete” during PRI governments, including 
reforms to the financial sector as well as the transportation and energy sectors. 
                                                 
13
 Fox’s official policy statement, along with several speeches cited in this section, and clips of television 
commercials were obtained from the archive of Vicente Fox’s campaign website, 
www.vicentefox.org.mx/pag_campana, in April 2006. The page is no longer online; however, past versions 
of it can be accessed through the internet archive at www.archive.org. 
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 Fox’s manifesto stresses the benefits of connection to the international economy,  
promising to “fully take advantage of the process of globalization.” The manifesto 
pledges efforts toward creating a common market between the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico (while acknowledging the concerns of the left wing of his coalition by promising 
to make good on unfulfilled PRI promises of compensation for negatively affected 
sectors), as well as toward establishing a free trade area throughout Latin America.  
Foreign investment is depicted in a similarly positive light; Fox’s manifesto states that 
foreign direct investment “should be much higher,” and proposes to attain this goal by 
creating effective regulatory agencies to promote competition and juridical security, as 
well as by opening parastatal enterprises to foreign involvement and promoting 
investment by high-tech firms. 
The official platform of the PAN’s electoral alliance devotes little space to 
economic policy proposals (two pages out of a nineteen page document), but emphasizes 
the same themes as Fox’s personal campaign manifesto. The platform promises that 
economic development and growth will be attained through a “responsible economic 
policy” that would emphasize “strengthening of the financial system, linkage with the 
international economy,” and “stimulating increases in productivity and private 
investment.” The platform also stresses the importance of fiscal austerity, promising that 
“we will not spend more than we have” and proposing that this goal would be attained in 
part through tax reforms that would “stimulate investment and saving and decrease 
evasion,” as well as a more efficient allocation of government spending.  (2000 Platform, 
Alianza por el Cambio). 
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 Fox’s campaign promised a significant improvement in economic performance, 
pledging that his administration would “begin a new economic miracle” in his platform, 
and that annual growth rates would reach 7% during his administration (in contrast to the 
PRI, which promised an annual growth rate of 5%) (Reforma,  Jan. 3 2000) Although Fox 
distinguished himself from the PRI through more extravagant promises of growth, the 
actual policies he and his party offered differed little from the measures undertaken by 
recent PRI governments.  This congruence was unsurprising, given that PAN support and 
cooperation had been crucial to the passage of the PRI’s market reform policies. 
Speaking before a hostile audience of workers in February, Fox defended this 
cooperation, asserting that “We have wanted to be responsible with Mexico. That’s why 
we have sometimes voted with the PRI in the Chamber of Deputies.” (Reforma, Feb. 17 
2000).  
 Mexico’s economic establishment approvingly took note of Fox’s commitment to 
neoliberal policies, and of the economic policy congruence between the PAN and the 
PRI. Speaking before a conference of bankers in March 2000 alongside the two other 
major candidates, Fox received an enthusiastic reception for his speech, in which he 
promised to increase the autonomy of the Central Bank, maintain fiscal equilibrium, 
permit private investment in the petrochemical and electrical sectors, and continue the 
PRI’s exchange rate and general macroeconomic policies.  Following the speech, one of 
the executives stated to journalists that “Fox told us what we wanted to hear,” and 
another noted that the PAN and PRI “offered the same...the economic proposals are 
almost identical.” Carlos Gómez y Gómez, the outgoing president of the Mexican Bank 
Association summarized the speeches by declaring:  
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“There are only two options for the voters: one is that of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, 
and the other is that of Fox and Labastida.  The first is intended for a Mexico that 
doesn’t exist, and the second is viable. And between Fox and Labastida...the 
differences are only in minor details”  (Reforma, Mar. 13 2000). 
 
Assessing the economic proposals of the two leading candidates before the election, 
Francisco Avila, the president of the Mexican Institute of Financial Executives noted that 
the proposals of both Fox and Labastida were based on adherence to the principles of 
globalization and the free market, and that as regardless of which of the two won, “our 
prediction is the continuation of the economic model.” (Reforma, Jun. 26 2000) 
Similarly, economic analyst Rogelio Ramirez de la O. noted that “The financial markets 
have taken a simple view of the similarity between the economic programs of the PRI 
and the PAN, thus their confidence that no matter who wins the election, good 
macroeconomic management is guaranteed and there’s nothing to worry about.” 
(Reforma, May 16 2000) 
 Fox’s campaign, then, was obligated to reconcile its continual insistence on the 
idea of “change” and its promises of greatly improved economic performance with the 
fact that Fox’s economic proposals represented far more continuity than change in regard 
to the policies of the PRI.  Fox’s solution to this apparent problem was an appeal that 
incorporated the messages and ideas of second generation reformism. In a speech to the 
Chamber of Commerce of Monterrey, Fox declared “Our government has concentrated 
its attention on the fundamentals of the economy. This is indispensable, and requires 
greater attention, but it is not sufficient.  In addition to the macroeconomic fundamentals 
high quality growth would require that “other fundamentals be in order.”  In accordance 
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with this perspective, Fox’s economic policy statements often featured the ubiquitous 
second generation reformist slogan that economic growth needed a “human face,” and his 
campaign manifesto promised that Mexico would “grow with quality. ” While the market 
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s laid the foundation for strong economic growth and were 
not called into question, sustaining this growth and translating it into widespread 
improvements in standards of living would require additional reforms.  
 According to Fox, the development of human capital was the most important of 
the “other fundamentals” that needed to be in order. Fox’s rhetoric emphasized the 
significance of education and health care for economic growth. One of his official policy 
statements noted that experience of nations that during the twentieth century “raised 
themselves from destruction, and today are world powers, because they built their 
economic and social development around their educational project; ” a central campaign 
promise was his pledge to devote 8% of Mexico’s GDP to education.  
 In accordance with typical second generation reformist messages, Fox 
emphasized the importance of small and medium sized businesses; his manifesto called 
for  “growth built on the microeconomy, ” and pledging to “incentivize the growth and 
expansion of small and medium sized enterprises” and to pursue policies to facilitate their 
access to capital. Labor reform is cited as an important goal, but without specifics: The 
manifesto includes a promise to “promote a reform of labor law to make it competitive 
with those of out partners in the free trade area, but also assure the rights of Mexican 
workers,” without elaborating on the specific policies that would be pursued to achieve 
these goals. 
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 Given the paucity of specific proposals for change, Fox’s promises of 
dramatically improved economic performance rested to a great extent on promises of 
improved governance. Like the other second generation reformist challengers examined 
in this study, Fox depicted improved governance as a goal in its own right, but also as a 
crucial component in attaining socioeconomic progress. Fox’s manifesto describes good 
government as “an effective instrument for change” as well as a “competitive advantage 
for the economy.” In laying out his economic proposals at a Mexico City conference in 
March 2000, Fox concluded by noting that all of his economic policy proposals  and 
proposals were based on “the strengthening of the rule of law...a rule of law that 
generates certainty, confidence, and political stability.”  In a speech to the national 
federation of law schools, Fox emphasized that economic and personal development 
depended on juridical security, without which “there is no protection for the 
economically weak against the economically strong” and “relations between economic 
actors are affected by lack of confidence.”   
 Beyond emphasizing the general importance of the rule of law for economic 
growth, Fox invoked institutional improvements as important factors enabling the pursuit 
of specific policy goals.  His manifesto cites reduced corruption and “clear and 
transparent rules that minimize the discretionary power of governmental organs” as 
crucial to attaining the goals of economic stability and a solid financial system, and 
promises that institutional improvements will lead to a reduction in the costs of public 
services and that a government that is “agile, productive, and high quality” will improve 
the effectiveness of industrial policy.  Similarly, in promising to attract more foreign 
investment, the platform stresses the importance of “judicial guarantees and laws that are 
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modern and adapted to the insertion of Mexico in the international community of 
nations.” (www.vicentefox.org.mx/pag_campana, accessed April 2006) 
 
 
In sum, the campaign of Vicente Fox and his party rested above all on promises of 
“change,” and on the creation of an expectation that change would produce a rapid 
improvement of standards of living. The change that Fox proposed was essentially 
political in nature; his only clear and crucial campaign promise was to remove the PRI 
and everything that it represented from power;  other positive social and economic 
changes would follow from the introduction of alternation in power. The ideas and 
rhetoric of second-generation reformism accorded well with this type of campaign. Fox’s  
conception of change contrasted strongly with the opposition agenda set forth by the 
PRD, his rival for primacy within the opposition. 
 
 
The PRD Alternative 
 
 In the battle for primacy within the anti-PRI opposition, the PRD sought to stake 
its own claim to the mantle of “change;”  doing so involved putting forth an alternative 
vision to the second generation reformist message of Fox and the PAN. From its origins 
as a protest movement in 1988 to its triumphant entry into the forefront of Mexican 
politics in 1997, the PRD’s message had evolved, and generally become more pragmatic. 
However, the nature of the “change” that the PRD proposed in 2000 closely reflected the 
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principles and concerns that had motivated the FDN’s original founding: an emphasis on 
the poor and on improving social conditions, suspicion toward the free market model and 
free trade, and promotion of nationalism and national sovereignty. 
 In 2000, the PRD directly attacked Fox’s tendency to treat alternation in power as 
an end in itself, and, as Kathleen Bruhn  (2004) observes, “took pains to identify 
‘alternation’ more in policy than in party terms.” Cárdenas consistently asserted that the 
vision of change promoted by Fox was superficial or meaningless, characterizing Fox’s 
promise as “an alternation in power that would replace Zedillo and continue doing the 
same.” (Reforma, May 6 2000). Cárdenas’ campaign derided Fox’s efforts to broadcast 
an ideologically all-encompassing message, attacking his rhetoric as full of 
contradictions, and arguing that the lack of clarity was meant to obscure a fundamental 
agreement with the PRI.  In justifying Cárdenas’ unwillingness to enter into an alliance 
with the PAN, his campaigns Coordinator of Program and Plan argued that “Cárdenas 
cannot support Fox because he can’t support a variant of the PRI” (Reforma, Apr 21 
2000), and the combative PRD president Andrés Manuel López Obrador claimed that the 
dispute between Fox and Labastida “is not about programs or ideas, but is a dispute 
between factions within the same regime” (Reforma, May 6 2000). 
 The PRD focused much of its criticism of the PAN on the congruence between 
Fox’s economic policy principles and those of the recent PRI administrations. Cárdenas 
attacked Fox for having “approved of all of Salinas’ reforms.” (Reforma, May 13 2000). 
At a May rally, López Obrador charged that “The PAN only offers changes in the men 
who are in power, but will maintain the same anti-popular and corrupt nature that as the 
technocratic and neoliberal PRI.” López Obrador further argued that the PAN and PRI 
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were united by their lack of popular representativeness, claiming that the two parties 
“represent and serve identical minorities.” Cárdenas echoed this charge at the same rally, 
ridiculing the idea of “a useful vote to protect the financial interests... to support 
latifundiustas so that they can continue accumulating land, for alternating in power and 
continuing to serve the big transnational corporations” (Reforma,  May 6 2000). Cárdenas 
also attacked the PAN and the PRI for ostensibly intending to undermine Mexico’s 
national sovereignty, in particular through privatization of the electrical and petroleum 
industries. In a speech commemorating the anniversary of the expropriation of Mexico’s 
oil industry by his father Lázaro Cárdenas, he accused Mexico’s leaders of intending to 
submit to “geopolitical and financial interests” by supporting the privatization of the oil 
and electrical industries to “accommodate and augment their personal interests and those 
of their group of friends and political clients;”  and derided Fox’s PAN as a 
“domesticated opposition” that intended to do the same. (Reforma, Mar. 19 2000).  Three 
days later, in a rally commemorating the birthday of Benito Juárez in Oaxaca, Cárdenas 
accused both Labastida and Fox of dishonoring the legacy of Juárez by intending to sell 
the country out to foreigners (Reforma,. Mar. 22 2000).  In another rally the following 
month, Cárdenas sought to underline the distinction between his version of “change” and 
that of the PAN: 
 
“We are not compromised, unlike many others... we are not here to 
privatize the electrical industry and the oil industry, or so that we can have six 
more years of the same, but rather so that in this election we will guarantee a 
profound change in the economic, political, and social direction of the country” 
(Reforma, Apr. 11 2000). 
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 These general tendencies in the PRD’s public statements were reflected in the 
official platform of their electoral alliance, the Alianza por México. On economic issues, 
the PRD’s 2000 platform criticizes the impact of economic globalization on Mexico, 
claiming that “The current globalization only benefits a fistful of big transnational 
corporations, creating a high social cost in terms of unemployment, falling salaries, 
impoverishment, and exclusion of the majority of the population.” Beyond general 
critiques of globalization, the PRD platform specifically charged that the North American 
Free Trade agreement for damaging small and medium sizes businesses and agricultural 
producers, and demanded that existing free trade pacts be renegotiated; additionally, the 
platform calls for the imposition of taxes on short term external capital flows.   
The PRD’s  platform calls for an augmented role of the state in the economy.  The 
platform proposes an increase in government spending as a percentage of GDP, in order 
to reverse the trend of decreased spending that had occurred during the period of market 
reform , a tendency that had “reduced the role of the state in promoting national 
development.” The platform attacks previous governments for “having “abandoned their 
constitutional role of overseeing the national economy” and calls for the Mexican state to 
“assume an active role in directing the development and definition of a new industrial 
policy.” The platform criticizes the privatizations conducted under recent PRI 
governments, and specifically stresses the importance of maintaining the petroleum and 
energy sectors under state control.  The PRD also promises a renewed emphasis on the 
“strengthening of the internal market” and the “reconstruction of the productive 
apparatus,” and on increasing salaries, and declares that “the state can and should play the 
role of promoter, facilitator, and advisor in this process.” The PRD platform stresses the 
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role of the state in attending to social needs, promising to “Construct a policy of 
strengthening of social institutions that will revert tendencies toward privatization. ” The 
platform emphasizes the importance of free education and guaranteed healthcare, and 
promises to devote more resources to these sectors, as well as to state programs to 
provide housing.  The PRD platform is often vague on the exact nature of the policies 
that would serve as an alternative to neoliberalism. However, the overall tone of the 
document involves a sharp critique of the free market policies of the previous 
administrations, and a promise to shift toward an economic policy that involves an 
expanded state role and an increased emphasis on addressing poverty and exclusion. 
As the name of its electoral alliance would suggest, the PRD’s program also 
touches on nationalistic themes. The document depicts the contemporary era of 
globalization as posing grave threats to self-determination, invoking “the weight of 
governments of great powers, the pressures of the international financial organizations, 
and the gigantic operations of transnational corporations,” and concluding the “”National 
sovereignty has been practically wiped out by globalization.” The platform accuses the 
previous three PRI administrations of having exacerbated this trend by “having ceded 
important parts of Mexico’s political and economic sovereignty” to external actors. 
Attacking the conditionality policies of international financial institutions for “keeping 
developing countries in a prostrate position, ”  and undermining social welfare and 
productive industry, the PRD promised to “initiate and intense offensive of negotiation 
with the international financial institutions” and to work with other indebted countries to 
generate international debt negotiation accords. The PRD also proposed to recover 
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economic sovereignty and autonomy through regulation on the movements of foreign 
capital.  
 
The 2000 Election Campaign 
 
While the platforms and campaign messages of both Fox and Cárdenas 
emphasized “change” and often lacked precision, the two opposition challengers 
nevertheless offered drastically different perspectives on the sort of change that Mexico 
needed.  Fox’s campaign offered almost no change in economic policy, stressing the 
importance of continuing Mexico’s transition to the free market and the benefits of 
integration into the global economy; promises of economic policy change were confined 
to minor reforms along second generation lines to “give a human face” to the market 
economy. The change that Fox promised was primarily in the style and quality of 
governance, with an incompetent, authoritarian, and corrupt PRI being replaced by 
democratic and honest leadership. Cárdenas offered a policy agenda that involved 
retreating from economic liberalization in favor of more state involvement and activism 
in addressing economic and social shortfalls, and displayed a decidedly suspicious 
perspective on economic globalization (viewed as a means for the enrichment of 
privileged groups and a threat to Mexico’s sovereignty).  Cárdenas’ vision of change 
emphasized a direct role for government in promoting inclusion and upending an unjust 
social order.  
In the end, Fox’s vision of change triumphed handily over Cárdenas’ alternative; 
when asked to choose between a leftist and nationalist opposition and a second 
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generation reformist opposition,  anti-PRI voters overwhelmingly favored the latter. By 
January 2000, a Reforma poll placed Fox clearly at the head of the opposition with 35% 
of voter preferences, trailing the PRI’s Labastida by 15 points, but well ahead of the 14% 
combined for Cárdenas and other candidates. By April, the same poll placed Fox three 
points ahead of Labastida at 45%, while Cárdenas lagged below 12% (Moreno 2004b, 
245).  For most of the campaign, Cárdenas was largely marginalized, and the contest 
between Fox and Labastida dominated the public and media attention. 
As Fox had hoped, the presidential contest became in large part a referendum on 
the 71 year rule of PRI and its standard of governance; the centrality of governance issues 
to the opposition’s message was reflected in surveys of voter attitudes.  According to exit 
polls, Fox received two thirds of the vote of those who identified “change” as their 
primary reason for behind their vote choice (Bruhn 2004, 134). In another exit poll, 
among voters who considered corruption and democracy to be the most important issues 
in the 2000 election, Fox won by 54% to 25% over Labastida; for those who considered 
poverty or unemployment to be the most important issue,  Fox’s advantage over the PRI 
candidate was only 4 points (Mitofsky exit poll, 2000). A postelection poll showed a 
similar pattern, with Fox supporters being 16% more likely than Labastida supporters to 
mention corruption as one of the three most important problems for the new president, 
and Labastida supporters being 12% more likely than Fox supporters to mention poverty 
as one of the three most important problems (Mexico Panel Study 2000, postelectoral). In 
personal terms, a February 2000 survey by CIDE found Labastida to be perceived as 
slightly more experienced and prepared to govern than Fox, while Fox enjoyed 
substantial advantages in terms of ability to bring change and honesty.  
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Perhaps most fundamentally, voter preferences accorded with views of whether 
Mexico was a democracy.  In a survey taken the month before the elections, 63% of 
Labastida’s supporters agreed that Mexico was a democracy, and only 30% disagreed. In 
contrast, 55% of Fox supporters asserted that Mexico was not a democracy (Mexico 
Panel Study, June 2000). By the time of the election in July 2000, it was clear that Fox 
had succeeded in the immediate goals of his campaign: establishing himself as the only 
viable challenger to the PRI, associating himself with the idea of “change,” and, through 
a second generation reformist message, promoting a vision of change that centered on 
governance issues rather than ideology or policy positions.  
 
The Mexican campaign of 2000 differed markedly from previous ones; the greater 
equality of financial resources and the improved openness of the media allowed 
opposition candidates to gain a higher profile and televised debates attracted major 
attention (Lawson 2004b, 2004c). Notwithstanding the fact that the two main contenders 
agreed on most major policy issues, negative campaigning was common, particularly in 
the case of Fox, who often mixed his criticisms of the PRI regime with demeaning 
comments about his opponent.  While early surveys showed a PRI lead, Fox's support in 
polls gradually grew, making the race a statistical dead heat by the time of the election. 
Despite the closeness of polls, many observers expected a PRI victory, in part because of 
evidence that electoral reforms had fallen far short of eliminating the PRI's ability to 
influence, buy, or coerce votes in rural regions through uses of state resources or 
intimidation.  
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In the end, despite having trailed in the polls for most of the campaign, Fox 
emerged victorious in the July 2 election, winning 42.5% to Labastida’s 36.1%; Cárdenas 
finished a distant third with 16.7%. (Table 5.1) The PAN’s victory at the executive level 
was accompanied by gains at the legislative level.  The PAN went from third place, with 
121 seats, to second place with 206, just behind the PRI, which managed to hold onto a 
slim plurality of 211 seats (the PRD was reduced from 126 seats to 50). As the election 
results came in, President Zedillo calmly acknowledged Fox's victory, heralding the first 
genuine transfer of political power that most Mexicans had witnessed in their lives.  After 
71 years of PRI control, the voters had unequivocally opted for change; the great majority 
of the opposition vote had endorsed a vision of change that was second generation 
reformist in character. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 – Mexican Presidential Election, July 2000 
Candidate          % 
Vicente Fox (PAN) 42.5 
Francisco Labastida (PRI) 36.1 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (PRD) 16.7 
Other 4.7 
  
 
Chapter 6: The Origins of Second Generation Reformist Opposition  
 
 
Introduction 
 
As the past three chapters have outlined, at the end of the twentieth century, 
Argentina, Peru, and Mexico arrived at a similar political destination via differing routes. 
Despite the significant differences in the three countries’ socioeconomic context and in 
the historical evolution and contemporary state of political representation, the political 
opposition’s response to the onset of “reform fatigue” in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico 
represents a clear and seemingly similar pattern.  In each case, the opposition’s 
orientation toward second generation reformism was apparent both in the party’s 
campaign rhetoric and in the attitudes and priorities of its electorate. What explains this 
common tendency? 
An examination of the opposition campaigns in each country reveals several 
commonly shared ways in which second generation reformism proved to be an useful and 
appropriate approach. In each case, the incumbent’s record of government provided 
ample basis for an opposition campaign focused on governance issues.  Menem’s 
administration was notable for its corruption scandals and the president’s autocratic 
tendencies, Fujimori had resorted to authoritarian methods on regular occasions (and was 
committing obvious abuses in an effort to extend his tenure), and PRI rule was essentially 
synonymous with Mexico’s undemocratic past for much of the country’s electorate. The 
relevance and appropriateness of a governance-related critique was unquestionable.  
The focus on institutions and accountability served another shared purpose for 
oppositions in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico by providing a common theme to unite an 
ideologically varied movement (both at the level of leadership and among the broader 
electorate). Opposition supporters in each case ranged from hardcore neoliberals to 
leftists. A message that could provide a common ground for these diverse groups  was 
essential in posing a challenge to the incumbent. 
These factors clearly contributed to the appearance and effectiveness of second 
generation reformist opposition strategy;  nonetheless, they fall well short of providing a 
complete explanation.  The presence of leaders with questionable records of governance, 
and the existence of significant ideological diversity among potential opposition 
supporters, were hardly unique circumstances to Argentina, Peru, and Mexico.  It is not 
obvious why those conditions promoted the successful opposition adoption of second 
generation reformism in these three countries, but not elsewhere. A more complete and 
convincing explanation requires the identification a shared and politically significant 
tendencies that distinguishes Argentina, Peru, and Mexico from the rest of the region.  
This sort of explanatory similarity can be most clearly found in the patterns of 
social class support for opposition and incumbent in Argentina, Peru and Mexico, and in 
the prior political circumstances that produced those patterns. Opposition parties in each 
case enjoyed their strongest support among voters who were relatively more educated, 
affluent, and urban, while the market reforming incumbents drew on an electorate that 
was disproportionately poor and rural. A study of the origin and nature of the challenges 
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to market reforming incumbents in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico suggests a plausible link 
between the social basis of the opposition vote and the second generation reformist, 
governance based content of the opposition message 
In the following sections, evidence is presented regarding the socioeconomic 
profile of the second generation reformist vote in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico. These 
patterns in opposition and incumbent support are then linked to previous patterns of 
political representation and leadership.  In each case, the prior success of a “neoliberal 
populist” approach to market reform shaped the nature of the eventual opposition 
coalition, and generated the conditions under which a second generation reformist appeal 
provided the most likely route to opposition victory. 
 
Argentina 
 
In socioeconomic terms, the Alianza clearly drew its strongest support from more 
affluent and better educated sectors in 1999.  As displayed in Table 6.1, dupport for De la 
Rúa rises with education; a survey taken by Graciela Römer shows Duhalde winning a 
majority of support among respondents with less than primary education and a plurality 
of those who had only completed primary education; while De la Rúa won every higher 
category. A similar pattern can be observed with regards to income: Duhalde led De la 
Rúa by 9 points among voters whose monthly income did not exceed $500, while De la 
Rúa dominated among higher income voters (Romer, April 1999).   
This tendency also appears when respondents are asked to characterize their own 
level of economic comfort – in an April 1999 poll, those who reported that they had 
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enough money to make ends meet on a monthly basis were more likely to support the 
Alianza while those who responded that their income didn’t cover necessities supported 
Duhalde (Romer, April 1999).  The Alianza also performed well among students and 
younger voters, while the PJ enjoyed strong support among housewives.  Unemployed 
voters provided Duhalde with substantially higher support than the voting public as a 
whole.14 
 
Table 6.1-Vote choice %  by social category, Argentina  
 
 De la Rúa 
(Alianza) 
Duhalde  
(PJ) 
Income   
≤ $500/month (42%) 40 49 
$501-$1000/month (31%) 50 40 
$1001-$2000/month (19%) 58 25 
>$2000/month (9%) 56 17 
Education   
None/Primary (32%) 32 58 
Secondary (40%) 54 33 
Tertiary (10%) 61 25 
University/Postgrad (17%) 59 19 
Employment   
Unemployed (11%) 45 46 
Temporary (8%) 46 41 
Permanent (27%) 53 35 
Self-Employed (18%) 49 30 
Student (6%) 52 31 
Housewife (17%) 45 46 
Source: Graciela Römer & Asociados, National survey, April 1999. N= 979 for income question, 1,041 for 
education question, 1,041 for employment question. 
 
The patterns of socioeconomic support demonstrated in opinion polls are reflected 
in the geographic distribution of the vote results according to socioeconomic status by 
                                                 
14
 Other national surveys reported in newspapers report similar results; for example, those by Gallup 
Argentina in La Nación, 7/24/99 and 8/11/99).   Raúl Jorrat and Dario Canton (2002) have conducted a 
multivariate analysis within the city of Buenos Aires finding social class to be an independent and 
significant predictor of vote choice. 
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district.  A district-by-district examination of the 1999 election results, incorporating 
census data, shows strong associations between vote choice and wealth, literacy rates, 
and urbanization (measured in terms of population density).  Tables 6.2 to 6.4 display the 
aggregate vote percentage attained by De la Rúa and Duhalde within the combined 
electoral districts in each socioeconomic category15. 
 
Table 6.2 - Vote % by district poverty rate, Argentina 
 
 <5% 
(7%) 
5-9.99 
(14%) 
 10-14.99 
(32%) 
15-19.99 
(18%) 
20-29.99 
(20%) 
>30 
(8%) 
De la Rúa 56.4 50.4 45.8 45.8 43.7 40.4 
Duhalde 19.1 28.6 33.0 36.5 41.2 49.2 
 
Table 6.3- Vote % by district illiteracy rate (10 years +), Argentina 
 
 <1% 
(16%) 
1-1.49 
(19%) 
 1.5-1.99 
(21%) 
2-2.99 
(25%) 
3-6.99 
(14%) 
>7 
(8%) 
De la Rúa 53.0 46.9 43.2 44.9 47.8 40.7 
Duhalde 22.4 33.2 38.4 36.2 39.0 48.4 
 
Table 6.4-Vote % by district population density (pop/ sq. km), Argentina 
 
 >10k 
(11%) 
3k-10k 
(18%) 
 500-2.9k 
(16%) 
50-499 
(19%) 
10-49 
(21%) 
0-9.9 
(15%) 
De la Rúa 54.0 46.3 40.2 45.9 48.1 45.6 
Duhalde 21.7 34.6 36.4 36.6 35.0 41.9 
 
On the whole, The Alianza attained its widest margins within the most affluent, 
literate, and urban districts, while the PJ was competitive primarily in the most 
impoverished, illiterate, and rural areas. While this trend is straightforward with regard to 
poverty rates, an exception to this trend can be seen in the results for illiteracy and 
urbanization. The relative strength of the PJ in semi-urban areas and areas with moderate 
                                                 
15
 Information about the source and nature of electoral and survey data for both is provided in the 
Appendix. 
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illiteracy stems largely from its success in the province of Buenos Aires, which surrounds 
(but does not include) the country’s capital city, contains about a third of the country’s 
population, and is a traditional Peronist stronghold. Of the ten districts with illiteracy 
rates bewteen 1.5 and 2 percent in which Duhalde won a plurality, eight were located in 
the province of Buenos Aires; similarly, nine of the ten PJ-won districts with population 
densities between 500 and 3000/sq. km were located in the Buenos Aires province. 
  Bivariate correlations confirm the strength of the links between socioeconomic 
tendencies and vote results. Table 6.5 displays results of independent correlations of the 
three socioeconomic variables with De la Rúa’s percentage of the vote in each district. 
 
Table 6.5-Correlation with De la Rúa vote  
    R P value 
Population Density  .206 .000 
Poverty -.497 .000 
Illiteracy -.342 .000 
n=538 
 
These socioeconomic tendencies in the vote represented both continuity with and 
change from previous patterns.  The association between lower levels of education and 
income and Peronist support has been a consistent feature of Argentine electoral behavior 
(Ostiguy 1997, Catterberg 1991).  To some extent, the Alianza’s vote can be viewed as a 
reuniting of the middle-class dominated, anti-Menem electorate that had split during the 
mid-1990s.  However, while Menem had obtained 49% of the vote in 1995, four years 
later his party’s support had been reduced to 38%.  In 1995, Menem had benefited from 
an unusually high share of middle class and upper class voters, who tended to lack 
Peronist partisan identification but responded positively to free market economics and the 
economic stability that had accompanied it (Gervasoni 1997). By 1999, with all the major 
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parties supporting convertibility and pledging commitment to economic stability, these 
voters tended to trend away from Duhalde’s candidacy, throwing their support either to 
the Alianza or to Cavallo  (Levitsky 2001, 64).  As a result, Duhalde was left with an 
electoral coalition that barely exceeded the PJ’s traditional “floor.” In accordance with 
traditional patterns, Duhalde drew his strongest support from the lower class; as a result 
of the shifts in the character of the Peronist vote under Menem, his support was 
disproportionately concentrated among the rural poor of the country’s interior, and in the 
informal sector.   
 
Both the content of the Alianza’s campaign message and the socioeconomic 
characteristics of its support base had their roots in the political shifts of the 1990s, both 
within the opposition and government.  FREPASO’s emergence as an opposition force 
during Menem’s first term was built around an appeal to governance issues and a 
successful attraction of middle class, urban voters away from the UCR; this success 
reinforced the leadership’s tendency toward messages that offered minimal critiques of 
the existing economic order. The UCR’s precipitous electoral decline stemmed from the 
successive discrediting of the party’s capacity for economic management (as a result of 
the disastrous outcome of Alfsonsin’s tenure) and capacity to represent a genuine 
opposition capable of holding the Peronist government accountable (primarily as a result 
of Alfonsín’s capitulation to the Pacto de Olivos).  These events elevated the stature of 
De la Rúa, who had opposed the pact, and whose economic views differed sharply from 
those of Alfonsín.  In electoral terms, the UCR’s  clearest path back to political relevance 
involved adopting much of FREPASO’s political message and ”clean government” 
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image, in order to bring its wayward supporters back into the fold.  In this regard, the 
urban middle class was clearly central.  These were the voters that represented a 
traditional support base of the UCR but had been more likely to desert the party in 1995; 
obtaining a majority in this sector was essential for the Alianza’s hopes of victory in 
1999. 
 These trends were closely tied to strategies undertaken by the government, and 
the evolution of Peronism, under Menem.   Menem’s autocratic approach, combined with 
the initial success of his economic reforms and the emergence of economic stability, 
helped ensure that much initial opposition to his government was centered on governance 
issues.   As the country’s economic performance began to falter, the government’s 
electoral strategies  (including the shift toward patronage based machine politics and 
politically targeted social spending), combined with traditional partisan loyalties, 
sustained the party’s support among lower class voters, with the core of Peronist support 
shifting away from the shrinking organized working class and toward the rural poor and 
the informal sector.   In 1999, faced with the increased unpopularity of the president, 
Duhalde attempted to distinguish himself from the government on the basis of economic 
policy critiques, leaving the opposition room to define its message through appeals 
involving governance and corruption.  
 
Peru 
 
Journalistic accounts of Toledo's rise to the status of leading opposition candidate 
often tended to focus on his childhood of poverty and indigenous ethnic heritage, and on 
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the potential appeal of these qualities to the poor and excluded in Peru.  Public opinion 
data, however, indicate that the major sources of Toledo's political support were in fact 
Peru's upper and middle classes, a sector that had initially offered strong support to 
Fujimori but had increasingly soured on the president during the second half of the 1990s 
(Balbi and Gamero 2003).  While Toledo attracted some of Fujimori's lower class vote 
during the last months of the campaign, his rapid ascent in the polls apparently came 
primarily on the basis of attracting comparatively affluent voters who had intended to 
vote for the previous leading opposition candidates, Alberto Andrade and Luis Castañeda 
(Compañia Peruana de Investigación poll in Caretas, March 16 2000).  Opinion surveys 
that examined vote choice by social class were essentially unanimous in their depiction of 
the eventual tendencies in voting in a two-way race between Toledo and Fujimori.  The 
results in Table 6.6, collected after the first round of the elections, illustrate the trend. 
Due to the difficulty of accurately measuring income levels, Peruvian pollsters 
typically create an index of socioeconomic status, employing the categories A to E as 
shown. Of particular note in these results is Toledo's dominance in the upper middle class 
sector, where he outpolled Fujimori by nearly a two to one margin, and Fujimori's similar 
dominance among the poor. This pattern of vote by social class is present and similarly  
pronounced in surveys conducted by a variety of other polling firms.16 Survey results 
from 2000 at the national level in Peru are generally less extensive, detailed or reliable 
than those taken within Lima, due to practical obstacles involved in obtaining a 
                                                 
16
 For example, a survey taken at the same time by IMA S.A. found Toledo leading Fujimori by a 65 to 21 
percent margin among those who fell into the upper/middle economic category, and trailing Fujimori by 48 
to 43 in the low income sectors An Analistas y Consultores poll found Toledo leading Fujimori by 58 to 28 
percent among the combined A and B sectors, and by 56 to 36 percent among the C sector. Fujimori held a 
54 to 35 percent lead among the combined D and E sectors (Peru Election 2000 website). 
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representative sample and measuring social class.  To the extent that this national survey 
evidence exists, however, it points to a similar tendency, as demonstrated in the results 
provided for vote choice by education level.17 
 Table 6.6 - Vote choice % by social category, Peru  
 Toledo 
(PP) 
Fujimori 
(P2000) 
Socioeconomic Levela 
  
A (upper class) (7%) 49 40 
B (upper middle) (17%) 60 32 
C (lower middle) (40%) 45 44 
D (lower) (30%) 33 56 
E (very poor)  (6%) 33 47 
Educationb 
  
Primary or less (9%) 28 63 
Secondary (36%) 38 51 
Tech.school/some university (42%) 51 37 
University grad/postgrad (13%) 44 35 
Residenceb   
Urban (80%) 44 43 
Semiurban/Rural (20%) 41 50 
Sources: a. Apoyo, April 2000, Metropolitan Lima and Callao, n = 512. b. Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (Datum), May 2000, nationwide postelectoral survey, n=1,040. 
 
As in Argentina, the tendencies suggested by opinion polls are generally 
confirmed by a district-by-district examination of vote results and demographic data from 
the 2000 first round election in 1788 electoral districts (Tables 6.7-6.9).   
 
Table 6.7-Vote % by district poverty rate, Peru 
 
 0-14.9% 
(10%) 
15-29.9 
(13%) 
 30-39.9 
(18%) 
40-49.9 
(16%) 
50-64.9 
(15%) 
65-79.9 
(9%) 
80-100 
(19%) 
Toledo 45.4 44.6 43.3 38.3 39.4 37.1 35.4 
Fujimori 41.2 46.0 48.4 52.7 52.1 53.2 52.9 
 
                                                 
17
 Additional detail about the survey samples is provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 6.8-Vote % by district illiteracy rate, Peru 
 
 0-2.9% 
(11%) 
3-4.9 
(28%) 
 5-9.9 
(28%) 
10-24.9 
(21%) 
25+ 
(12%) 
Toledo 43.6 42.1 41.1 36.8 36.1 
Fujimori 43.3 48.6 50.5 53.4 52.0 
 
 
Table 6.9-Vote by district % rural, Peru 
 
 0% 
(33%) 
1-2.99 
(19%) 
 3-14.9 
(13%) 
15-29.9 
(9%) 
30-59.9 
(10%) 
60+ 
(18%) 
Toledo 41.2 42.9 45.2 38.0 36.4 35.2 
Fujimori 48.4 48.9 46.4 51.8 54.1 53.0 
 
 
 Overall, Toledo’s showing in the most affluent districts was just sufficient to 
compensate for Fujimori’s majority support in poorer, rural, less literate regions, enabling 
Toledo to force a runoff election. As with the Argentine election results, the electoral 
geography according to urbanization rates presents a more complicated picture. While 
enjoying his strongest support in rural areas Fujimori performed strongly in the most 
urbanized districts, a performance based largely on his electoral strength in Lima. The 
incumbent’s strength in the country’s  capital and  main city helps explain the muted 
difference in overall urban vs. rural vote totals in table 6.9, and represents a noteworthy 
difference between Peru and the other two cases examined here. Toledo, while tending to 
perform well in urban areas overall, attained his highest support in smaller cities in the 
country’s interior. In districts outside of Lima with 0% rural population (a category 
encompassing roughly 6% of the electorate) Toledo defeated Fujimori by 48.9 to 41.3 
percent. 
 Correlations of the Toledo vote according to district demographics (Table 6.10) 
reinforce the survey data and aggregate vote tallies, although the statistical relationships 
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are notably weaker than in the Argentine case. A correlation between Toledo’s 
percentage of the vote and literacy rates falls just short of statistical significance.  
 
Table 6.10 - Correlation with Toledo vote 
 
 R P value 
Rural % (1993) -.134 .000 
Poverty -.112 .000 
Illiteracy -.045 .058 
n=1788 for illiteracy, 1813 for rural % and poverty 
  
In contrast with Argentina and Mexico, where class tendencies in the vote 
reflected long-term historical trends and patterns of partisan loyalty, the looser 
representative links between Peruvian voters and leaders led to considerable shifts in the 
social profile of opposition and incumbent support throughout Fujimori’s term. Having 
won election with the backing of Peru’s poor and votes from the interior, Fujimori’s 
initial policies and their outcomes received approval from across the socioeconomic 
spectrum. Following the 1992 autogolpe and the capture of Abimael Guzmán, the 
president’s approval in all social classes was between approximtaely 63 and 67%, with 
the very poor indicating the lowest levels of support, and the middle classes the highest 
(Carrión 2006, 130).  However, over the next few years this coalition would be reshaped, 
in response to two major trends: government social spending intended to build support 
for the President’s reelection among the poor, and Fujimori’s efforts to concentrate power 
and override legal limitations, particularly in his pursuit of a constitutionally prohibited 
third term. After the1993 referendum demonstrated that his support among the poor and 
rural sectors was potentially tenuous, the government made attracting those voters a top 
priority. By the 1995 elections, Fujimori’s overall popularity had increased, but a gap had 
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emerged between his support from the upper classes and very poor, which surged, and his 
support from the middle and lower classes, which remained relatively constant (Carrión 
2006, 130).   In the 1995 election, support for Javier Pérez de Cuellar’s governance- 
centered campaign was drawn disproportionately from urban areas and middle class 
voters (Kay 1996, 87).  
Following Fujimori’s reelection, as the economy began to decline, the 
government launched its campaign for reelection,  and as Fujimori’s popularity dropped 
overall, the middle class remained Fujimori’s weakest supporters. During this period 
upper class opinions shifted from approving to disapproving, and the president came to 
rely increasingly on the support of the very poor. (Carrión 2006, 130; Tanaka 2003, 128-
129). By the time of the 2000 election, only among the very poor did Fujimori enjoy an 
approval rating over 50%, while support from the upper and middle classes both were 
just under 40%.   
The consistently weaker support for Fujimori among the middle class has in part 
been ascribed to economic factors: Tanaka (2003) and Balbi and Gamero (2003) note that 
the middle class, (and the urban formal sector more generally) suffered some of the 
sharpest costs of the switch to the free market, was hit the hardest by economic slowdown 
and increase in unemployment following Fujimori’s reelection, and benefited little from 
the spending and public works of the government. Despite having some basis in 
economic concerns, the ensuing discontentment was not expressed primarily in terms of 
rejection of the free market model. Support for privatization declined overall throughout 
Fujimori’s term; however, the middle classes consistently expressed greater support for 
the free market than the poor or very poor (Carrión 2006, 139). Balbi and Gamero note 
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that burgeoning middle class dissatisfaction following Fujimori’s reelection was 
significantly tied to governance issues: the “continually decreasing government respect 
for the rules of democracy” and “the growing arbitrariness of the regime’s actions.” 
(Balbi and Gamero 2003, 167-168) 
Given the fluid and transient nature of political representation in post-crisis Peru, 
this general, middle class-centered discontent did not coalesce around its eventual 
standard bearer until just before the election. The initial beneficiaries of the growing 
opposition sentiment were Andrade and Castañeda; after they faltered due to the 
geographic limitations of their support and the withering assaults of the government, 
Alejandro Toledo stepped into the gap at the last minute.  While in some ways an 
arbitrary choice to embody the anti-Fujimori message, Toledo’s persona offered 
advantages –while able maintain the middle-class, urban core of the opposition’s support, 
his provincial and indigenous roots and emphasis on decentralization helped broaden the 
opposition’s appeal.   The votes of the middle class and more educated are insufficient to 
enable electoral competitiveness in a country with Peru’s social and economic 
composition. Nonetheless, strong support in those sectors, combined with inroads into the 
poorer and the rural vote, allowed Toledo to attain enough support to reach the 2000 
runoff, dealing a considerable blow to the incumbent and effectively positioning him to 
claim the presidency following Fujimori’s eventual fall. 
Mexico 
 
During its decades of dominance in Mexican politics, the PRI’s traditional bastions 
of electoral support had been, as Joseph Klesner describes them, “rural areas and poor 
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states, populated with older voters who remember the years of the ‘Mexican miracle,’ 
with illiterates and peasants who are easily coerced, and with housewives who have 
traditionally feared change.” (Klesner 2001, 109)  Throughout the latter part of the 
twentieth century, social and economic changes shrank the size and importance of these 
constituencies, as Mexico’s population underwent rapid increases in urbanization and 
literacy.  
Survey data from the 2000 elections shows that the strongest support for the PAN 
and Fox came from the social groups outside of the of the shrinking traditional support 
base of the PRI.  According to preelection surveys and exit polls (see table 6.11), Fox 
defeated Labastida among younger voters, voters with higher levels of education, and 
voters with higher levels of income. Fox held large advantages among voters who 
described their occupations as private sector employees or students, while Labastida led 
among self-described housewives and welfare beneficiaries.  The Fox vote increases by 
educational level, with voters with no education supporting Labastida by a sixteen 
percent margin, and with Fox ahead by nearly forty percentage points among those with a 
university degree.18 
Newspaper accounts and commentaries by public opinion analysts on the campaign 
and its outcome emphasized the centrality of Mexico's middle class to the opposition 
victory.  One pollster, referring to results such as a Reforma poll which showed Fox 
leading Labastida by more than a 2-1 margin among professionals under 40, 
characterized the election as a "yuppie revolution" (Associated Press, 7/6/00). 
                                                 
18
 The other major exit poll, conducted by Consulta Mitofsky with a sample size of over 6000, obtained 
similar results. For more detailed discussion, see Klesner (2005). Magaloni and Poiré (2004) and Moreno 
(2003) have conducted multiple regression analysis of the 2000 Mexican vote). 
 220 
 As in Argentina and Peru, a study of vote results by district confirms the tendencies 
established in surveys.  Joseph Klesner (2004, 2005) has conducted analyses of the 
election for federal deputies at the municipio level; in a multiple regression analysis for 
the election of 2000, literacy, urban population, and industrialization all have a 
significant and positive effect on the PAN vote. The results of the analysis support the 
picture presented by surveys of the PAN as “a party with an urban, educated, middle 
class base” (Klesner 2005, 111). 
 
Table 6.11 - Vote choice % by social category, Mexico  
 
 Fox (PAN) Labastida (PRI) 
Education a   
None (8%) 30 46 
Primary (34%) 35 36 
Secondary (22%) 49 34 
Preparatory (21%) 53 28 
University (15%) 60 22 
Income b   
≤1000 pesos/month (27%) 31 48  
1001-2000 (24%) 46 41  
2001-4000 (22%) 56 29 
> 4000 (27%) 58 31 
Welfare Beneficiary a   
Yes (15%) 27 56 
No (83%) 48 32 
Residence b   
Urban (69%) 53 32 
Rural (24%) 28 54 
Employment a   
Public sector (18%) 41 37 
Private sector (26%) 53 31 
Student (5%) 59 19 
Housewife (25%) 41 43 
 
Sources: a. Reforma exit poll, July 2000 n=3,313  b. Mexico Panel Study, July 2000, n=476 for income question, 
n=1,028 for residence question. 
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As Alejandro Moreno (2002) notes, the electoral coalition that propelled Fox to 
victory was “not an accident of the 2000 elections. ” Rather, it had its roots in the 
modernization of Mexico, as Fox drew his “main support from the educated and urban 
electorate that started to vote against the PRI long ago in local elections.”  The basic class 
tendencies in the PRI and anti-PRI vote dated back to the first appearances of genuine 
electoral competition (Moreno 2002, 4). Fox’s victory and the profile of the voters that 
made it possible, then, were in part the culmination of a long term historical trend; 
however, the nature of the political context in 2000 and Fox’s electoral strategy also 
played a role in the assembling of the coalition that carried the PAN to electoral success. 
In Moreno’s view, during the era of declining PRI hegemony: 
 
Mexicans have been split into two politically relevant camps. One of them 
is younger, more educated, more urban, and holds more democratic and pro-
liberal points of view.  The other is older, less educated, more rural, more 
authoritarian and more fundamentalist.  The former tends to vote for the 
opposition, and supported the rise of the PAN in the electoral arena, more than the 
PRD. The latter tends to vote for the PRI and constitutes the core support of a 
party with a long tradition in government (Moreno 2002, 24) 
  
 
Given that the links between social class, attitudes, and vote choice in the 2000 
election represented a pattern that had characterized all post-1988 political competition in 
Mexico, why was 2000 the year in which the opposition camp successfully took the 
presidency behind a PAN candidate? As discussed previously, the overall gradual decline 
in size of the social groups that the PRI relied on for its support steadily strengthened the 
opposition’s hand. The increased political opening and fairness of electoral reforms post-
1988 were also of considerable importance, and the economic discontentment that 
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followed the Mexican peso crisis of 1994 made the PRI more vulnerable than in any year 
since the watershed 1988 contest. 
 Beyond these contextual factors, the successful adoption of a deliberately 
expansive appeal by Fox was crucial to mobilizing the opposition vote as an effective 
force against the PRI. Building on the independent and non-partisan elements of his 
campaign,  Fox pursued a strategy that was forthrightly non-ideological, incorporated 
figures from across the political spectrum and appealed to the politically divided anti-PRI 
electorate by citing the principle of the “useful vote” and making the claim that only Fox 
could remove the PRI from office. Exit poll results demonstrate that this approach was 
largely effective; the PAN drew “support from the left to the center right;” and in 
particular gained support from left-leaning voters (with the biggest gains coming among 
the “educated and liberal segments of the left.”(Moreno 2002)  Fox’s support both 
exceeded the percentage of the vote achieved by his party at the legislative level, and was 
more evenly distributed across the country than PAN legislative support. The successful 
uniting of the ideologically diverse anti-PRI opposition was crucial to Fox’s victory. 
  A final factor that helps explain the sudden success of the “coalition of change” 
in 2000 was the impact of electoral turnout. Despite the increased competitiveness of the 
election process, overall turnout in 2000 was 64 percent, 13 points lower than in 1994. 
This turnout decline occurred disproportionately among voters in the PRI’s target 
electorate. Pre-election surveys indicated that Fox’s supporters were more likely to vote 
than Labastida supporters, a fact that helps explain the difference between the final 
opinion polls (which slightly favored the PRI) and the eventual outcome (Moreno 2002). 
Turnout in districts won by Fox’s electoral alliance tended to be higher than in PRI 
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districts: districts in which the PAN won a majority averaged 67% turnout compared to 
59% for PRI majority districts, and districts in which the PAN was held below 20% 
averaged 56% turnout compared to 72% in districts where the PRI failed to break 20% 
(Klesner and Lawson 2001, 19).  The increase in PAN district turnout was paralleled by a 
shift in the socioeconomic determinants of participation. Whereas higher rates of literacy 
had been significantly correlated with abstention during the era of  PRI dominance, by 
2000 literacy, urbanization, and education were all positively correlated with voter 
turnout, the decreasing effectiveness of the PRI’s clientelistic machine and the increasing 
competitiveness of election created a turnout pattern more in with those observed in 
established democracies (Klesner and Lawson 2001, Lawson and Klesner 2004). 
In sum, the Mexican election contest of 2000, like previous elections,  revolved 
around two basic divides. In socioeconomic terms, the divide was between more urban, 
educated, affluent and younger voters who tended to favor the opposition and more rural, 
poorer, older, and more traditional voters who tended to favor the PRI.  In attitudinal 
terms, the divide centered around differing opinions on the political regime. The fact that 
this previously existing pattern of divisions produced an unprecedented opposition 
victory in 2000 can be tied to a number of factors: institutional changes that leveled the 
electoral playing field, long-term demographic changes that increased the size and 
importance of the opposition’s social base, a decline in the effectiveness of clientelist 
methods (leading to higher levels of turnout among more civically engaged voters),  post-
crisis economic difficulties that promoted overall discontentment, and  the effective use 
of a non-ideological opposition campaign that appealed to a broad range of anti-PRI 
voters. 
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The existence of similar patterns of social support for government and opposition 
in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico (combined with the ideological diversity of opposition 
supporters and the governance-related political liabilities of incumbents), provides a 
potentially strong explanation for the simultaneous and successful adoption of second 
generation reformist opposition in each of the three cases. This common configuration of 
social class and political loyalties, and the campaign messages associated with it, were 
not a chance occurrence. In each case, the nature of the electoral contest and patterns of 
representation were a product of a shared prior trend: the successful implementation of 
market reform by an incumbent leader employing a political approach that can be 
characterized as “neoliberal populism.”  
  
 
Neoliberal Populism 
 
The term “neoliberal populism” describes a particular political strategy and 
pattern of political representation that was central to the implementation of sweeping 
packages of market reform in Argentina (under Carlos Menem), Peru (under Alberto 
Fujimori), and Mexico (under the PRI, and in particular under Carlos Salinas de Gortari). 
Second generation reformist opposition in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico was a reaction to, 
and a logical consequence of, the previous political success of these neoliberal populists.  
  This political approach was not unique to Argentina, Peru and Mexico.  Leaders 
elsewhere in Latin America at various times displayed neoliberal populist tendencies or 
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attempted neoliberal populist strategies during the market reform era; some of these 
attempts will be discussed in the concluding chapter.  However, only in Argentina, Peru, 
and Mexico did a neoliberal populist approach prove effective in both political and policy 
terms over the medium term, in the sense that neoliberal populist leaders or parties both 
successfully implemented free market reforms and successfully pursued reelection.  It 
was this dual success that generated the apparent free market consensus responsible for 
the second generation reformist nature of opposition challenges. 
 
 The phenomenon of neoliberal populism has several facets. The “neoliberal” 
aspect is straightforward; in each case, the central political goal of leaders was a drastic 
shift from a state-centered to market oriented economy.  Prior to the 1990s, this type of 
policy agenda was typically viewed as antithetical to the sort of political approaches 
traditionally associated with the word “populism.” During the early 1990s, however, 
some prominent market reform efforts were accompanied by political styles and tactics 
that could be considered populist in nature, were carried out by parties or leaders with 
populist heritage, and were directed toward a predominantly lower class electorate. 
 The precise definition of “populism” is a matter of some debate.19 In the context 
of the neoliberal populist pattern discussed here, “populism” invokes several elements: 
the social nature of the electoral support base, the methods by which the loyalties of those 
supporters were maintained, and the political and leadership style displayed by the 
                                                 
19
 In particular, Kurt Weyland (2001) has argued that the concept of  “populism” should be defined in 
solely political terms to denote a strategy based on personalized appeals to an unorganized mass of 
supporters. Other authors have adopted definitions that incorporate additional elements that have 
historically been associated with the term (such as Roberts, 1995) The use of the term “neoliberal populist” 
here is not intended to indicate a general preference regarding this conceptual debate; rather, it has been 
selected for descriptiveness and familiarity, in consideration of how the term has generally been applied in 
much of the literature. 
 
 226 
market reforming presidents. Neoliberal populism drew primarily on the poor for its 
electoral support. This lower class vote was disproportionately concentrated in the rural 
and informal sectors, and was accompanied by the support of the urban economic elite.  
This distinctive electoral coalition was assembled with a political strategy that 
emphasized clientelistic linkages, in particular through politically targeted and highly 
discretionary spending. Finally, this political strategy was associated with a leadership 
style that bypassed or undermined many existing representative organizations and ties, 
and relied on the individual, personalistic and often autocratic leadership of the president. 
The presidents and parties that spearheaded market reforms in Argentina, Peru, 
and Mexico displayed all of these characteristics. The fusion of populist politics with 
hardcore free-market economic policies appeared surprising or paradoxical to some, 
given the extent to which it ran counter to historical trends. However, some observers 
have noted that the variants of populism that emerged following the debt crisis, often 
referred to as “neopopulism,” share key affinities with the neoliberal populist policy 
agenda (Weyland 1998, Roberts 1995). In each case, the emergence of the neoliberal 
populist approach can be linked to the domestic and international pressures for market 
reforms, as well as the exhaustion of previous corporatist and state-centered modes of 
representation.  In the following sections, I outline the basic features of the neoliberal 
populist coalition and strategy, and their relevance to the ensuing appearance of second-
generation reformist opposition. 
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Neoliberal Populism: Electoral Coalition 
 
At the most basic level, that neoliberal populist pattern is characterized by the 
incumbent’s continued maintenance of a lower class electoral base. In Argentina, Peru, 
and Mexico this lower class support was central to the successful implementation of 
market reform; it was also largely maintained during the era of increasing post-reform 
economic disenchantment following the reelections of market reformers in 1994 and 
1995.   
While the centrality of the lower class to the electoral coalition is a shared 
characteristic of both traditional populism and the recent neoliberal populist variant, the 
neoliberal populist support base displayed some novel features.  These differences 
reflected the changing nature of representation and organization in Latin America 
following the debt crisis, as well as the political imperatives associated with the 
implementation of radical market reform.  The most prominent difference involves the 
role of the working class. Although typically a significant actor in Latin America’s initial 
populist experiences (and particularly so in Argentina, among the three cases examined 
here), the organized, urban working class became less influential under neoliberal 
populist leadership. This decline in the political clout of labor was a region-wide trend, 
but was also deliberately pursued by neoliberal populist leaders. Correspondingly, the 
neoliberal populist coalition depended to a greater extent on the informal sector and on 
the rural poor.  
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As Weyland (1996a) notes, the centrality of the informal sector to populist 
mobilization is a key difference between modern variants of populism and their 
predecessors. The informal sector poor were among “the main victims of ISI,” and were 
largely disorganized. While previously politically marginal, the informal sector was 
empowered electorally as a result of democratization and the weakening of the clientelist 
control of landed elites (Weyland 1996a, 10-12). As a result, these voters presented a 
prime opportunity for neoliberal populists:  they were numerous, available for 
mobilization, uncommitted to the preservation of existing economic arrangements, and 
amenable to new clientelistic linkages. 
While the rural poor had always provided important support for populist 
movements, their weight relative to urban sectors increased in the 1990s. Edward Gibson 
describes this trend as a shift in the importance of the “metropolitan” and “peripheral” 
bases of populist parties in Argentina and Mexico; while populist parties traditionally 
relied on the vote of both the metropolitan and peripheral sectors, neoliberal populists 
deliberately bolstered the electoral importance of the periphery relative to the metropolis. 
The overall effort was intended to weaken and sideline urban political actors that could 
be expected to oppose market reform, while bolstering electoral support in the marginal 
sectors to compensate for the declining weight of organized labor (Gibson 1997, Bambaci 
et al. 2002). 
Although the “metropolitan coalition” became relatively less important to 
neoliberal populists leaders as a source of votes,  neoliberal populists successfully 
cultivated support from the urban, internationally connected economic elite. Surveys and 
studies at the height of neoliberal populist popularity showed strong backing for 
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neoliberal populists among the richest as well as among the poorest voters. Gibson 
describes Menem’s electoral support as “strongest at the bottom and the top of the social 
ladder and weakest in between (Gibson 1997, 364), and notes that in Mexico “While 
retaining a mass base that overwhelmed its opponents, the PRI in 1994 also mobilized 
substantial electoral support from affluent sectors of Mexican society.” Similarly, 
Fujimori’s sudden adoption of free market orthodoxy won him the backing of the 
economic elite in the elections following his accession to the presidency; in the municipal 
elections of 1993 and the 1993 constitutional referendum, the wealthiest regions of the 
country offered strong support. As the number of votes provided by the upper class was 
of limited significance in electoral terms, the support of the economic elite was most 
relevant in terms of financing and policy advice, rather than impact at the ballot box.    
 
The characteristic electoral coalition for neoliberal populists, then, featured strong 
support from the poor (and the rural poor in particular), support from the wealthy, and 
weakness in the middle sectors. While each of the leaders examined here drew on an 
electoral coalition that displayed these basic qualities, the tendency toward reliance on 
the vote of the interior appears to have been less in Peru than in Argentina and Mexico; 
while the capital city became a source of electoral weakness for neoliberal populists in 
Argentina and Mexico, Fujimori ran strongly in Lima. This difference can be accounted 
for largely in terms of the differing histories and origins of neoliberal populism in each 
case. In Argentina and Mexico, the construction of a neoliberal populist electoral 
coalition involved reshaping existing populist parties, shifting the party’s internal base of 
support and economic ideology while preserving and relying upon some existing party 
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structures and traditional party loyalty.   In Peru, the neoliberal populist coalition was 
created essentially out of whole cloth following the collapse of prior channels of 
representation (a collapse that Fujimori both benefited from and promoted through his 
constant attacks on the traditional parties). Under these circumstances, a support coalition 
would need to be rapidly established to fill this political vacuum; in practice, the lack of 
existing party structures in the countryside necessitated an emphasis on the poor voters in 
urban areas and in Lima specifically, who were more accessible and more easily 
mobilized.   
 
Neoliberal Populism: Political Strategy 
 
The similar electoral coalitions present in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico were 
constructed via similar political means. Clientelistic practices, in particular the use of 
politically targeted social spending, were crucial to the establishment and maintenance of 
lower class support in each case.  These clientelistic links, as well as neoliberal populist 
leadership more broadly, involved a decreased emphasis on traditional representative 
organizations and partisan structures, in favor of a more personalistic leadership in which 
the discretionary authority of the president and autonomous, technocratic political elites 
were central. In each case (to varying extents), this powerful and discretionary executive 
leadership displayed autocratic or openly authoritarian tendencies. 
 
In Argentina, as Steven Levitsky notes, Menem’s implementation of market 
reform with sustained lower class support was accomplished in part through the 
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transformation of Peronism from a labor based party to a clientelistic “machine” party 
Much of this shift occurred during the 1980s, as the PJ underwent an internal 
restructuring following their 1983 election defeat, and as Peronist leaders who obtained 
office at the subnational level gained access to patronage resources independent of union 
support (Levitsky 2005, 191; Levitsky 2003).  Following Menem’s election, a dramatic 
increase in federal transfers to the provinces and the maintenance of high levels of 
spending and public employment by provincial governments were crucial to the political 
viability of market reform (Gibson and Calvo 2000). As the 1995 election approached,  
Menem’s administration introduced a series of targeted anti-poverty spending programs; 
Weyland (1998) finds a significant effect of these spending programs the president’s vote 
share at the provincial level in 1995. Between 1993 and 1999, the percentage of social 
spending under the control of the presidency more than doubled (Corrales 2002, 210). 
 
 In Peru, social spending was a central element of Fujimori’s successful efforts to 
achieve reelection following the implementation of market reforms. During the first three 
years of his term, the economic costs of structural adjustment took a significant toll on 
the government’s approval. While Fujimori’s switch to market reformism had won him 
backing from upper classes and business interests,  disapproval was concentrated in rural 
and poorer areas. While public support for the autogolpe, successes against terrorism, and 
the elimination of inflation helped improve the public mood, Fujimori’s political recovery 
in the run up to the 1995 election was also based substantially on a dramatic increase in 
social spending, and an increasingly explicit connection between spending decisions and 
the personal leadership of the president. From 1993 to 1995, bolstered by an influx of 
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revenue from privatization, overall government social spending more than doubled as a 
percentage of GDP, and increased more than tenfold in per capita terms. (Roberts and 
Arce 1998), At the same time, authority over allocation of funds was increasingly 
concentrated in the Ministry of the Presidency (Kay 1996, 83).  This sudden increase in 
emphasis on social programs provided clear electoral benefits: analyses by Roberts and 
Arce (1998), Kay (1996, 87-88) and Weyland (1998) demonstrate that the regions in 
which Fujimori’s support improved most between the 1993 constitutional referendum and 
the 1995 election were those that had received the highest levels of social spending. As 
economic recovery lost steam following the 1995 election, the Fujimori government 
maintained its reliance on the use of state resources to foster political support from the 
lower classes. 
 
In Mexico, the 1988 election had revealed the waning effectiveness of traditional 
PRI representative structures and mobilization in the post-crisis era. The revitalization of 
the PRI under Carlos Salinas would depend in large part on securing the vote of the poor; 
as a result, overall social spending nearly doubled as a percentage of the national budget 
between 1988 and 1991 (Dresser 1991, 6). The most significant new instrument to this 
end was the National Solidarity program (PRONASOL). PRONASOL spending was 
substantial  (with spending reaching an estimated 1.7 billion in 1991 (Dresser 1991, 5), 
and highly discretionary,  being targeted to politically strategic locations. It was also 
explicitly linked to PRI support (Dresser 1991, 28). As such, it served a dual purpose: it 
bolstered public support for the PRI in the 1991 and 1994 elections, but also strengthened 
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the political influence of Salinas and his inner circle relative to the traditional PRI 
hierarchy, helping sideline potential internal opposition to the liberalization process. 
 
 In each case, the ability of the government to buy voter loyalty through social 
spending was central to their success in implementing neoliberal policies while remaining 
electorally viable. The discretionary and politically targeted nature of social spending 
promoted electoral support for market reformers in politically crucial areas; equally 
importantly,  it also helped consolidate the personal power of presidents, and in doing so 
sidelined interests and groups that might pose obstacles to market reform. The 
availability of resources for these clientelist practices was partially contingent on the 
recovery of the economy in aftermath of market reforms, as well as the short term 
infusion of funds provided by privatization of state enterprises. Following the reelection 
of neoliberal populists, economic slowdown, along with the diminished possibilities for 
additional privatizations, tended to hinder the government’s efforts to maintain levels of 
spending while simultaneously maintaining fiscal restraint. In practice, however, the 
overall worsening of the economic and public opinion panorama led to an increased 
dependence on clientelism as a source of political support.  In the twilight of the 
neoliberal populists, clientelistic methods tended to become both more central and less 
effective.  These tendencies contributed to the emergence and success of a second 
generation reformist discourse. 
   
 The discretionary nature of the politically motivated social spending in Argentina, 
Peru and Mexico was emblematic of a broader trend; neoliberal populist electoral 
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strategies were accompanied by a tendency toward increased autonomy and concentration 
of power on the part of executives and their inner circle, and a corresponding decrease in 
the influence of existing party structures and leaders, as well as of organized civil society.  
In Argentina, Menem’s election marked the continued consolidation of Argentina’s 
institutions of democratic competition and political freedom, and during his 
administration the Argentine military ceased to play a significant role in politics. Despite 
these democratic trends, the president’s leadership style was often autocratic in character. 
An obvious example of this tendency was his use of decree powers; in the course of 
pursuing radical market reforms, Menem issued 355 Decrees of Necessity and Urgency 
(compared to 10 during the entire administration of his predecessor). (Levitsky and 
Murillo 2005, 35) Similarly, Menem packed Argentina’s supreme court with friendly 
judges that posed few challenges to his policies, made a the pursuit of a constitutionally 
prohibited second term a top priority (ultimately by pressuring the UCR leadership into 
agreeing on a constitutional revision to that end) and unsuccessfully attempted to run for 
a third term as well. Overall, policymaking under Menem represented an archetypical 
example of what Guillermo O’Donnell (1993) has characterized as “delegative 
democracy.” Menem’s general disregard for institutional limits and democratic 
deliberation was echoed by his relationship with his party. While the negotiation of side-
bargains and payoffs to provincial and labor leaders was essential in removing obstacles 
to Menem’s program, actual decision processes sidestepped these actors. Instead, policy-
making power was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the president and loyal 
technocrats.  
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 In Peru, Fujimori dominated Peruvian politics during his entire decade in office. 
To some extent, this dominance reflected the breakdown of the Peruvian party system 
following the economic crisis of the 1980s; however, Fujimori did everything he could to 
exacerbate this breakdown and prevent alternative political organizations from emerging. 
Railing against the “political class,” he adopted a plebiscitarian style,  appealing directly 
to the public, depicting his personal leadership as an alternative to the politicians that had 
failed Peru, and sidestepping or ignoring inconvenient institutional limits . The most 
forceful illustration of this approach was the autogolpe of 1992; following the 
reintroduction of electoral procedures his administration remained essentially autocratic 
in character. Political influence and policy authority were based on cooperation among 
insulated technocrats, business interests, and the military (with the spymaster Vladimiro 
Montesinos at the center of the network) and public support was cultivated through the 
discretionary use and abuse of state resources by the president and his cronies.  
While Carlos Salinas could not be expected to campaign against the “political 
class,” (as the “political class” was synonymous with his own party), his implementation 
of market reform in Mexico was nonetheless accompanied by a similar tendency toward 
increased autonomy and personalization of executive leadership. In part, this tendency 
represented.a continuation of Mexico’s tradition of presidentialism; throughout the years 
of PRI control, presidents had occupied a dominant position in Mexican politics. 
However, under Salinas, the dominance of the presidency was accompanied by an 
increasing independence from existing party structures. Although the PRI’s clientelistic 
networks remained important, Salinas’ administration was characterized by the 
ascendance of neoliberal technocrats at the expense of traditional party bosses and 
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organizations, as well as by “the circumvention of sectoral organizations” (Gibson 1997, 
361). Alan Knight (1998) describes Salinas’ leadership, likening it to that of Menem and 
Fujimori: 
 
“...Salinas - like other neoliberal presidents - had his populist side. Like Menem, he 
broke with the traditions of a nationalist, 'populist' party; but, like Menem (and 
Fujimori), he elevated the power of the executive, rode roughshod over political and 
economic vested interests, and adopted an arbitrary, personalist and populist style of 
government....  Presidentialism flourished as never before; a veritable cult of 
Salinas... Salinas toured the country like some latter-day Cárdenas, distributing 
government largesse, gladhanding the people, marching down dusty streets in casual 
shirtsleeves or leather jacket, communing with an admiring people.” 
 
In Mexico, unlike in the other countries examined here, the years preceding the 
election of second generation reformists were associated with a transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy, as electoral processes became fairer and more 
competitive, and PRI hegemony receded. Nonetheless, the leadership style and tactics 
associated with the implementation of market reform under Carlos Salinas bore a strong 
similarity to the pattern observed in Argentina and Peru. 
Overall, neoliberal populist leadership was top-down and personalistic, both in 
terms of policy making and political representation.  Market reform was driven by 
powerful executives and autonomous technocrats, and social spending was targeted, 
discretionary, and allocated by the president. The political style that accompanied this 
policy approach relied on personal connections between the president and voters, with 
political representation occurring outside of organized institutions. In each case, the 
personalistic and presidentialist governing style of neoliberal populist leaders sometimes 
became autocratic or authoritarian in character.  
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The policy successes and decisive reelection of neoliberal populists cannot be 
solely ascribed to skillful use of social spending or forceful executive leadership. In 
Argentina and Peru, the elimination of hyperinflation and the economic boom that 
followed the implementation of market reforms dramatically elevated the popularity of 
both Menem and Fujimori. Weyland (1998) has observed a strong connection between 
the presence of a hyperinflationary crisis and social support (and lower class support in 
particular) for market reformers. This explanation does not account for PRI support in 
Mexico, where the incumbent party was in power both for the debt crisis and for the 
neoliberal response; nonetheless, economic optimism during the early 1990s following 
Salinas’ reforms contributed significantly to the PRI’s 1994 recovery from the debacle of 
the 1988 election.  In Peru, public gratitude for economic recovery was compounded by 
gratitude for internal security; the successful counterinsurgency against the Shining Path 
guerrillas that had terrorized the country (and the 1992 capture of their leader, Abimael 
Guzmán) were viewed as an immense accomplishment.  In Argentina and Mexico 
(although not in Peru), neoliberal populist leaders benefited from decades of powerful 
party loyalty among lower class voters, loyalties that in many cases were unshaken by the 
party’s dramatic shift in economic ideology.  Independent of the government’s strategies, 
the weakening or division of the main opposition groups during the mid-1990s was also 
helpful for the electoral prospects of incumbents; the rapid decline of the UCR smoothed 
Menem’s reelection, the disintegration of the Peruvian party system helped prevent a 
credible challenge to Fujimori, and the PRI benefited from a slump by the PRD (partially 
self-inflicted, and partially as a result of PRI pressure), as well as a continuing and 
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indecisive battle between the PAN and the PRD for the mantle of the anti-PRI opposition. 
While clientelism was a central element of the electoral strategy, other favorable 
conditions also contributed to neoliberal populist reelection victories.   
 
By the end of the decade, however, most of these favorable conditions were no 
longer in effect. In Argentina and Peru, the elimination of hyperinflation created a 
“paradox of success;” as the previous crisis faded into the distance, the government’s 
achievements became less prominent in public opinion. Less favorable issues (such as 
unemployment, corruption and democracy) obtained greater salience.   A similar 
tendency toward declining salience of successes occurred with regard to Fujimori’s anti-
terror victories (Weyland 2000). In Mexico, the government’s economic achievements 
were nullified not by success but by failure, through the devastating impact of the peso 
crisis. As favorable memories faded, the burgeoning recessions sapped support for the 
government.   At the same time, divisions within the opposition diminished – Argentina’s 
opposition parties formed an alliance, anti-Fujimori voters coalesced around a series of 
standard-bearers, and Fox attracted a broad range of anti-PRI opposition voters through 
an independent and non-partisan campaign and a flexible ideology.  By 1999 and 2000, 
the continued viability of the neoliberal populist model was in doubt. 
 
The Opposition Response 
 
 While the successful application of a neoliberal populist approach paved the way 
to reelection for Menem, Fujimori, and the PRI, the political environment in 1999-2000 
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offered new opportunities for challengers. The nature of the opposition strategy, and the 
electorate to which the opposition appealed, was largely defined in response to the 
strengths and weaknesses of the incumbent.  
   
  Despite the fact that economic optimism had largely given way to economic 
disenchantment by the end of the 1990s, opposition campaigns remained reluctant to 
challenge the basic features of the economic model. In each case, this fact can be 
plausibly ascribed in part to the incumbent’s successful maintenance of the electoral 
support of the poor; the voters who would likely have been most amenable to a more 
radical challenge to free market orthodoxy remained the most loyal supporters of the 
incumbent. The declining economy, while a general drain on incumbent support, had the 
least impact on the political loyalties of the poor; rather, the worsening overall picture 
resulted in an increased government reliance on clientelist methods. The voters, and the 
regions, that were most dependent on the social spending of neoliberal populist leaders 
tended to remain loyal. In contrast, the opposition attracted the support of dissatisfied 
voters who demanded goods that the neoliberal populist model was ill-equipped to 
provide, such as (in the words of a Peruvian opposition activist) “work and citizenship.”20   
  
 In each case, the connection between a campaign based on governance issues and 
a middle class, urban, educated electorate had first appeared in elections prior to the onset 
of “reform fatigue.”  In Argentina, FREPASO’s rapid shift from critiques of Menem’s 
economic policy to attacks on corruption enabled the fledgling third party to grow rapidly 
by capturing disillusioned middle-class Radical voters in the aftermath of the Pacto de 
                                                 
20
 Interview with Dr. Eduardo Cáceres of APRODEH, Lima, Feb. 2004) 
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Olivos. This growth elevated the new party onto the national stage and made its support 
and its message indispensable to a Radical party seeking to renovate its battered image; 
its anti-corruption message also resonated with the traditional “civic republican” element 
of Radical discourse. In Peru, Pérez de Cuellar’s challenge to Fujimori centered on 
honesty, democracy, and respect for the constitution; his support was concentrated among 
the middle classes (Kay 1996, 87). Outside of the partisan arena, the initial mobilizations 
against Fujimori that initially emerged during his second term were also fundamentally 
governance-based, having been provoked by the president’s efforts to pursue a second 
term; the social base of these movements was similarly affluent and educated. In Mexico, 
the emphasis on the importance of democratic competition was the only consistent and 
significant difference between the PRI and a disproportionately middle-class, urban based 
PAN that had enthusiastically signed onto Salinas’ market reform policies, and the 
regime divide remained the defining feature of partisan divisions from beginning of 
genuine political competition in 1988 to the PRI’s defeat in 2000. In each case, the 
emerging middle class opposition to neoliberal populists had initially coalesced not 
around disapproval of their free market economic policies, but instead around a forceful 
rejection of the incumbent’s attempts to monopolize the political arena. 
The urban, middle class constituency that had formed the initial basis for 
opposition challenges, while insufficient to win a presidential election on its own, 
nonetheless remained essential. Without retaining the support of a strong majority of 
these voters, opposition challengers would have no hope of overcoming the incumbent’s 
remaining advantages. The founding identity of the opposition to neoliberal populists was 
fundamentally governance centered in nature; this basic identity naturally persisted as 
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second generation reformists attempted to build on their core support by attracting a 
broader range of voters who were disenchanted with the incumbent. Beyond its 
continuity with prior messages, the continued usage of a governance-centered, reformist 
message was a logical choice for several reasons. 
 
Even as post market reform economic performance faltered, middle-class and 
urban voters demonstrated an increased concern with governance issues relative to 
economic preoccupations. While economic developments and economic policy under 
neoliberal populists were unkind to many elements of the middle class, those voters that 
maintained their relatively privileged and affluent status were unlikely to be responsive to 
calls for a more radical overhaul of the free market system. In order to mount a realistic 
challenge, opposition parties needed to maintain a strong majority among voters who 
were characterized by economic discontentment, but who were not experiencing social 
exclusion. A governance-centered message was appropriate for this constituency.  
Survey data from Argentina, Peru, and Mexico points to corruption and 
governance issues as being higher priorities for more educated, middle class voters. In an 
April 1999 survey in Argentina, 18% of respondents with a university education 
considered corruption to be the single most imporant issue facing the country, compared 
to 6% of those with only a primary education (and 10% overall). In a nationwide poll of 
in May 2000, Peru, when asked what they disliked about Alberto Fujimori, 32 percent of 
upper and middle class voters (sectors A and B) identified “is authoritarian/dictator” as 
the biggest problem. Among poor voters (the D and E sectors), only 11% pointed to 
Fujimori’s authoritarianism, while the most common response was “doesn’t create 
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employment.” (Datum International, May 2000). In an a Mexican exit poll, 46% of voters 
with some university education identified “corruption” or “democracy” as the most 
important problem facing the country; among those who had completed only primary 
education, only 28% selected one of those issues (Mitofsky exit poll, July 2000).   In a 
preelection poll, 60% of Mexicans with a university education believed that Mexico was 
not a democracy, compared with 40% of the respondents with only primary education.  
(Mexico Panel Study, June 2000).  
 While it is possible that the association of governance related concerns with social 
class might be an effect of political loyalties rather than a cause, the preceding studies of 
the three cases suggest that the link primarily involved parties adjusting their message to 
the attitudes of the electorate, rather than loyal partisans adopting the rhetorical priorities 
of their party. In Argentina, for example, FREPASO initially attempted to open space for 
itself within the political system by stressing economic issues, adopting an anti-
neoliberal, social democratic message, and appealing to disaffected Peronists; only after 
this strategy produced meager results did corruption and governance become increasingly 
central to the party’s message. In Peru, Toledo’s initial entry into the politics in 1995 
involved a more populist campaign message (Schmidt 2000); only in 2000 did he 
position himself primarily as a candidate associated with democratization. In Mexico, 
opposition voters were presented with an explicit choice between a governance-centered 
alternative in Fox and a leftist and nationalist alternative in Cárdenas; both the PAN and 
the PRD had proven to be potentially credible challengers during the previous twelve 
years.  The fact that the second generation reformist opposition won out can be plausibly 
linked to the priorities of the available voters: the potential opposition vote was 
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disproportionately urban, middle class, and amenable to Fox’s message, while the poorer 
sectors that might have formed the basis for a strong PRD challenge retained strong links 
to the PRI. 
 
In addition to the importance of the urban, middle class vote, other considerations 
favored the adoption of a governance-centered message.  The political movements that 
had been assembled in response to the initial successes of neoliberal populism also 
included a wide variety of economic ideologies.  Adopting a stronger challenge to the 
free market model would have created dissension within the opposition’s ranks; 
maintaining a reformist focus promoted unity, as the anti-corruption and pro-democracy 
themes were points of agreement among all opposition factions (albeit a tenuous and 
sometimes grudging unity, with divisions over economic ideology simmering beneath the 
surface).  
Moreover, the central elements of the neoliberal populist strategy – clientelism 
and powerful, personalistic executive leadership- favored the adoption of a governance 
centered message. Clientelistic tactics and the use of state resources for political ends, 
essential components of neoliberal populist success, generated public perceptions of 
corruption and undemocratic leadership, and became the target of opposition attacks on 
reformist grounds.21   Furthermore, the tendency for strong and personalistic leadership of 
neoliberal populists to cross over into outright authoritarianism (most strongly in Peru, 
but also in Argentina and Mexico) elevated issues of democratic accountability and abuse 
of power to the top of the agenda.   
                                                 
21
 Levitsky (2005, 196) makes this point regarding Menem. 
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In response to these conditions, opposition campaigns combined a continued 
adherence to their governance centered message with general promises of improved 
economic performance, arguing that a higher standard of leadership would produce better 
results, and courting voters whose electoral preferences were driven primarily by a desire 
for “change” in the most generic sense. The adoption and electoral success of this second 
generation reformist appeal can be viewed as a reflection of the central elements of the 
successful neoliberal populist strategy that had been previously applied.. 
 
 
Comparative Perspectives: The Failure of Neoliberal Populism in Venezuela and 
Bolivia 
 
 The connections between a successful neoliberal populist approach to market 
reform and the ensuing appearance and success of second generation reformist opposition 
can be further illustrated in comparison with contrasting cases elsewhere in Latin 
America. In particular, two cases provide useful contrasts: Venezuela and Bolivia. In 
Venezuela, a formerly populist party’s effort to liberalize the economy via a post-election 
policy switch (in the style of Menem or Fujimori) proved to be a disaster in both political 
and policy terms: the market reform effort was thwarted, and the unpopular president that 
had promoted it was removed from office. In Bolivia, by contrast, economic 
liberalization along neoliberal populist lines was a success in policy terms; however, it 
was less successful in political terms. As in Argentina and Peru, stabilization and 
structural adjustment brought economic stability, economic growth, and an end to 
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crippling inflation, and Bolivia became widely viewed as a model example for market 
reformers.  Unlike in Argentina and Peru, rather than being accompanied by sustained 
lower class support for the market reformer, Bolivia’s economic transition was associated 
with increasing political exclusion of the lower classes. Venezuela and Bolivia also 
represent two of the cases in which the onset of “reform fatigue” was associated with 
increased polarization over the free market economic model. 
 Venezuela, like most of Latin America, underwent a severe economic decline 
during the 1980s. After two decades of economic growth, fueled by oil revenues, that had 
dramatically reduced poverty and produced a sizable middle class, Venezuela sank into a 
recession in 1979, recording negative growth rates from 1980 through 1984 (López Maya 
and Lander 2004, 209). With the country burdened by a massive foreign debt and oil 
revenues plummeting, economic decline turned into economic crisis on “Black Friday” 
(February 18, 1983), when the government was forced to drastically devalue the 
country’s currency.  Under president Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989), efforts to restore 
growth and stability largely failed; in the process, the government increased public 
spending every year and the country fell deeper into debt (Romero 2001, 10). By 1988, 
poverty rates had surged, and the country’s inflation adjusted GDP per capita had fallen 
below its level of twenty years earlier (Levine and Crisp 1999, 388).  
 In hopes of reversing the devastating trends of the last decade, the Venezuelan 
public turned to a figure from better times. In 1988, the presidential election was won by 
Carlos Andrés Pérez of the Democratic Action (AD) party. Pérez had previously 
occupied the presidency from 1974 to 1979, and his prior administration had been 
associated both with the height of the economic boom and with the oil-driven fiscal 
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excess that became a crippling burden in the following decade. Despite the fact that 
Pérez’ massive spending and borrowing had proven unsustainable following his previous 
exit from power, he built his 1988 campaign around populist promises to “restore the 
standards of living prevailing during the petrodollar years” (Romero 2001, 10) raising 
public expectations that his return to power would signify to a return of the “good old 
days.”  (McCoy and Smith 1995, 131) Like Menem and Fujimori, Pérez won election 
amid dire economic circumstances by promising to avoid austerity and structural 
adjustment.  And, like Menem and Fujimori, he changed course immediately following 
his election, announcing a package of harsh adjustment measures that were dubbed the 
“gran viraje” (big turnaround).  
Unlike those of Menem and Fujimori, Pérez’ policy switch was greeted with a 
massive and debilitating public rejection. Only 25.6 percent of the Venezuelan public 
approved of the adjustment measures upon their announcement; even during the height of 
a temporary oil boom several years later, approval of Pérez’ economic policy never 
reached 50%.  The president’s approval rating dropped precipitously, falling to 22% just 
eight months after he had been elected with a majority vote (Romero 2001, 15). The most 
powerful rejection of Pérez’ switch to neoliberalism occurred not in polls but in the 
streets. Within days of the announcement of the austerity measures, rioting broke out in 
the capital city of Caracas, and quickly spread throughout the country. The violent 
protests, which included “barricades, road closures, burning of vehicles, storming of 
shops, shooting, and widespread looting” (López-Maya 2002, 202), were eventually 
repressed at heavy cost. Police officers who were unprepared for the widespread chaos 
responded with deadly force, killing hundreds; the exact number of deaths remains 
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unknown. Along with their human and economic cost, the rioting (often referred to as the 
“Caracazo”) represented a major psychological blow for a country in which peaceful and 
orderly politics had become the norm (Levine and Crisp 1999, 390). Following the 
Caracazo, demonstrations continued on a daily basis; between 1991 and 1994, there were 
an average of 2.75 protests per day (López-Maya 2002, 202).  
The deeply unpopular Pérez survived two military coups in 1992 (one of the coup 
leaders, Colonel Hugo Chávez,  attained national prominence through his failed attempt), 
and was eventually removed from office in 1993 on charges of corruption. His successor, 
Rafael Caldera, was a founder of one of Venezuela’s two major parties, COPEI; however, 
in response to the deepening public disaffection with political parties as a whole, 
abandoned the party he had helped create to run as an independent. Caldera won election 
by promising to halt or reverse the neoliberal shift that Carlos Andrés Pérez had initiated, 
and his promises found a receptive audience: in a 1994 survey, overwhelming majorities 
of Venezuelans backed price controls, subsidies, and salary increases. Unlike his 
predecessor, Caldera made good on his word, imposing price and exchange controls. 
When his populist measures proved to be economic failures, Caldera shifted toward 
policies based on austerity and stabilization; overall, his administration was characterized 
by “vacillation between populist overtures to a restive population and reluctant stabs at 
liberal orthodoxy.” (McCoy and Smith 1995, 142) This inconsistency, and the persistent 
economic stagnation that accompanied it, further undermined Venezuelans’ faith in their 
politicians.  
By 1998, with Venezuela’s formerly dominant parties in complete disrepute, the 
stage was set for the emergence of Hugo Chávez, who turned his notoriety from the 1992 
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coup attempt to a hugely successful presidential campaign. Chávez’ campaign was based 
around promises to dismantle the Venezuelan political system and on opposition to 
neoliberal economics. After winning the election with 56% of the vote, he set about 
reshaping the country’s institutions, consolidating his power and establishing Venezuela 
as an ostensible alternative to the free market economic model of the “Washington 
Consensus.” 
 As McCoy and Smith (1995, 131) have noted, efforts to employ a neoliberal 
populist strategy in Venezuela failed in both economic and political terms. Not only did 
Carlos Andrés Pérez fail to generate popular support for his government or his program, 
economic reform in Venezuela did not advance past initial attempts at stabilization. 
Moves toward neoliberalism were limited, halting, and haphazard; and unlike in 
Argentina, Peru, and Mexico, the economy never recovered sufficiently to create public 
optimism. The precise reasons why Pérez failed where Menem and Fujimori had 
succeeded are open for debate: prominent and plausible hypotheses include the absence 
of a hyperinflationary crisis (with an associated lack of a sense of public urgency) 
(Weyland 1998, 2002), and Venezuelans’ unrealistic assumptions of their country’s 
affluence (with an associated assumption that deprivation was a result of elite corruption) 
(Romero 1997). However, for the purposes of this study, the reasons for the failure of the 
gran viraje are tangential to the main point: the failure of a neoliberal populist approach 
opened the door to increased political polarization around economic issues at the end of 
the 1990s. 
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By contrast, in Bolivia, the implementation of market reforms by a former 
populist party was largely successful in policy terms: the government succeeded in 
stabilizing the economy and adopting structural adjustment policies. In political terms, 
however, the shift from populism to neoliberalism was less successful. In the aftermath of 
transition to democracy in Bolivia in the early 1980s, the country was wracked with 
severe economic problems. Under Henrique Siles Zuazo (1982-1985) Bolivia suffered 
from high levels of debt, economic stagnation, the collapse of the economically central 
tin sector, and hyperinflation that reached 25,000 percent by 1985. Siles Zuazo’s populist 
policies were ineffective in addressing these problems. In 1985, the presidency was won 
by Víctor Paz Estenssoro of the National Revolutionary Movement party (MNR), who 
finished second in the presidential election, but was named president by the legislature 
(who are responsible for choosing a president if no candidate receives a majority of the 
popular vote). MNR had first entered the political stage as a truly revolutionary 
movement – after being denied a 1951 presidential victory by the military, the party led 
the 1952 revolution that overturned Bolivia’s elite-dominated political system and put in 
place “populist reforms more sweeping than any in the previous history of Latin America 
(Mayorga 1997, 142); the most significant reforms included political inclusion through 
universal suffrage, land reforms, and nationalization of the tin industry (Gamarra and 
Malloy 1995, 403). 
Despite his party’s revolutionary populist heritage, Paz Estenssoro (one of the 
MNR’s main leaders at the time of the revolution) concluded that the way out of 
Bolivia’s contemporary crisis was through neoliberal reform. Paz Estenssoro proposed 
and successfully carried out a New Economic Policy (NEP) that involved deregulation of 
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the economy and elimination of price controls, cuts in government spending, 
international economic integration, and a general reduction in state intervention. The 
macroeconomic results of the NEP were dramatically positive. Inflation was largely 
eliminated, positive growth rates returned in the late 1980s, exports surged, and the 
state’s budget deficit declined dramatically. As in Argentina and Peru, the 
implementation of structural adjustment by a Democratically elected government 
transformed Bolivia’s economy “from ‘basket case’ to ‘showcase’” in the eyes of the 
international financial establishment. (Mayorga 1997, 143). 
The MNR’s economic successes were not paralleled by political successes. The 
former revolutionary populist party had been elected without capturing even a plurality of 
the vote, and was no longer backed by organized social forces (the collapse of state 
centered development and the tin industry had undermined social organization in 
general). Despite the macroeconomic gains achieved during Paz Estenssoro’s tenure, his 
party lost the subsequent presidential election. Over the next decade, overall respectable 
macroeconomic performance was associated with increasing popular political exclusion. 
The outcomes of presidential elections continued to be determined by the legislature 
through elite bargaining, as presidential candidates all fell well short of a majority.  
 
Subsequent administrations maintained their adherence to the structural 
adjustment policies of the NEP. During the late 1980s and 1990s, Bolivia’s three 
traditional parties essentially converged around a neoliberal consensus (Barr 2005, 73). 
At the same time their support, and support for political parties as a whole, dwindled. In a 
1990 poll, only 5 percent of the public believed that political parties represented their 
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interests; 71 percent believed that the government represented the interests of the wealthy 
and politicians (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 419). Combined support for the three major 
parties fell from 74 to 57% of the vote between 1985 and 1993. In their place, two new 
populist parties headed by political outsiders arose to capitalize on increasing public 
disaffection.  In 1993, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of the MNR was elected president. 
Despite a campaign that in part emphasized the MNR’s revolutionary roots and sought to 
capitalize on public discontentment toward austerity policies (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 
423), Sánchez de Lozada pushed ahead with the move toward neoliberalism, in particular 
accelerating the process of privatization (which had received less emphasis in the original 
NEP) (Mayorga 1997, 146).  
 
In general, Bolivian politics during the 1990s was characterized by the 
convergence of major parties around neoliberal economics, a decline in overall support 
for those parties, and their increasing isolation from the poor majority of voters and from 
increasingly demobilized social organizations.  The generally exclusionary nature of the 
political system was intensified by U.S. - sponsored government crackdowns on the coca 
growing industry, which had boomed in the aftermath of the collapse of the tin industry 
in the early 1980s and had become increasingly central to Bolivia’s economy. Anti-coca 
policies were intensified during the presidency of Hugo Banzer (1997-2001). 
Beginning in 1999, Bolivia (like much of Latin America) experienced an 
economic decline, accelerating the decline of the major political parties.  The populist 
political movements that had emerged during the 1990s, the UCS and CONDEPA, had 
been headed by charismatic outsiders and were largely personalistic; their leaders had 
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been willing to cooperate with the traditional parties in exchange for access to patronage 
(Barr 2005, 73-74; Gamarra and Malloy 1995). Both parties were weakened by the deaths 
of their leaders in 1995 and 1997, and faded from the political scene.  The populist 
opposition movements that emerged in the late 1990s to take their place in mobilizing 
Bolivia’s poor and indigenous majority were more organized, radical and intransigent. At 
their head was Evo Morales, leader of the union of coca growers in the Chapare region. 
During the next few years, anti-government protests became increasingly common and 
increasingly violent (Barr 2005, Whitehead 2001). In the election of 2002, three populist 
outsider parties received a combined 46% of the vote while running on strongly anti-
neoliberal, anti-system campaigns; the incumbent’s party received only 3%, and the 
combined support of the three major parties fell below 50% for the first time. Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada of the MNR was elected president with 22.5% of the popular vote 
(just ahead of Evo Morales and his Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), at 21%. 
Widespread, violent protests forced him from power in 2003. In 2005 Evo Morales was 
elected president; unlike all previous presidents since democratization, he won a majority 
of the popular vote (53%). 
As in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico, Bolivia implemented market reform under the 
auspices of a former populist; as in Argentina and Peru, the reforms successfully 
stabilized the economy, controlled inflation, and generated macroeconomic recovery. 
However, Bolivia’s economic liberalization was not accompanied by sustained lower 
class support for a market reforming party – in fact, the years following the 
implementation of market reform were characterized by increased political exclusion and 
disaffection of the popular sectors, and declining support for all major parties. As a result, 
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when Bolivia experienced an economic downturn at the end of the 1990s, the opposition 
that arose in response was not second-generation reformist, but rather strongly populist,  
anti-market and anti-system. Weyland (2003) has argued that the political consensus on 
the acceptance of the free market in Argentina and Peru at the end of the 1990s was in 
large part a result of the successful pursuit of economic stabilization and taming of 
hyperinflation; according to that explanation, Bolivian politics should also have displayed 
a similar consensus. In reality, the 1990s in Bolivia saw increasing polarization over the 
economic model, culminating in the rise and eventual victory of Evo Morales and the 
MAS. The Bolivian case suggests that the key factor behind the appearance of a pro-
market, second generation reformist opposition in the era of reform fatigue was not the 
successful implementation of economic liberalization measures, nor the achievement of 
economic stabilization through those measures, but rather the ability of neoliberal 
populists to maintain strong support from the lower classes. Successful neoliberal 
populist approaches precluded the emergence of anti-liberal, anti-system populist 
movements; failed neoliberal populist efforts created opportunities for renewed 
polarization over economic ideology. 
  
Conclusion: From Neoliberal Populism to Second Generation Reformism 
  
In conclusion, the successful adoption of second generation reformist campaign 
appeals by opposition candidates in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico is best understood as a 
response to prior successes and emerging weaknesses of the incumbent neoliberal 
populist leadership. The adoption of market reform on the basis of a coalition that 
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consisted of policy support from the economic elite and electoral support from the poor 
and rural ensured that the opposition’s main political opening was found among the urban 
middle classes.  The initial economic successes that followed market reform, combined 
with the corruption, clientelistic practices, and autocratic leadership of neoliberal populist 
leaders, promoted an opposition appeal that cultivated this urban, middle class vote by 
emphasizing governance issues– an electorate and a message that were initially 
insufficient to prevent the incumbent’s reelection.  
 Following the reelection of neoliberal populist parties, the coming of recession 
(and in Mexico, an economic crisis) sapped incumbents’ overall public support. At the 
same time, incumbent support from economic elites weakened, for several reasons:  the 
successful completion of first generation reforms had removed the initial motivation for 
the neoliberal populist synthesis, and the governance shortcomings of the incumbent 
seemed to pose potential problems for future economic growth and reform. Under these 
circumstances, the neoliberal populists became more dependent on clientelism and their 
“peripheral” constituents. In response, opposition parties crafted a message that retained 
the prior emphasis on corruption and governance, but incorporated the governance 
question into part of a broader promise of  “change,” claiming that a similar policy 
agenda under superior leadership would produce improved economic results.  This 
second generation reformist opposition strategy attained victory by building on the initial 
electoral gaps in the neoliberal populist approach, and taking advantage of the new 
incumbent weaknesses that emerged in the late 1990s.  
Second generation reformist opposition, then, can be best understood as a 
evolving and pragmatic response to the immediate electoral challenges associated with a 
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particular political circumstance: the presence of a neoliberal populist incumbent with 
sustained lower class support. This explanation for the origins of the opposition messages 
is notable in part because it illustrates what second generation reformism was not. 
Contrary to the assumptions of some observers, the adoption of a reformist perspective 
did not signify a newfound consensus on the desirability of the free market economic 
model among all significant actors.   Neither can the second generation reformist message 
be viewed as a coherent policy agenda designed to respond to the interests and needs of a 
cohesive electoral coalition, or to address the most pressing problems facing the country.  
As a response to electoral challenges, second generation reformism proved 
successful in electoral terms. However, the ad hoc and conjunctural nature of the 
reformist option in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico proved deeply problematic when newly 
elected reformists faced the tasks of governing according to the principles they had 
espoused and of making good on their campaign promises.  The opposition had 
essentially built their campaign on two central pledges: the removal of a corrupt and 
undemocratic incumbent, and the attainment of rapid and noticeable improvements of 
standards of living. Following their electoral victories, the former of these promises, 
having been accomplished, became irrelevant; the latter goal would prove elusive.  
  
 
Chapter 7: Second Generation Reformists in Power 
 
Introduction 
 
Second-generation reformist campaign messages proved immensely successful in 
Argentina, Peru, and Mexico, helping opposition candidacies surmount considerable electoral 
challenges. In Argentina, the Alianza’s victory marked the first time the Peronist party had been 
removed from power via the ballot box in the country’s history, and restored to the presidency a 
party whose support had been reduced to a mere 17% of the vote five years before. In Peru, 
Toledo’s campaign raised him from single-digit obscurity to near parity in two months, allowed 
him to deny Fujimori a first round majority despite substantial electoral abuses to the benefit of 
the incumbent, and positioned him as Fujimori’s logical successor when the weakened 
administration collapsed under the weight of post-election corruption scandals.  And in Mexico, 
Fox removed a party that had controlled Mexico’s presidency for seven decades, and that had 
begun the campaign favored to extend its tenure. As a campaign strategy, second-generation 
reformism was overwhelmingly successful. 
Following their successful election campaigns, however, each of the three triumphant 
reformist challengers faced considerable doubt as to whether they could move from effective 
candidates to effective leaders.  It was unclear whether the often vague reformist message that 
had served to convince voters of the possibility of positive change could form the basis of a 
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mandate for specific policies in response to actual problems. Equally questionable was the 
reformist challengers’ ability to retain consistent political support from the broad and 
heterogeneous coalitions that had placed them in office. In the absence of this clear mandate and 
sustained political loyalty, newly elected leaders would struggle to overcome the entrenched 
opposition to a reformist agenda, both from within the state (where opposition parties still carried 
considerable weight) and from interest groups. 
In this regard, the eventual experiences of second generation reformist challengers once 
in office were generally disappointing; while the nature and scope of the political failures of 
second generation reformism varied greatly among the three cases, by the end of their tenures 
none could claim to have been successful both in political and policy terms. In Argentina, 
economic tribulations, unpopular policies, internal divisions, and scandal rapidly and 
dramatically drained the Alianza’s public support.  Following a long period of decline, a chaotic 
crisis led to the collapse of both the economy and the government; just two years into his term, 
De la Rúa abandoned the presidency, the Alianza (and FREPASO) ceased to exist, and the UCR 
virtually disappeared as a national party. In Peru, after his ascendance to the presidency was 
imperiled by a surprisingly strong electoral challenge from the disgraced former president Alan 
García, Toledo’s public support quickly dissolved; he spent most of his term viewed as a weak 
and ineffective president, saddled with terrible approval ratings and beset by continual turmoil 
within his government.  His party performed poorly in midterm elections, and by the subsequent 
presidential election had essentially disappeared as a political force. Only in Mexico did the 
second-generation reformist leader experience a modicum of success; Fox maintained his 
personal popularity at a high level until the end of his six-year term, and (despite a poor 
performance in midterm elections) eventually managed to transfer power to a presidential 
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successor from his party. Despite these successes, Fox was never able to transform his personal 
prestige into momentum for a policy agenda: he failed in his major reform initiatives, was unable 
to overcome legislative opposition from Mexico’s other two parties, and was generally viewed 
by the public as an honest and well intentioned leader who was also largely ineffective.  
 
Why did the reformist challengers that had been such formidable candidates uniformly 
prove to be weak and ineffective leaders?  To some extent, the performance of each reformist 
depended on factors particular to each country.  The nature of the newly elected party played a 
strong role in shaping outcomes; these differences, which (as described in the introduction) were 
of lesser importance in determining the general nature of the opposition message in each case, 
regained causal importance following the election.  Argentina’s second generation reformist 
party was a coalition of an old and a new party, which differing ideologies, differing priorities 
and differing modes of political competition; as a result, a breakup of the two parties and the end 
of the coalition was a constant threat. In Peru, the second generation reformist party was an 
ideologically incoherent and vague movement; as a result, despite the party’s tendency toward a 
lack of cohesion and the absence of a clear political program, a dramatic fracture between rival 
factions was not likely. In Mexico, the second generation reformist party was relatively cohesive 
and well institutionalized, despite some tension between the president and partisan leaders; 
however, its strong electoral showing had been partly due to temporary support from strategic 
voters with no long-term loyalty, and its minority status left it incapable of pursuing key policies 
without support from other parties. 
 An additional factor that was crucial in determining political outcomes was the economic 
situation faced by each country. As second generation reformist programs consisted more of a set 
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of rhetorical postures than a clear agenda for addressing the country’s most pressing problems, 
the three opposition campaigns had proposed very similar agendas for countries in different 
economic circumstances. In particular, the ongoing recession and severe debt constraints that the 
Alianza encountered upon taking office would prove critical, both in terms of their direct impact 
on the government’s options and public image, and in regard to the effect of those constraints on 
the existing divisions within the party. By way of contrast, Peru’s relatively strong 
macroeconomic performance under Toledo allowed the president some political breathing room 
even after his public image had collapsed, and the economic disenchantment faced by Vicente 
Fox in the early years of his term was less powerful than in Argentina (and was replaced by 
increasing optimism during the latter years of his term). In general, these two factors – the 
partisan makeup of the government and the economic context – were influential in determining 
the differing outcomes faced by the three reformist presidents: in Argentina, political collapse in 
Argentina,  political incapacitation in Peru, and political stalemate in Mexico 
 
Alongside these differences, certain general, commonly shared elements of the second 
generation reformist challenges created a natural predilection toward political weakness and 
ineffectiveness governance that emerged in each case. Specifically, the lack of coherence of the 
ideological nature of the second generation reformist appeal, and the ideological heterogeneity 
present among both voters and leaders of second generation reformist parties, created frictions 
following the assumption of power    Furthermore, the adoption of second generation reformism 
as a fundamentally negative campaign appeal, intended to aggregate the support diverse groups 
based solely on opposition to the current government, left reformist leaders with little effective 
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mandate once they assumed power and contributed to internal friction within their governing 
coalitions.  
Moreover, the composition of the second generation reformist vote posed its own 
problems. Reformist candidates attained office in part through the strong backing of a relatively 
narrow and privileged segment of society that was amenable to appeals centered on governance 
issues.  They supplemented this support by attracting voters of all classes who were dissatisfied 
with the economic situation, promoting the idea that political change would lead to economic 
improvement.  In the absence of the promised improvements, many of these voters, whose 
partisan loyalties tended to be weak, soon abandoned the new government. The second 
generation reformist campaigns and the electoral coalition they attracted were largely ad hoc and 
opportunistic; they did not represent an agenda directed to the material demands of a coherent set 
of social interests. Representative ties within the movement, both between leaders and their 
parties, and between parties and their supporters, tended to be weak and contingent.  
The problems associated with the lack of a clear agenda, internal disunity, weak 
representative ties, and an obsolete electoral coalition were magnified by a general disadvantage 
faced by second generation reformist leaders: their relative inability to call on clientelistic 
methods and state resources. Neoliberal populist leaders, and the main opposition parties that 
second generation reformists faced upon taking office, were able to employ clientelistic tactics 
and (to a varying extent) the machinery of the state.  This capacity allowed them to overcome 
internal divisions within their parties, and in some cases to adopt policies that differed drastically 
from their campaign promises, without suffering debilitating electoral consequences.  Second 
generation reformist parties were less equipped to pursue this sort of strategy, both because they 
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lacked the practical capacity to do so, but also because attempting to do so would undermine 
their fundamental justification for seeking office. 
 
In order to fully examine both the particular factors and general tendencies that led to 
reformist weakness, it is necessary to assess the post-election performance of each successful 
challenger in more depth. In the following sections, I detail the experience of the three second 
generation reformist challengers after taking office 
 
Argentina 
 
Fernando de la Rúa  and the Alianza took power in an atmosphere of general public 
optimism. One month before assuming office, the president enjoyed a favorability rating of 73% 
in a CEOP poll, the other major Alianza figures (Raúl Alfonsín and Chacho Álvarez), while less 
popular, received a higher favorability rating than any important Peronist leader. The same poll 
indicated that a majority of Argentines expected that the De la Rúa government would be 
successful in reducing unemployment and corruption. (Clarin, Nov. 12, 1999) 
Despite this generally favorable public mood, the Alianza government confronted several 
immediate and significant challenges. The coalition’s substantial margin of victory in the 
presidential race had not been replicated in the legislative and subnational contests. The Alianza 
maintained a plurality in the Chamber of Deputies; however, their advantage was too small to 
ensure the passage of legislation on their own (Novaro 2002, 66) The Senate remained firmly in 
the hands of the PJ, due to the Peronists’ strength in rural areas and the strongly disprortionate 
effects of Argentina’s federal system. The picture was worse at the provincial level, with the 
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Alianza controlling only six provincial governments, while the PJ held fourteen, including three 
of the most important and powerful (Córdoba, Santa Fe, and the massive province of Buenos 
Aires). Several of these governors aspired to the PJ’s next presidential nomination, a fact that 
strengthened their inclination to resist potentially unpopular aspects of the De la Rúa  
administration’s policy agenda. The tendency of the Alianza to rely primarily on anti-Menem 
sentiment for political support had left it at a disadvantage in races where Menem was not on the 
ballot; as a result, the ability of opposition legislators and powerful provincial governors to 
obstruct reform initiatives would represent a major obstacle for the new administration. In 
addition to the party’s continued access to state power,  Peronist leaders maintained considerable 
capacity to mobilize social opposition via patronage networks (Calvo and Murillo 2005) and ties 
to labor. Overall, despite their dismal showing in the presidential election, the Peronist 
opposition retained significant influence over the direction of the country and the fate of the De 
la Rúa government. 
The internal dynamics of the Alianza coalition also presented pitfalls.  The ideological 
divisions both between the UCR and FREPASO, as well as those within the two parties, had 
been temporarily subsumed to the goal of defeating Menem, and internal discontentment had 
been quieted by the Alianza’s political successes. Following the achievement of the coalition’s 
main goal, other means would have to be found to maintain unity. In fact, this temporary 
adhesion to a common goal had not significantly lessened the fundamental divisions within the 
Alianza.  De la Rúa’s preference for market liberalism still placed him at odds with large sectors 
of his own party, as well as with the preferences of FREPASO. The independent-minded 
FREPASO leadership of would also face a new test, as the new party’s more ideologically 
fervent members would likely demand a level of influence over policy within the new coalition 
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that would be difficult to achieve given the smaller party’s subjugated position and De la Rúa’s 
inclinations to the contrary.  Keeping the fragile alliance together would require intensive 
collaboration between De la Rúa  and his coalition partners, as well as continued political 
victories for the Alianza. 
De la Rúa’s manner of governance proved deeply unsuited for this delicate state of 
affairs. As a candidate, De la Rúa had campaigned (in the words of Juan E. Corradi) “in the U.S. 
style, as an individual rather than a party chief,” relying on sound bites, slogans, and the mass 
media. While this independence from his party allowed for flexibility in tailoring his campaign 
message to attract support from a wide range of supporters, the isolation proved to be a liability 
once in office, as it “deprived the president of the undivided attention and automatic loyalty of 
disciplined troops.” (Corradi 2003, 119-120) De la Rúa’s personal approach exacerbated this 
isolation; in delegating authority and seeking advice, he tended to rely on a small circle of 
associates rather than incorporating important figures from the coalition’s two parties. Only half 
of his initial cabinet slots were assigned to Alianza politicians,  and FREPASO recieved just two 
ministries: Labor, headed by Alberto Flamarique, and Social Development, headed by Graciela 
Fernández Meijide (a considerable loss of status for the former presidential contender) (Latin 
American Regional Report-Southern Cone (LARR), Dec.21, 1999). Chacho Álvarez, whose 
presence was of central importance to the party’s anti-corruption message, was largely 
marginalized in the vice-presidency.  Hector Schamis describes De la Rúa as  “cut off from the 
larger political society, at odds with his own party, and surrounded by a clique of unelected, 
nonpartisan advisors, several of whom had no previous political experience of any kind.” 
(Schamis 2002, 86). De la Rúa’s own uninspiring persona, which his campaign had attempted to 
associate with austerity and seriousness, were a poor fit for a personalistic approach to 
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leadership. As a result of these conditions and his own personal characteristics, De la Rúa 
eventually became seen as an isolated and ineffectual leader. 
 
 Alongside its internal frictions and the challenges of a powerful opposition, the Alianza 
faced an unfavorable economic and social panorama. While the first half of Menem’s term had 
been characterized by economic growth alongside increasing inequality, by 1999 several years of 
recession had inflamed social tensions.  The recession had also undermined the country’s fiscal 
position, and  Menem’s efforts to win support for a third term though massive spending had 
added further debt. Prior to leaving office, the Menem government announced that the expected 
deficit was more than twice as high as previous estimates, and would exceed a $5.1 billion target 
previously agreed with the IMF (LARR, Nov. 6 1999). External factors exacerbated the fiscal 
crisis. At the same time, the strictures of the politically untouchable convertibility law hampered 
the performance of exports, undermining the government’s access to foreign exchange to service 
its debts. As creditors’ faith in Argentina’s ability to sustain its economic model weakened, 
Argentina’s country risk ratings and the interest rates paid on its debt climbed, further sapping 
the country’s fiscal resources and international confidence. Policy debates and campaign 
messages during the Alianza’s campaign over the past two years had centered around where and 
how to allocate state resources; however, the country’s precarious fiscal state ensured that the 
policy agenda of the new administration would have little to do with allocation of resources, and 
instead revolve around urgent efforts to reduce deficits and stave off insolvency (Bonvecchi 
2002, 124). 
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Under these conditions, the Alianza government’s economic team decided that restoring 
international and domestic confidence in the economy was of utmost importance; the existing 
cycle, in which lack of confidence translated into higher debt payments and vice versa, needed to 
be reversed. (Bonvecchi 2002, 125) The top priorities were to increase revenue and cut back 
spending; at the same time, the government intended to proceed with second generation reforms 
that could be established without the commitment of significant fiscal resources and would be 
viewed favorably by the government’s international constituency.  However, the policies 
demanded by the administration’s international constituency often contradicted the preferences 
of the government’s own voters.  
A prominent early policy initiative involved a significant tax increase.  The tax increase 
was intended to build private sector confidence in the new government, thus reducing the 
country risk and interest rates, which would eventually contribute to economic recovery; 
unfortunately, the measure had apparently the opposite effect on economic activity in the short 
term (Powell 2002, 7), and was widely unpopular, quickly becoming universally referred to by 
the derogatory term “impuestazo.” The tax increase was particularly burdensome for the middle 
class, the Alianza’s core of support. While the De la Rúa government was able to push the 
impuestazo through the legislature, it undermined its political position in the process (and in 
doing so, at least partially undermined whatever confidence might have been generated by the 
demonstration of fiscal austerity).   
The other major issue that the Alianza addressed during the first months of the new 
administration was labor reform. The Alianza’s campaign platforms had referred to the need for 
labor reforms, a trademark priority of second generation reformist perceptions, but their rhetoric 
had been deliberately unclear about the exact nature of the changes that would be made. This 
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vagueness was unsurprising, given that actual labor reform proposals tended to focus on 
increases in employer flexibility in hiring and firing, a goal that was distinctly unpopular among 
the coalition’s own supporters. The Alianza depicted its reform measures, which included 
increases in the probationary period of hires and shift from sectoral to workplace bargaining, as 
necessary to spur increased employment in the long term; however, the specific policies were 
rejected by some of the coalition’s supporters, in particular from FREPASO (LARR Mar. 7, 
2000); it also provoked a strong reaction from organized labor, including four general strikes by 
the country’s main labor union, and violent protests (Cook 2006, 94). As with the tax reform, the 
passage of labor reform represented both a policy success and a political setback for the 
government.  The reform itself was not popular, and any initially noticeable social impacts were 
likely to be negative. 
With the recession persisting or worsening and the government’s agenda doing little to 
assuage popular concerns, smoldering social conflicts began to ignite, most notably in a series of 
violent demonstrations in the country’s interior.  Committed to satisfying the demands of 
Argentina’s creditors, the De la Rúa administration had little room for maneuver in response to 
these pressures. In May of 2000, at the bidding of the IMF, the government announced a new 
austerity package involving cuts in government salaries, pensions, and other spending. A single 
aspect of the austerity package – the reduction of role of the country’s deeply unpopular labor 
unions in provision of social programs-was welcomed by a majority in surveys, but inspired 
strong antagonism from the weakened but still potentially troublesome labor sector, which 
sponsored several strikes in response to the adjustment package. Overall, the austerity package 
met with widespread public condemnation, and De la Rúa’s approval rating plummeted in 
surveys. The government’s decision to opt for economic orthodoxy and austerity widened the 
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gap between the president’s team and the political parties that constituted the Alianza, as many 
of the coalition’s politicians advocated for adjustments in the economic model in response to the 
continued recession (Corrales 2002, 45; Novaro 2002); this opposition came in large part from 
FREPASO but also from the left wing of the UCR, led by Raúl Alfonsín.. The fragile consensus 
on a “second generation” reform agenda that had existed during the campaign abruptly ceased to 
exist when the Alianza government was faced with hard choices in a context of severe monetary 
and fiscal restraints. 
As economic policy issues steadily eroded the coalition’s public image and internal unity, 
the Alianza government made some efforts to attend to the issues of corruption and 
accountability that had been the centerpiece of the party’s campaign message.  Soon after taking 
office, the government announced the formation of an Anti-Corruption Office entrusted with 
administrative oversight and the design of anti-corruption policies. While generally well 
regarded, the office was also viewed as largely inadequate to the scope of the task, and its efforts 
were not considered a major priority for the government.  The De la Rúa administration also 
attempted to follow through on its campaign promise to pursue the investigation and punishment 
of corrupt figures from Menem’s administration, but did so in a primarily symbolic manner.  In 
July 2000, the government initiated high profile cases against several prominent and supposedly 
“emblematic” Menem era officials, including Victor Alderete (former head of PAMI, the 
notoriously corrupt pensioners’ health care system) and Maria Julia Alsogaray (former minister 
of the environment), in July 2000. The Alianza leadership hoped that an increased emphasis on 
the issue of transparency would help the party weather the public disapproval generated by its 
economic measures. 
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Regardless of whether this renewed focus on transparency and accountability could have 
sufficed to sustain the Alianza under difficult economic circumstances,  the government’s efforts 
to rely on the corruption issue as a source of unity and prestige were soon definitively nullified 
by scandal. In August of 2000, rumors surfaced in the media that the legislative success of the 
administration’s labor reform initiative had been obtained in part through bribes to several 
Peronist senators, with the president’s close associate Fernando de Santibañes (head of the 
national intelligence agency) mentioned as a key conspirator in the arrangement.  (Morales Solá 
2001). De la Rúa initially responded with pledges to fully investigate the allegations.  However, 
the government took little substantive action, despite pressure for a more aggressive approach 
from Chacho Álvarez, whose reputation depended on the government’s anti-corruption 
credentials.  When a cabinet reshuffle by De la Rúa the following month left Santibañes in his 
post, Álvarez resigned from the vice presidency, throwing the coalition and the government into 
crisis. 
 While the Alianza coalition survived Álvarez’ resignation in theory,  the removal of 
FREPASO’s only significant leader within the government marked the beginning of the end for 
the coalition. International financial markets took note of the inauspicious political trend and the 
emerging potential for ungovernability, driving Argentina’s country risk rating still higher.  The 
Alianza’s economic policies failed create the intended virtuous cycle of increasing confidence 
leading to easing of fiscal pressures. Instead, the immediate political backlash and social 
consequences of austerity created a vicious cycle with no apparent exit: fiscal austerity led to 
economic slowdown and political conflict, which further undermined international confidence, 
driving up interest rates and creating a need for further austerity. 
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  In December 2000, the Argentine economy received a temporary respite in the form of a 
$15 billion loan package from the IMF, colloquially referred to as the “blindaje” (shielding).  
When this failed to restore confidence or revert the cycle of rising interests rates followed by 
rising debt, Economy minister José Luis Machinea resigned in March 2001. In his place De la 
Rúa named Ricardo López Murphy, a UCR economist and former defense minister with 
doctrinaire neoliberal views that accorded closely with the president’s own inclinations.  The 
incoming minister immediately announced a new set of austerity measures. While the 
international financial establishment responded warmly to López Murphy’s nomination and his 
economic measures, the reaction within the Alianza was drastically negative; condemnations 
from within the coalition and a spate of high-profile resignations forced López Murphy’s 
resignation within two weeks of his nomination. Now thoroughly discredited and politically 
weakened, De la Rúa turned as a desperate last resort to Domingo Cavallo, the architect of 
convertibility and of Menem-era structural adjustment (and a rival of De la Rúa in the 1999 
election).  
Given substantial discretionary power over the economic agenda, Cavallo pursued a 
heterodox set of policies. He pressured the central bank to ease banking regulations and increase 
access to credit; when the central bank resisted some of these changes, its head was removed 
from office through an apparently politically motivated disciplinary inquiry (LARR,  May 22 
2001). Cavallo also promoted subsidies for certain sectors, instituted a tax on financial 
transactions, and loosened the convertibility regime by adding the euro to a basket of currencies 
pegged against the peso.   These measures failed to restore confidence, forcing another round of 
spending cuts in July 2001. The announcement of the new austerity plan, enacted as part of a 
stated “zero deficit” policy, met with an extremely unfavorable reaction from international 
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investors; immediately following the announcement, Argentina’s country risk rating surged from 
1200 to 1600 basis points (Powell 2002, 12). 
         Cavallo’s efforts to simultaneously overcome recession and restore fiscal equilibrium 
were dealt a further blow by a hardening of attitudes within the United States Treasury and the 
IMF. Neither the US presidential administration of George W. Bush (and his treasury secretary 
Paul O’Neill), nor the newly appointed IMF leadership of Horst Kohler (and his deputy Ann 
Krueger) were inclined to favor bailouts for the Argentine economy. Instead, the new leadership 
was primarily concerned with issues of moral hazard, and viewed the Argentine crisis as an 
opportunity to make an example of their newfound strictness. This attitude represented a sharp 
contrast with the IMF’s loose treatment of Argentina during the fiscal unraveling of Menem’s 
second term.  This shift in the international environment exacerbated the country’s political and 
economic problems in several ways. The government was forced to institute harsher austerity 
measures. Additionally, international investors took exactly the message that the IMF and US 
intended; the widespread conclusion that a bailout was unlikely increased the pressures on 
interest rates and the peso (Corrales 2002, 37). By the arrival of midterm elections in October 
2001, it had become widely assumed that a default and devaluation were inevitable. 
  The midterm elections of 2001 both confirmed and worsened the Alianza’s crisis. With 
the President’s approval ratings edging into the single digits (Cheresky 2003, 44), pre-election 
surveys unanimously predicted defeat for the government (Morales Solá 2001, 271). At the same 
time, the Alianza’s main candidates were unanimously critical of De la Rúa’s economic policy 
(Cheresky 2003, 44).  A more forceful critique of the government’s economic model was 
presented by the newly formed movement “Alternative for a Republic of Equals” (ARI),  
founded by dissident Radical deputy Elisa Carrió, whose rhetoric also emphasized the fight 
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against corruption.  The main opposition figure, Eduardo Duhalde, now running as a candidate 
for the senate, was similarly critical, although apparently amenable to the prospect of serving in a 
government of national unity following the elections (Morales Solá 2001, 274). In the absence of 
any possibility of a renewal of the government’s policy mandate, the outcome of the 2001 
election would largely serve to set the stage for competition as to who would fill the emerging 
political vacuum.  
 The results of the election were as disastrous for the Alianza as surveys had predicted. 
The governing party received only 23% of the vote in the chamber of deputies, a 20 point decline 
from its result in the elections two years prior; with the worst losses coming in the coastal 
provinces and, in particular, the City of Buenos Aires.  The Alianza’s support in the capital 
dropped from 1.03 million votes in 1999 to 260,000 in 2001 (Cheresky 2003, 47). Having 
finished first in the Congressional vote in sixteen provinces in 1999, the Alianza managed to win 
only six in 2001. The PJ received 36% of the nationwide vote for the Chamber of Deputies,  
reclaiming a plurality of seats in that chamber (and forming an opposition majority with the 
assistance of the ARI (Ollier 2003, 180); they expanded their strong majority in the Senate. 
Nonetheless, the Peronists’ total also represented a decline from their 1999 performance. 
Overall, the vote for the two major parties declined from 71 % of all votes in 1999 to 45% in 
2001.  Some of this vote went to smaller or provincial parties, including the ARI (which garnered 
a second place finish in the city of Buenos Aires (Cheresky 2003, 47); much of the decline, 
however, stemmed from the surge in blank and spoiled votes. Whereas 6.6% of the votes cast in 
the election of the Chamber of Deputies in 1999 had been blank or spoiled, in 2001 that number 
rose to 24%, an unprecedented figure for competitive, democratic elections in Argentina (Bassett 
2003, 60).  The increase in the incidence of spoiled ballots was particularly strong; the 
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percentage of spoiled votes rose from 1% in 1999 to 13% in 2001 (Basset 2003, 63). At the same 
time, the electoral abstention rate rose from 18 to 25% of eligible voters. The 2001 election, then 
signaled both a dramatic decline in support for the Alianza, and an overall public disgust with 
politicians, exemplified by the so-called voto bronca. By October of 2001, only 5% of the 
Argentine public expressed confidence in the country’s politicians (Murillo 2002). While the 
message of the election included a rebuke of all parties, its immediate practical consequence was 
the strengthening and emboldening of the opposition; the PJ signaled its increased intransigence 
by violating several parliamentary norms of cooperation, and some of the Alianza’s own 
candidates abandoned the party following its defeat at the polls (Ollier 2003, 180). 
 In the aftermath of the election, the De la Rúa government’s political isolation and 
weakness intensified, and domestic and international confidence in the government’s ability to 
find a way out of its dire fiscal straits or maintain the value of the peso continued to decline.  In a 
desperate attempt to forestall a run on banks, the De la Rúa administration instituted a freeze on 
bank withdrawals.  This widely hated measure, known as the “Corralito,” brought the middle 
class of Buenos Aires into the streets to demand De la Rúa’s resignation; at the same time, 
residents of poorer districts looted supermarkets (Schamis 2002, Murrillo 2002).  Riots were met 
with police repression, leading to 30 deaths, and emergency efforts to form a government of 
national unity were rejected both by the PJ leadership and by leaders of the Alianza, who were 
rapidly abandoning De la Rúa and his government. Beset from all sides, the president and his 
cabinet abandoned power on December 21. 
 The aftermath of De la Rúa’s resignation brought both political turmoil and economic 
catastrophe. Following a temporary assumption of power by Ramon Puerta, a Peronist senator 
and president pro tempore of the Senate, the newly Peronist-dominated legislature selected 
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Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, governor of the tiny province of San Luis, as the new president. In his 
inaugural speech, Rodríguez Saá announced (to thunderous applause) that Argentina would 
default on its debt, while pledging to maintain peso-dollar convertibility and promising a social 
policy intended to address poverty and unemployment.  Of these pledges, only the debt default 
announcement was credible, and within a week further social protests and internal division 
among Peronists forced Rodríguez Saá to abandon power. In his place, the Legislative Assembly 
settled on Duhalde, now viewed as the Peronist with the firmest base of political support and the 
best chance of containing the burgeoning popular unrest. Duhalde, like Rodríguez Saá, promised 
an economic policy that would depart from the neoliberal model and address the demands of the 
needy; in the short term, his first move was to eliminate the dollar-peso convertibility system. In 
the ensuing months, Argentina would suffer the worst economic collapse in its history, with the 
peso losing 70 percent of its value, unemployment rates reaching a quarter of the population, and 
a surge in poverty levels.  
 Argentina’s political and economic collapse destroyed not only the Alianza coalition, but 
its constituent parts. Following the collapse, FREPASO ceased to exist as a political party, and 
its major leaders abandoned electoral politics. The UCR, Argentina’s longest existing party, was 
effectively eliminated as a national party, surviving only as a regional party in areas where 
popular local leaders had run under the UCR label; the UCR’s candidate polled only 2% in next 
presidential election of 2003.  Two former Alianza leaders managed to remain politically viable 
as national political figures: Elisa Carrió, whose ARI continued to combine economic populism 
with anti-corruption messages, and Ricardo López Murphy, who took up the banner of the free 
market.  Neither of the two finished among the top two contenders in the 2003 presidential race, 
and combined they mustered 30% of the vote.  In the years following Duhalde’s administration, 
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Argentina’s political space was dominated by Nestor Kirchner, whose rhetoric emphasized social 
justice, economic nationalism, and departure from neoliberal orthodoxy, and who cultivated a 
personalistic and sometimes autocratic leadership style. As the Argentine economy recovered 
from its dire straits and eventually rebounded strongly during Kirchner’s tenure, the public 
responded enthusiastically to his leadership, and alternative messages were generally 
marginalized   The second generation reformist option that the Alianza had emobdied  remained 
essentially absent from the electoral arena. 
 
Peru 
 
Following Fujimori’s resignation, preparations began for a new presidential election in  
May 2001 that would replace the interim administration. As the most prominent opposition 
candidate and the eventual standard-bearer of the anti-Fujimori movement, Alejandro Toledo 
was the early favorite; his chances seemed further enhanced by the fact that Fujimori’s anti-
democratic tendencies, and the related issue of official corruption, had vaulted to the top of the 
political agenda in the aftermath of the scandal. 
As the campaign proceeded, however, Toledo faced an unexpectedly forceful challenge 
from an apparently unlikely source: Alan García, former president and leader of the largely 
dormant APRA party.  García’s economic and political mismanagement were closely associated 
in the public mind with the economic crisis and breakdown of internal security that Peru had 
experienced during the late 1980s, conditions whose alleviation had provided the basis for much 
of Fujimori’s popular backing; as a result, the prospect of his successful return to the presidency 
seemed remote. As the campaign began, García had only recently returned from an exile spurred 
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by charges of corruption, and displayed insignificant levels of support in opinion polls. As late as 
February, two months before the first round election, García barely exceeded 10% of the vote 
(Datum poll in Caretas, Mar. 29 2001), placing him in fourth place behind Toledo, Lourdes 
Flores (the candidate of the center-right alliance Unidad Nacional) and Fernando Olivera  (the 
leader of the ostensibly anti-corruption Independent Moralizing Front, who was responsible for 
disclosing the videotapes that touched off the scandal that sunk Fujimori) (Latin American 
Weekly Report (LAWR),  Feb 6 2001). Bolstered by the remnants of APRA’s party machine and 
traditional base of support as well as by his famous personal charisma, García rapidly rose in the 
polls, and eventually took second place in the April 8 first round vote, obtaining 26% of the vote 
to Toledo’s 37%.   
In mounting his challenge, García staked an ideological position somewhat to the left of 
Toledo’s second generation reformist stance.   García’s need to banish memories of the 
disastrous economic collapse of his previous administration obliged him to foreswear the sort of 
macroeconomic profligacy that that had fueled the hyperinflation, and to commit himself to a 
degree of fiscal probity. However, in contrast with Toledo, his rhetoric stressed the need for a 
change in the economic model; during a presidential debate in May 2001, García blamed the 
“neoliberal model” for “ the collapse of industry, the abandonment of farmlands, and the 
immense unemployment that we have” and pledged to  “essentially change” the country’s 
economic orientation (El Debate 2001, 42).  Beyond broad calls for a change in economic 
strategy, García’s rhetoric and promises focused on basic pocketbook issues, stressing concerns 
such as the cost of utility services and the price of medicines. This emphasis on immediate and 
tangible voter preoccupations, combined with García’s formidable abilities as a communicator, 
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proved very effective (Taylor 2005, 575-576), and as the second round approached García was 
approaching Toledo in the polls. 
In the face of García’s surging popularity, Toledo responded by shifting away from his 
emphasis on democratization and integrity, in place of governance based appeals, he opted for 
ever-more extravagant promises.   Toledo’s campaign pledged to create 400,000 new jobs in the 
first two years of his term and devote 30% of the national to budget to education (Caretas, Aug. 
2 2001), as well as generating 7% annual economic growth. In large part thanks to the reluctant 
support of voters who viewed a second García presidency as the worst possible outcome, Toledo 
managed to fend off the former president’s challenge, winning the second round by a 53% to 
47% margin.  
 
Despite his surprisingly narrow victory, Toledo enjoyed high levels of public support 
immediately upon taking office, with over 60 percent of the public expressing approval.  
Nonetheless, the unexpected strength of García’s challenge had uncovered significant 
weaknesses in the president’s political position. Toledo’s shaky performance in the 2001 election 
campaign was in part tied to deficiencies in his public image; although a majority of the public 
expressed optimism at the moment of his inauguration, he was nonetheless saddled with widely 
held perceptions of personal untrustworthiness, and his weak showing in the first round election 
demonstrated that he lacked a substantial base of loyal public support. 
Toledo’s legislative position was also somewhat precarious. His party, Perú Posible, 
obtained 45 seats in Congress, 13 short of a majority; and was obliged to seek the support of the 
FIM as a coalition partner (LAWR, Jun. 5 2001, Jun. 12 2001), as well as several smaller parties. 
While the second largest party, APRA, only had 28 seats, and thus had limited ability to obstruct 
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policy on its own, the lack of a stable majority in the legislature suggested that Toledo’s 
legislative fortunes would depend on his ability to maintain strong public support while 
espousing policies that met the approval of a broad range of political actors. 
Upon taking office, Toledo emphasized the inclusive character of his administration, 
pledging to appoint “a cabinet of all bloods, all political persuasions” based on criteria of 
“professional solvency and moral authority.” (LAWR,  Jun. 12 2002)  The Peruvian news weekly 
Caretas characterized the eventual cabinet as being comprised of “Perú Posible partisans, 
liberals, ex-Marxists, and populists.” (Caretas Aug. 2 2001) The most significant appointment 
from a policy perspective was the naming of Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski to the economy ministry.  
Kuczynski was a favorite of Wall Street (and later, coeditor of a prominent book on second 
generation reformism). (Kuczynski and Williamson 2003)  His appointment signaled the 
maintenance of the free market model that Fujimori had established, as well as renewed 
privatization efforts, and earned the approval of the international financial establishment. Unlike 
many other prominent liberal economists, Kuczynski had not collaborated with the Fujimori 
regime’s market reform efforts, making him a logical choice for a new administration that had 
promised policy continuity and improved governance.  The other top cabinet prize, the powerful 
post of Prime Minister, went to another technocrat,  prominent international lawyer and 
investment advisor Roberto Dañino.  The most prominent posts reserved for members of 
Toledo’s own party were the ministries of health and defense, while the only leader from another 
party to obtain a post was the FIM’s Fernando Olivera, a divisive and confrontational leader who 
was awarded the ministry of justice. Other positions were filled by independents, two of whom 
(Fernando Rospigliosi and Nicolás Lynch, in the interior and education ministries respectively) 
were from the left.  Overall, the cabinet clearly reflected the nature of Toledo’s electoral alliance: 
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it featured a wide range of ideological perspectives, but relatively few leading politicians from 
his own party or allied parties, and reserved the most significant posts for neoliberal technocrats 
with favorable international reputations. Toledo assembled his cabinet the same way he had 
established his party’s identity –favoring the cultivation of personal ties over the construction 
inter or intra-party alliances, emphasizing ideological flexibility, and placing a high priority on 
the maintenance of neoliberal economic model with increased attention to social concerns and 
government integrity. 
This nonpartisan and ecumenical approach, while compatible with electoral success, 
rapidly proved incompatible with effective governance. Within a few months of Toledo’s July 
inauguration, members of the cabinet, as well as the president himself, were already making 
apparently contradictory statements on the government’s policy agenda (Caretas, Sept. 6 2001), 
and Toledo’s government clashed with its own legislative supporters on questions surrounding 
the taxation of electrical utilties (Caretas, Sept. 20 2001). The chief of Perú Posible’s plan of 
government observed in an interviews that the relative lack of partisan leaders in cabinet posts, 
combined with the failure to immediately produce jobs for the party’s supporters, had generated 
discontent within the party  (Caretas, Sept. 6 2001). The nature of Perú Posible contributed to 
internal disunity; in the absence of a coherent program, a wide variety of viewpoints were 
represented within the movement, and many of the party’s members were primarily concerned 
with access to patronage. 
The cautious economic measures proposed by the new government, representing 
primarily continuity with the previous administration’s policies (Soria 2002, 70-71), did little to 
sate public demands for social and economic improvements.  Hopes that efforts to increase 
international confidence would lead to an immediate and substantial boost in international 
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investment were not realized in the short term, forcing the government to adopt a relatively strict 
fiscal line (Gamero 2003). A the same time, Toledo suffered from a series of personal missteps, 
notably an increase in the presidential salary that was widely viewed as grossly excessive, as 
well as several political appointments that provoked accusations of nepotism (The Economist, 
Dec. 11 2001).  Throughout the early part of his term, Toledo was dogged by his refusal to 
acknowledge the paternity of a 14-year old girl who claimed to be the president’s daughter via an 
extramarital affair; after months of less-than-credible denials, Toledo eventually owned up to the 
charges in 2003 (when faced with the possibility of a court-ordered DNA test), having done 
considerable damage to his personal credibility in the meantime.  
The government’s obvious incapacities, and the absence of immediate, concrete results, 
magnified Toledo’s perceived personal shortcomings in the public mind. The failure to rapidly 
produce the increased employment that Toledo had endlessly promised during his campaign was 
viewed not only as a policy failure, but as a demonstration of the president’s personal 
untrustworthiness. The continual squabbles and tensions within Toledo’s government fostered 
perceptions of feeble and ineffective presidential leadership. Those same conflicts tended to 
undermine Toledo’s attempts to maintain and reconcile the multiple identities that he had 
promoted during his campaign. While Toledo the candidate had been able to switch from 
business suits and technocratic professionalism to indigenous clothing and ethnic-tinged 
populism depending on the audience, as president his image quickly solidified as an out-of-
touch, deceptive, and ineffectual politician.    
By October public support for Toledo had fallen below 50%, and the government 
confronted a series of mobilizations in the country’s interior  (Ballon 2002). By December, only 
a third of the public registered approval, and a majority disapproved (The Economist, Dec. 2 
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2001); by March, Toledo’s approval rating lay at 25%.  The precipitous decline in public 
support, and the conflicts within the government (exacerbated by a cabinet reshuffle in which 
ministers from Perú Posible were removed from their posts) led to widespread speculation about 
whether Toledo’s government, less than six months old, would be able to survive a full term in 
office. 
Toledo’s government responded to these concerns about governability by attempting to 
foster a multi-party consensus on goals and policy principles.  During the first half of 2002, the 
Toledo administration promoted a series of talks with leaders of opposition parties in an effort to 
establish a declaration outlining a shared ideological vision. The negotiations culminated in the 
signing of a “National Accord” in July 2002, in which leaders of major parties (including the two 
main opposition parties, APRA and Unidad Nacional) and several important social organizations 
expressed their agreement with certain basic principles; among others democracy, transparency, 
decentralization, universal access to education and health, and the creation of a “social market 
economy.” Despite the political travails of the government, the essentially second generation 
reformist ideas described in the National Accord retained sufficient elite support to form the 
basis of an apparent consensus among the country’s political leadership. 
Even as Toledo was promoting elite consensus, however, polarizing forces were 
gathering strength outside the government.  The trigger that unleashed those forces was an effort 
by Toledo’s government to promote privatization of electricity generation in the southern city of 
Arequipa.  Despite polls showing opposition to electricity privatization, Toledo’s administration 
(at the behest of the IMF) pursued the sale of two electric plants serving Arequipa and southern 
Peru to a Belgian firm. The response was violent: in June of 2002, anti-privatization protests in 
Arequipa rapidly turned to riots, and spread to other cities in the south, forcing the government to 
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declare a state of emergency. The government’s consternation in the face of the Arequipa 
uprising was heightened by the fact that Arequipa, and the southern highlands in general, had 
been a source of electoral strength for Toledo. At the head of the protests was Arequipa’s mayor 
José Manuel Guillén, an ally of Toledo during the 2000 election campaign (who had briefly 
served at the head of the new administration’s commission on decentralization, but resigned 
shortly into Toledo’s tenure). The regional movements of the south had cooperated with 
Toledo’s campaign in the hopes of reversing the centralizing tendencies of Fujimori’s 
administration, but had little loyalty toward Toledo himself.  Privatization decrees from Lima 
were viewed as an indication that Toledo’s administration represented more of the same.  
 In response to the incipient crisis, Toledo’s government, now apparently weaker than 
ever, abandoned the privatization efforts. The following month, he drastically changed the face 
of his cabinet, opting for a more political team and dispensing with several technocrats. In the 
aftermath of the events of Arequipa and the government’s retreat, the finance minister 
Kuczynski’s doctrinaire neoliberalism and his ties to the United States and foreign investors, 
were now viewed as a liabilities; he was replaced by Javier Silva Ruete, a somewhat less 
orthodox economist and a trusted figure who had held the same job in the transitional 
government. The relatively apolitical Roberto Dañino left the office of prime Minster, and was 
replaced by Luis Solari, the head of Perú Posible, who immediately announced that future 
privatization decisions would be left up to regional governments.  
 
By shifting toward a more economically heterodox and politically partisan cabinet, 
Toledo hoped to placate both his party and the public in the run-up to regional elections 
scheduled for the fall. The elections to name governors to each of Peru’s 25 regions were a new 
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institutional mechanism, replacing the system of appointed governors that prevailed during the 
Fujimori administration, and were intended to bolster Toledo’s credentials as a decentralizer. 
Despite representing the fulfillment of a key promise, the elections themselves further 
undermined Toledo’s position, as his attempts to change course were insufficient to prevent a 
drubbing in the November 2002 contest. Unimpressed by the government’s efforts to broaden its 
support through the National Accord and cabinet changes, the Peruvian electorate opted for the 
Perú Posible candidate in only one of the 25 regional contests.  The dramatic failures of the 
governing party contrasted with the continued revival of APRA and Alan García. In a departure 
from the recent trends of declining support for national parties, APRA captured 12 of the 
regional governments. No other party garnered more than two governorships, with ten of the 
posts being won by regional parties or movements (LAWR, Nov. 19 2002). The regional 
elections results of 2002 both undercut Toledo’s already precarious political position, and 
bolstered his main rival. Ironically, the one significant promise that Toledo successfully made 
good on – political decentralization – created the opportunity for a major blow to his already 
reeling government and bolstered his main rival. 
 By the end of Toledo’s first year in office, the tone for the rest of his administration had 
been set.  During the first year as a whole, Toledo’s approval averaged 23.8% (Barr 2003, 1168), 
and public perceptions of the president as untrustworthy, out of touch, and ineffective persona 
were firmly cemented. The combination of Toledo’s personal discrediting, internal turmoil 
within his party and cabinet, widespread popular mobilizations, and a resurgent opposition 
suggested that the prospects for Toledo to successfully complete the remaining four years of his 
term were dim. 
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   Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that the obvious weaknesses of Toledo’s administration 
would persist throughout the remainder of his term, his tenure in office was never seriously 
challenged. The absence of a clear and direct threat of presidential removal can be in part tied to 
the weak divided nature of the opposition.22 The main opposition leaders both saw the 
subsequent presidential elections as their preferred path to power, and saw little reason to disrupt 
the functioning of the democratic process. The political impact of opposition social movements 
was similarly limited.  In contrast with the movements that were generating political upheaval in 
Peru’s Andean neighbors, the popular mobilizations that troubled Toledo throughout his tenure 
were diffuse, and generally centered around sectoral or regional concerns; they showed little 
potential or inclination to unite into a broader movement capable of representing a clear 
alternative force, or posing a challenge to institutional continuity (Pizarro et al. 2004, 39). 
 An additional factor mitigating the government’s vulnerabilities was the performance of 
the economy. While the economic slowdown inherited by Toledo persisted into the first months 
of his administration, between 2002 and 2006 the Peruvian economy grew at an average of 
approximately 5% per year, a performance that was among the best in Latin America during that 
period and was unprecedented in recent history. The growth was driven in large part by strong 
revenues from raw material exports, a result both of increasing production and increasing world 
prices. During Toledo’s administration, the country experienced little inflation, and its fiscal 
situation improved, with external debt as a percentage of GDP declining from 50.6% to 45.5% 
between 2001 and 2004 (CEPAL 2005, 288).  However, the macroeconomic gains registered by 
the country as a whole were felt only weakly by the majority of the public. Unemployment 
remained at high levels, in contradiction of Toledo’s central campaign pledge. Consumption 
among the poor increased, but the improvement was inadequate to make a significant and 
                                                 
22
 Interview with Nicolás Lynch, Feb 2004. 
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immediate dent in poverty rates; according to CEPAL (2005), the national rate of poverty 
decreased by one tenth of one percent between 2001 and 2003.  Overall, the economic growth 
and stability achieved during Toledo’s administration generally did not translate into clear 
improvements in standards of living for the majority of the population (and, as such, did little to 
rehabilitate the image of his government).  Nonetheless, the overall positive trend tended to 
counter any momentum towards radical political disruption. 
 Rather than collapsing, Toledo’s administration settled into an ongoing pattern of 
stagnation and decline, with the president’s leadership becoming steadily less influential and less 
relevant as his term wore on. Toledo’s approval continued to be mired in the teens and twenties 
throughout most of his tenure, occasionally flirting with single digits. Between 2003 and 2005, 
his administration was preoccupied by a series of damaging scandals that received extensive 
media attention. Among these were accusations that Perú Posible’s party registration had been 
accomplished in part through fraudulent signatures on petitions; this was a particularly 
embarrassing allegation for Toledo, as Fujimori’s alleged use of forged signatures had been a 
central focus of the opposition’s 2000 campaign.  Toledo frequently attempted to deflect media 
criticism by asserting that members of the Fujimori-Montesinos cabal were conspiring against 
him. Whatever the truth of these accusations, they did little to sway public perceptions: opinion 
surveys indicated that Peruvian voters believed that corruption had worsened under Toledo 
compared to the previous administration (McClintock 2006b). This perception was likely fueled 
in part by the aggressive approach of the press during Toledo’s tenure, in contrast with the 
submissive and largely compromised media under Fujimori. 
Throughout the latter years of Toledo’s term, turnover within the cabinet was 
commonplace. In July 2003, facing calls that the president “step aside” and surrender some of 
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the leadership role to less discredited figures, Toledo acknowledged that drastic change was 
needed, and again reshuffled the cabinet, naming six new ministers. In an effort to rehabilitate 
the government’s prestige, Toledo placed Beatriz Merino, a widely respected independent 
politician at the head of the new cabinet. While initially welcomed, this effort ultimately proved 
futile; Merino was soon forced out of power as a result of intrigues and rivalries within the 
administration, leaving Toledo’s government adrift once again. 
  Alongside the continued failure of the government to maintain a semblance of internal 
unity, public support, or policy coherence, social protest continued to simmer, occasionally 
exploding onto the national stage. The most notable explosion occurred in the town of  Ilave in 
April and May of 2004, in which public anger over corruption led to massive, violent protests 
and the eventual lynching of a mayor. The crisis in Ilave underscored broader concerns about the 
breakdown of government legitimacy and authority, and prompted the resignation of Toledo’s 
interior minister Fernando Rospigliosi (following a censure by the legislature) (The Economist, 
May 8 2004).  Other prominent conflicts plaguing Toledo’s administration during its final years 
in office included clashes with the country’s main labor union, the CGTP, and the powerful 
teachers’ union, as well as with a coca growers movement that mobilized and became 
increasingly defiant following the government’s decision to undertake an aerial defoliation 
campaign in 2003 (Pizarro et al. 2005). 
 On the whole, the last years of Toledo’s term were characterized by the same trends that 
had dominated throughout – internal infighting and ineffective leadership, periodically violent 
social conflict and overwhelming public disenchantment with the government’s performance and 
the President’s character. These negative tendencies were mitigated somewhat by the sustained 
strength of the economy at the macro level, a tendency that discouraged any efforts to provoke a 
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political upheaval, but was insufficient to revert the public perception that the Toledo’s free-
market policies had failed to make due on his campaign promises.  
As a result of the plummeting fortunes of both the president and his party, Perú Posible 
failed to even nominate a candidate for the presidential elections of April 2006. The absence of 
an incumbent candidate opened the field for a variety of opposition figures to state their claim. 
Alan García had been viewed as the primary opposition leader during Toledo’s term. However, 
García’s persistently high negative ratings hindered his appeal as a candidate; consequently,  the 
initial leaders in preelection polls were other opposition figures (with essentially second-
generation reformist messages). Valentín Paniagua, Peru’s interim president following 
Fujimori’s resignation, was highly regarded for his commitment to democracy and personal 
probity; however, he was a somewhat reluctant candidate, and steadily faded in the polls due to 
perceptions of weakness and a lack of dynamism.   As a result, the early frontrunner was Lourdes 
Flores Nano of the center-right Unidad Popular. Throughout Toledo’s administration, as well as 
her campaign, Flores attempted to soften her image as an advocate of free-market policies and a 
representative of the elite, stressing her commitment to reducing poverty and her image as an 
honest leader, and promoting the perception that her gender made her a new voice, separate from 
the traditional political class. These efforts were sufficient to maintain a place at the head of 
electoral preferences for most of 2005.  
 As had become customary in recent Peruvian elections, the dynamics of the 2006 
competition were shaken by the unexpected emergence of a powerful outsider.  In this case, the 
anti-system challenge came from a new source: former military commander Ollanta Humala. 
Humala first came to the public’s attention as the leader, with his brother Antauro, of a failed 
uprising against Fujimori undertaken as the former president’s government was collapsing amid 
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scandals. Following the transition, Humala was pardoned. He entered politics in 2005 at the head 
of the Peruvian Nationalist Party, and obtained the nomination of the Union por Peru, at the time 
a minor left-leaning party, for the 2006 election.   Humala’s campaign was nationalistic and 
populist; he attacked both the neoliberal economic model and the political class,  depicted 
himself as a champion of Peru’s poor and indigenous, and cultivated ties with Venezuelan 
president Hugo Chávez (whose message and rise to power paralleled Humala’s).  While he 
disassociated himself from some of the more extreme positions taken by his politically 
controversial family members (including Antauro, jailed for another violent uprising in 2005) the 
tone and content of of Humala’s message contrasted sharply with that presented by any 
significant political figure since the Fujimori’s conversion to economic orthodoxy. 
Humala began the campaign as a marginal contender, managing only 5% of the vote in 
APOYO’s nationwide poll. He more than doubled his support to 11% by November in the same 
poll, an improvement built largely on strong support in the southern and central highlands (El 
Comercio, Nov. 13,  2005). During the next two months, Humala surged to 28% of the vote in 
APOYO’s poll, vaulting him into a statistical tie for first place with Flores (El Comercio, Dec. 
16 2005). In the face of Humala’s nationalist and populist challenge, Flores struggled to banish 
the perception of elitism; this task was made more difficult by her ill-advised decision to select 
Arturo Woodman, a powerful business leader with past ties to Vladimiro Montesinos, as a 
running mate. As Flores’ and Paniagua’s support declined, Humala faced problems of his own, 
including allegations of human rights abuses during Peru’s counterinsurgency war, and 
unwelcome associations with his embarassing family members.  As a result, some of the gains 
from the early front-runners’ decline accrued to Alan García, who had moved into third place. 
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The final APOYO poll taken before the election showed Humala in first place with 31% of the 
vote, Flores with 26%, and García with 23% (El Comercio, Apr. 2 2006).   
 The election results differed little from the pre-election surveys, with Humala taking 31% 
of the vote; however, Alan García eked out second place with 24%, less than a point ahead of 
Flores. The announcement that García had surpassed Flores’ totals to earn a place in the second 
round was greeted by an immediate drop in the Peruvian stock exchange, as Peru’s middle and 
upper classes faced the unpleasant prospect of a choice between Alan García, still reviled for his 
role in the economic collapse of the 1980s, and the far more frightening campaign of Humala.  
Despite early polls showing a strong advantage for García, the eventual margin of the 
second round was only five points in García’s favor;  52.6 to 47.4%.  The outcome of the second 
round contest laid bare Peru’s deep social and geographic divisions. Humala performed strongly 
in the interior and south of the country and in rural areas (winning a majority of Peru’s 
departments), while García dominated along the coast, both in APRA’s traditional stronghold of 
the north, as well as in Lima and in urban areas more generally.  The regional divide was echoed 
by a class division; According to surveys, support came disproportionately from the lower 
classes, while García won among working class, middle class, and upper class voters.23  García’s 
margin was particularly strong among the upper classes; he drew upwards of 70% support in the 
country’s wealthiest electoral districts (including the affluent Lima neighborhoods of San Isidro 
and Miraflores), a result that would previously have been considered highly unlikely. García’s 
victory over Humala rested on his ability to create a multi class alliance that included both 
traditional APRA supporters as well as the significant percentage of voters who viewed a 
Humala victory as a worst-case scenario. 
                                                 
23
 In the final APOYO poll prior to the second round, García led Humala by 93%-7% among voters in the 
“A” segment of the electorate,  and by a roughly 2-1 margin in the B and C sectors; Humala mustered an 
eight point lead in the D sector and equaled García’s 50% in the E sector (El Comercio, May 28 2006). 
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 The 2006 election in Peru underscored the temporary and fragile nature of the apparent 
free-market consensus that had previously prevailed in Peru, and the fading relevance of the 
second generation reformist message that had accompanied that consensus. Despite the country’s 
strong overall economic performance between 2001 and 2006, the 2006 election saw the 
reemergence of a formidable populist challenge to the neoliberal model; and the two candidates 
who most exemplified the second generation reformist position (Flores and Paniagua) proved the 
weakest in the face of this challenge. Although support for Humala and his political movement 
rapidly ebbed following the election, the widespread sense of exclusion and discontentment that 
had made his challenge possible remained a pressing concern. 
 
  
Mexico 
 
Like the other two successful second-generation reformist challengers, Vicente Fox 
entered office having generated extraordinary expectations and facing enormous obstacles.  
During the campaign, Fox had promised to (among other things) generate annual growth rates of 
seven percent, dramatically increase employment, boost government spending on education and 
health care, make considerable progress combating both crime and corruption, resolve the 
conflict in Chiapas, increase tax revenues, build infrastructure in poorer regions, and to improve 
relations with the United States.  
However, the methods by which these goals were to be attained were generally not 
clearly specified, with Fox’s campaign relying primarily on his personal image and generic 
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promises of change in order to foster public optimism.  And while Fox had proposed to pursue 
reforms in a variety of policy areas – including tax policy, the telecommunications sector, the 
energy sector, and the labor market – he generally avoided describing the exact policy changes 
that would be adopted in each area. As a result, Fox assumed office without having built public 
support for specific policy measures; while his election represented a popular desire for the end 
of PRI rule, it offered little mandate for any sort of policy agenda that would follow the transfer 
of power.   
The difficulties presented by the lack of a democratic momentum for a policy agenda 
were compounded by Fox’s weak political position. Although the Mexican presidency had been 
commonly viewed as an immensely powerful post during the era of PRI dominance, the transfer 
of power laid bare the fundamental weakness of the office. While PRI presidents had been able 
to amass considerable power in the context of their party’s dominance of the legislature and the 
state apparatus, in purely institutional terms the Mexican presidency is much weaker than in 
most other countries of the region (Pastor Jr. and Wise 2006, 141-142). The Mexican president 
has no exclusive right to introduce legislation, and lacks both veto power and decree powers. 
(Rubio 2004, 22).  The years preceding Fox’s election also saw an increase in the influence and 
budgetary clout of state governors, a trend which had contributed to the decline of the PRI’s hold 
on government and Fox’s rise to the presidency, but further weakened his position upon 
assuming office (Rubio 2004).  The increasing autonomy of Mexico’s judiciary represented an 
additional check on presidential power.  The institutional weakness that emerged into the light 
with the shift from authoritarianism was accompanied by a decrease in the symbolic stature of  
the presidency.  Public disapproval of the abuses and failures of recent PRI presidents (in 
particular, Luis Echeverría, José López Portillo and Carlos Salinas) had tended to undermine the  
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prestige of the office as a whole (Loeaza 2006, 28),  a tendency that was heightened by Fox’s 
own irreverent approach to his campaign and the position. 
Beyond the essential weakness of the office of president, Fox faced an unfavorable 
political context in terms of the balance of powers between the parties. Fox had been able to 
gather a fairly broad base of support by appealing  primarily to anti-PRI sentiment, attracting 
independent voters, openly seeking the “useful votes” of citizens who shared little common 
ideological ground with the PAN, and forming alliances with political figures outside of his 
party. An obvious consequence of this approach (and of Fox’s overall, career-long tendency to 
distance himself from his party) was a gap between the level of support for Fox in the 2000 
presidential election and support for the PAN at the legislative level. Despite having defeated the 
PRI by five points in the presidential election, the PAN continued to trail the PRI in both 
chambers of the legislature, obtaining 205 seats in the chamber of deputies (compared to the 
PRI’s 208, out of a total of 5000) and 46 senators (compared to the PRI’s 60). (Grayson 2003, 
4)While this represented a significant improvement over the PAN’s 2000 performance, the 
PAN’s lack of a majority ensured that it would have to forge coalitions with other parties to pass 
its initiatives, while the PRI’s strong position held out the hope that it could reclaim a legislative 
majority in the subsequent midterm elections in the event of public disenchantment with Fox (a 
considerable disincentive to cooperation). Outside of the national contest, the PAN’s electoral 
support in 2000 failed to transcend regional divisions. In subnational elections where party 
organization and clientelistic links retained greater significance than mass media messages, the 
PRI remained strong, holding the governorship of 20 states, and controlling 1,385 municipalities 
containing 51% of the country’s population (Sauri 2001, 267).   
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  The combination of Fox’s lack of a policy mandate, the inherent weakness of the 
executive, and the PAN’s minority status created a political environment in which committed 
opposition parties could easily obstruct most presidential initiatives. Under these circumstances, 
the president’s pursuit of a reform agenda would require deft political leadership in order to have 
any chance at success.  Fox proved lacking in this regard, initiating his term with a series of 
political mistakes and questionable judgments.  
An early mistake involved Fox’s attempts to address the Chiapas conflict, and indigenous 
rights more broadly.  Having promised during the campaign that he could solve the Chiapas 
problem in “15 minutes” (Lawson 2004a), Fox opened dialogue with the EZLN rebels (who had 
responded to Fox’s election by initiating a march to Mexico City) and initiated legislative efforts 
to pass an indigenous rights bill. However, Fox’s conciliatory response to the Zapatista 
mobilization generated discontent within his own party, and the weak measure that eventually 
passed the legislature was forcefully rejected by the EZLN. Fox’s puzzling decision to sacrifice 
political capital on a futile effort to address a fairly intractable issue that had not been a major 
part of his campaign agenda demonstrated his early lack of savvy, and set his administration off 
on the wrong foot. 
 Subsequent initiatives fared little better.  A economic policy proposal involved reforming 
the tax system to increase revenue levels, which Fox argued would need to increase by 2.5% of 
in 2002 and by 4% annually thereafter (Pastor Jr. and Wise 2006, 146),  to make the country less 
dependent on petroleum revenues . To this end,  measures were intended to broaden the tax base, 
eliminate loopholes, and bring the informal sector into the official economy. As Fox had 
promised that the additional revenues would serve as a basis for increases in spending on health 
care and education, tax reform constituted a central element of his second generation reformist 
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agenda. However, Fox was never able to convince the Mexican public of the necessity for his 
reform initiatives, and his proposals were by and large obstructed by the opposition majority.  In 
particular, the opposition focused on a significant  – and extraordinarily unpopular aspect - of 
Fox’s tax reforms: a proposal to apply value added taxes to food, medicine, and educational 
expenses (as part of a broader effort to reduce evasion by eliminating different rates and 
exemptions within the VAT) (Jaime 2004, 59). This measure, opposed by 86% of the Mexican 
public in a 2003 Reforma poll (Moreno 2004, 5), was seized on by the opposition to build public 
pressure against the president’s reform agenda as a whole. Mexico’s Congress eventually passed 
one of Fox’s proposals, a uniform income tax rate for the top bracket, but the rest of his major 
tax reform initiatives were rejected. Overall, Fox’s administration failed in its stated goal of 
making Mexican government finances less dependent on oil revenues: tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP was the same in 2004 as in 2000 (Pastor Jr. and Wise 2006, 146).  
 Fox encountered similar difficulties in pursuing reforms toward the energy sector. Lack 
of efficiency in the state-dominated oil and electricity industries was viewed as fundamental 
obstacle to growth, and reforms in those areas were a central part of Fox’s agenda. In line with 
his general campaign promises, Fox attempted to open up two parastatal energy firms to private 
investment. However, this effort provoked considerable resistance both from unions in the firms 
and from a PRI-led legislative opposition, as well as from public opinion (Rubio 2004, 59; Pastor 
Jr. and Wise 2006, 147), and eventually failed. In the oil sector, efforts to introduce private 
involvement in certain costly aspects of oil production faltered before united opposition of the 
PRI and PRD. Fox’s reform efforts in the energy sector faced particularly daunting obstacles: 
entrenched interests intent on preserving the status quo, united legislative opposition, 
constitutional impediments (in the case of the oil sector), and widespread negative public opinion 
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rooted in a traditional ideological link between state control of energy generation and national 
sovereignty.  Fox’s efforts to overcome these hurdles by mobilizing public opinion against his 
legislative opponents proved completely inadequate. 
 Fox’s political travails were accompanied by internal conflicts within his party and his 
government. The PAN leadership had been willing to set aside their longstanding suspicion of 
Fox’s rebelliousness during the campaign, endorsing the candidate’s depiction of the election as 
a nonpartisan plebiscite against the PRI. However, the division between Fox and his party’s 
traditional wing (headed by senator and former presidential candidate Diego Fernández de 
Cevallos, Fox’s longtime rival) reemerged following the election. Party president Luis Felipe 
Bravo Mena stated soon after the 2000 victory that while the PAN would not impinge on the 
President’s duties, it would also not “allow [Fox] to interfere or attempt to take charge of the 
business of the party.” (Crespo 2004, 24). For his part, Fox snubbed the PAN when appointing 
his cabinet, at one point declaring:    
 
The PAN knows it needs to respect the right, the authority of the president of 
the Republic to select his cabinet. They must respect those decisions! At the 
end of the day it is Vicente Fox who is governing, not the PAN! When things 
go wrong or mistakes are made, it is Vicente Fox, not the PAN! When the right 
choices are made, it is Vicente Fox, not the PAN! (Crespo 2004, 25) 
 
Fox’s initial cabinet included only four members of the PAN.  Two of these party 
members were placed in relatively minor posts, one was selected fill a position that had been 
declined by the PRD (which rejected Fox’s overtures to serve in the cabinet), and one (Interior 
Minister Santiago Creel) was a close ally who had only joined the party recently. Two members 
of Fox’s campaign joined the PAN subsequent to being named to the cabinet; the rest of the 
posts were filled by independents (most notably Jorge Castañeda as foreign minister) or by 
members of the PRI (Crespo 2004, 25-26). The lack of traditional PAN politicians underscored 
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the reemerging division between Fox and his party, a division that led to legislative conflict 
during the early years of Fox’s presidency (most notably in regard to the previously mentioned 
indigenous rights initiative) (Starr 2002, 61).  The diverse and independent cabinet that Fox had 
named also lacked cohesion, being plagued with internal squabbles and conflicting agendas 
(Starr 2002, 59-60; Erikson 2006, 17). By the midpoint of Fox’s term, several key ministers had 
resigned (including the leftists Aguilar Zinser and Castañeda, the latter pursuing an abortive 
presidential campaign).  
On some issues, Fox’s administration did make headway in advancing a second 
generation reform agenda; the government could claim some success on issues of poverty.  Fox’s 
primary anti-poverty policy involved the continuation and expansion of a well-regarded program, 
named Progresa, that had been initiated under Zedillo, and combined targeted subsidies with 
requirements of school attendance and health checkups. Progresa was widely viewed as an 
improvement over previous PRI anti-poverty efforts in that it was designed to be independent of 
political influence, and had registered some notable successes under the previous administration. 
Fox’s maintained the main aspects of the program,  renamed it “Oportunidades,” and extended it 
from rural areas to urban ones.  Although the government acknowledged that Oportunidades 
covered only two out five poor people, it and similar programs were nonetheless cited as one 
factor in a slight but noticeable decline in poverty rates that was observed between 2000 and 
2002 (Pardinas 2004, 66-70).  
Beyond this incremental progress on social issues, the maintenance of economic stability 
during the Fox administration can also be considered an accomplishment, given that it 
represented a break from the established pattern of periodic financial crises. Despite these 
advances, the Mexican public showed little inclination to credit the Fox administration for 
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modest improvements in welfare; instead, public judgments focused on the tepid performance of 
the overall economy during the early years of Fox’s term, and the apparent weakness of the 
president’s leadership. 
During the first few years of Fox’s term, disappointment and disillusionment in his 
leadership quickly became widespread.  This disappointment was a result not only of Fox’s 
difficulties in governing effectively, but also of economic performance that fell well short of 
campaign promises.  Instead of enjoying the 7 percent annual growth rates that Fox had forecast, 
Mexico fell into recession,  suffering a net loss of 2.1 million jobs and averaging annual GDP 
growth of less than one percent during the first three years of Fox’s term (Baer 2004). 
Employment in manufacturing was particularly hard hit (Pastor Jr. and Wise 2006, 151). In  part, 
this poor performance could be ascribed to a negative external context.  The onset of recession in 
the United States diminished demand for Mexican exports, with employment in the maquila 
sector dropping by 22 percent between October 2000 and July 2003. At the same time, increased 
competition from China further undermined Mexico’s manufactured export performance (Pastor 
Jr. and Wise 2006, 150). While Fox’s administration could not be blamed for Mexico’s recession 
during the early years of his term, the immense gap between the expectations and promises of his 
campaign and the post-election reality heightened dissatisfaction with his weak and ineffectual 
leadership.  
Fox retained relatively high approval ratings- although his approval rating sagged to 47% 
by May 2002 (Lawson 2004a, 140) it never went well below 50%, and later recovered to roughly 
60%. Voters tended to give Fox the benefit of the doubt in personal judgments, considering him 
to be overall well-intentioned and his government to be relatively clean. Fox’s tendency to 
appeal directly to the public via the media, while complicating relations with his party and being 
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largely ineffective in building legislative support for his agenda, helped bolster his personal 
image. (Loaeza 2006, The Economist Jul. 1 2006). On the other hand, public views of Fox’s 
capacity to govern were far less forgiving; surveys show that public evaluation of his leadership 
qualities and effectiveness dropped throughout his first three years in office. According to a 
yearly survey by Consulta Mitofsky, 69% of the public rated Fox’s leadership ability as good in 
November 2000; just one year later,  that number had fallen to 39%, and by November 2003 only 
28% of the public gave Fox’s leadership a good rating. A nearly identical decline was observed 
in ratings of Fox’s problem solving ability, and while 60% of the public had rated Fox’s level of 
experience positively when he assumed office, his clumsy and apparently naive governing style 
reduced that percentage to 23% by 2003.  When Fox took office in 2000, 46% of the public 
agreed with the statement “The President is in charge.” By 2003, only 29% believed that Fox 
was in charge, while 60% believed that he wasn’t.  (Loaeza 2006, 20). 
 
The combination of a divided party and government, perceptions of presidential 
weakness and ineffectiveness, and economic stagnation took a predictable toll on Fox and the 
PAN in the July 2003 midterm elections. Fox and the PAN hoped to pin the blame for the 
political stalemate on the legislative opposition (running under the slogan “Remove the brake on 
change”) (Grayson 2003, 3).  Instead, the Mexican electorate opted to punish the party 
controlling the executive. The PAN managed only 30.6% of the vote, and its representation in 
the Chamber of Deputies fell from 205 seats to 151, a decline from 41 to 30 percent of the seats. 
The PRI rebounded, capturing 222 seats in alliance with the Mexican Green Party (an 
opportunistic party that had run as part of Fox’s alliance in 2000, but abandoned the PAN after 
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not receiving any cabinet posts for its members). The biggest gains were made by the PRD, 
which surged to from 54 to 95 seats in the legislature (Grayson 2003, 4) 
Surveys showed that the PAN had retained the support of only some of the social groups 
that had underpinned their 2000 victory, and only by lesser margins. According to Reforma polls 
from the two legislative elections, in 2003 the PAN won 38% of university educated voters 
compared to 24% for the PRI; this represented a 12% decline in PAN’s margin from the 2000. 
Similarly,  in 2003 the PAN bested the PRI by 23 points (48%-25%) among urban, middle class 
voters, a group the PAN had won by 34% three years earlier. On the other hand, the PAN’s 46-
30% margin among urban residents as a whole in 2000 became a 36-32% loss in that group in 
2003. Perhaps most significantly, independent voters, who had supported the PAN by 46 to 21% 
in 2000, opted for the PRI over the PAN by a 30-28 margin in 2003 – a clear indication of the 
impermanent nature of the diverse anti-PRI coalition that Fox had assembled. (Grayson 2003, 6).  
The PAN was further hurt by low turnout; abstention in the 2003 elections reached 58%, an all 
time high.  Public apathy and disenchantment generally favored the PRI, whose hard core of 
support still exceeded that of the other two parties, and which proved better able to mobilize its 
supporters in the off-year election (Crespo 2004). 
The 2003 election results further dimmed prospects for breaking Mexico’s political 
stalemate. The electoral resurgence of the PRI (and, to a lesser extent, the PRD) raised the 
hurdles to achieving legislative majorities, and the upcoming presidential election (which all 
three parties viewed as potentially winnable) made cooperation unlikely.  Divisions with the 
PRD were heightened by political maneuvering; in particular, conflicts developed from a 
controversial government effort to strip the PRD’s clear favorite, Mexico City mayor Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador, of his immunity from prosecution for alleged abuses of his authority.  
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As a result, the second half of Fox’s term was characterized essentially by a  continuation of the 
political stalemate that had prevailed during the first three years of the sexenio. 
Fox responded to this challenge by pursuing some rapprochement with his own party, 
adding PAN ministers to three cabinet slots that had previously been held by independents. 
However, the upcoming election also mitigated against intra-party unity, as the contest for the 
party’s presidential nomination predictably brought the party’s fractures to the fore.  The most 
prominent possible candidates for the post were allies of Fox; Santiago Creel, the interior 
minister, led in opinion polls, and the possible nomination of the president’s wife Marta Sahagun 
was the subject of widespread and vigorous speculation.  The more traditional and partisan wing 
of the party viewed the nomination contest as an opportunity to reassert its dominance.  This 
effort coalesced around the candidacy of the energy minister Felipe Calderón, who resigned from 
his post in May 2004 after having been publicly criticized by Fox for promoting his presidential 
ambitions (The Economist, Jun. 5 2004). 
 
Despite its ongoing political struggles, the Fox administration’s picture was brightened 
by improving economic conditions. After having gradually risen from .03% in 2001 to 1.44% in 
2003, Mexico’s annual rate of growth surged to 4.36% in 2004 (OECD Country Statistical 
Profiles, 2006)24. At the same time, extreme poverty rates began to decrease throughout the 
country, a decline fueled by the eventual economic growth, but also by the gradual impact of the 
anti-poverty programs that Fox had inherited and expanded (The Economist, Jul. 1 2006) Public 
economic improvement buoyed Fox’s political standing; by the beginning of 2006, a Reforma 
survey showed receiving a favorable rating for his management of the economy from 50% of  the 
electorate against only 22% disapproval, a 13% increase in approval over two years earlier. Fox 
                                                 
24
 Available online at www.oecd.org/Mexico. Data accessed March 2007. 
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received a similarly positive evaluation on the question of poverty, attaining 56% approval and 
22% disapproval. Support on the poverty issue had reached its nadir in 2002 , when only 30% 
approved, and steadily increased in subsequent years.  Satisfaction with Fox’s performance on 
the issue of unemployment also increased, although it remained slightly negative. In January 
2006, 34% of the electorate approved of Fox’s handling of the unemployment problem, while 
37% disapproved (a 14% increase in approval and 16% decrease in disapproval over the previous 
year (Reforma, Jan 3 2006, Jan. 9 2005).  Mexico’s economic upturn apparently had little to do 
with Fox’s policies (as with economic recoveries throughout much of Latin America, increasing 
commodity prices were a major factor, with improved US economic performance also playing a 
role), and had relatively little impact on unemployment rate (OECD Country Statistical Profiles, 
2006); all the same, increased public optimism buoyed the PAN’s chances in the run up to the 
2006 presidential election. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the PAN’s presidential nomination fell to the former energy 
minister Felipe Calderón, who soundly defeated the most prominent candidate, interior minister 
Santiago Creel, in the party’s three regional primaries in 2005.  The surprising victory of 
Calderón could be in part traced to disappointment with Fox among PAN supporters, a sentiment 
that hampered Creel’s appeal. Calderón’s young age (he was 43 years old in 2006) and perceived 
honesty and competence helped enable him to benefit from the sources of Fox’s continued 
personal popularity.  At the same time, his independence from the president and his ties to the 
party’s traditional wing allowed him to disassociate himself from negative perceptions of the 
current administration and bolstered his promise that his government would succeed where Fox’s 
had failed in governing effectively. (The Economist,  Oct. 22 2005). Calderón’s campaign 
rhetoric reflected this dichotomy: he credited Fox for preserving economic stability and fiscal 
 301 
prudence and for making some progress against poverty, and promised to adhere to the market 
oriented economic policies that had been adopted over the previous two decades (Klesner 2007, 
27). Similarly, Calderón praised Fox for.his role in leading Mexico’s democratic transition.  At 
the same time, he acknowledged Fox’s ineffectiveness in the face of legislative opposition, and 
promised to be more effective in creating coalitions, including incorporation of other parties in 
his cabinet (Business Mexico Dec/Jan 2005, 26-29).  Calderón’s emergence as the PAN 
candidate helped revitalize the party’s prospects for the 2006 elections, as his better known rival 
Creel had consistently trailed in the polls to the PRD’s presumptive nominee, López Obrador. 
 
One of the PRD’s original founders, López Obrador had been elected to the mayor’s 
office in Mexico City in 2000, a post that made him the foremost opposition figure to Fox’s 
administration. López Obrador took advantage of this position more effectively than the previous 
PRD nominee, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, building immense popularity within the capital city 
through forceful leadership, personal charisma,  and popular social and infrastructure programs. 
At the same time, he adopted a combative posture toward the national government; and his 
tenure as mayor was universally viewed as prelude to an eventual president campaign in 2006.  
Having attacked Fox during the campaign for representing continuity with the neoliberal policies 
and social unrepresentativeness of the contemporary PRI, López Obrador sought to emphasize 
the contrasts between his leadership and the Fox administration,  attacking the free market 
economic model, and pointing to his policy successes in Mexico City as evidence that he, unlike 
the president, was capable of and committed to concrete accomplishments for the benefit of 
ordinary Mexicans.   
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López Obrador’s obvious potential as a political threat to both the PRI and the PAN led 
to a confrontation in 2004, with the national government to attempting to strip the Mexico City 
mayor of his immunity to prosecution for allegedly exceeding his legal authority in minor 
dispute over construction of a road. After the legislative vote to eliminate his immunity, López 
Obrador defiantly mobilized supporters against the campaign, which he (plausibly, given the 
partisan nature of the vote) attacked as politically motivated. In the face of large public 
demonstrations, Fox’s government backed down, leaving the path clear for López Obrador’s 
campaign, and cementing his position as front-runner. While enjoying widespread popularity and 
a powerful base of support in Mexico City, the PRD candidate suffered from several 
vulnerabilities. His party remained in third place in electoral loyalties, his autocratic and 
mobilizational tendencies were a source of concern for the Mexican public, and were emphasized 
by Calderón in a relentlessly negative campaign, and his administration in Mexico City had 
made little progress against crime, an issue that Calderón stressed intensely. Finally, Mexico’s 
gradual economic improvement slightly weakened López Obrador’s appeal as a defender of the 
poor. 
The PRI, despite its strong position in the legislature, eventually became an afterthought 
in the presidential contest. After defeating his rivals in a bitter internal struggle, Roberto 
Madrazo (a former Tabasco governor and party insider) began the contest in second place in 
polls, behind López Obrador.  Madrazo proved to be a weak candidate, and was weighed down 
by scandals, an uninspiring campaign, and his image as a representative of the old, largely 
discredited, PRI. Having peaked in February, he fell to a clear third place by the late months of 
the campaign, and was essentially discounted as a contender by the time of the election. (Estrada 
and Poiré 2007, 760) 
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  The 2006 election was fiercely contested between Calderón and López Obrador. The 
PRD candidate, who had led in the polls for several years, fell behind in Calderón in April 2006 
following the PAN candidate’s surge and his own ill-advised decision to skip the first 
presidential debate.  However, López Obrador regained a narrow lead in most polls by June, 
which he held until the election. The closeness of the margin suggested that the result would 
likely come down to turnout, and raised the specter of a contentious post-election battle over a 
disputed outcome. 
 The election results bore out these fears.  After an inconclusive election-night quick count   
found both of the leading candidates within the statistical margin of error,  both López Obrador 
and Calderón claimed victory (Schedler 2007, 90). The intensely scrutinized full count of the 
votes that followed several days later showed Calderón with 36.7% of the valid vote to López 
Obrador’s 36.1.  A postelection survey showed that the bases of PAN support were similar to 
that of past elections, with Calderón taking a disproportionate share of the vote from better 
educated and high income sectors, as well as urban voters. López Obrador drew support roughly 
equally from all educational and socoieconomic levels, and also had a primarily urban electorate. 
The PRI, reduced to a distant third with 22.7% of the presidential vote, continued to draw 
disproportionately strong support from poor voters and the rural sector.  Among those who 
identified themselves as Fox voters in 2000, 28% cast a vote for López Obrador in the 2006 
election  (Mexico Panel study July 2006, Klesner 2007, 31 ); in contrast, Calderón received only 
9% of the vote from those who had favored the PRD in 2000. 
 Following the announcement of the official outcome, López Obrador immediately 
protested the results, complaining of both election day fraud and government interference during 
the campaign.  López Obrador pursued his claims through both legal and extra-systemic means, 
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with the PRD filing an official complaint and demanding a nationwide recount, and the candidate 
calling his supporters into the streets.  While the electoral dispute was being examined in the 
courts, a series of mobilizations of PRD supporters roiled the country, particularly in the capital, 
where hundreds of thousands of protesters packed Mexico City’s main square, and López 
Obrador’s supporters established a protracted blockade of some of the city’s major 
thoroughfares. When Mexico’s electoral tribunal conceded the PRD only a limited recount that 
barely altered the totals, López Obrador broadened his attacks, claiming that the country’s 
institutions were invalid, and declaring himself the legitimate president. The increasingly radical 
(and occasionally absurd) nature of López Obrador’s prounouncements, along with negative 
publicity from the protests, sapped the challenger’s support; in surveys, a strong majority of the 
Mexican public expressed confidence in the election result, and Calderón led voters’ post- 
election preferences by a wide margin. However, despite his intransigent stance, López Obrador 
retained the support and loyalty of close to a third of the Mexican public at the time of 
Calderón’s inauguration. The continued political division represented the most immediate and 
urgent challenge for the incoming president.  
 
The Common Difficulties and Divergent Outcomes of Second Generation Reformist 
Opposition 
 
 In each of the three cases examined here, an opposition that had attained striking electoral 
success through a second generation reformist message came to be viewed as a failure in 
government. In Argentina, the failure was most clear and dramatic, leading to a complete 
collapse of both the government and the economy, and the extinction of the political party that 
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had carried the second generation reformist banner. In Peru, Toledo managed to complete his 
term while maintaining a stable and growing economy; however, the President experienced a 
rapid and lasting decline in public support, and his leadership was overwhelmingly rejected by 
society; as in Argentina, the second generation reformist electoral movement had virtually 
ceased to exist by the next presidential election. In Mexico,  Fox maintained his personal 
popularity until the end and turned over the office to a successor from his own party, but was 
widely viewed as a failure in policy terms; faced with resolute congressional opposition, he was 
unable to advance much of a substantive agenda.  
 In each case, an indication of the political failure of second generation reformists was the 
fact that political consensus on the maintenance of the neoliberal model that had prevailed at the 
end of the 1990s did not survive until the next presidential election. In Argentina, the advent and 
eventual hegemony of a more traditional strain of Peronism can be clearly linked to the 
economic and political collapse that occurred under the watch of a second generation reformist 
leadership.  However, the emergence of politically influential challenges to the free market 
model is more difficult to explain in Peru and Mexico, countries where macroeconomic 
performance under second generation reformists was generally better than that of the previous 
five years.  
These three unsuccessful outcomes- collapse in Argentina, deterioration in Peru, and 
stalemate in Mexico – resulted from numerous factors, many of which were particular to the 
individual country and circumstance.  However, certain general patterns can be observed among 
the three cases. Many of the problems and pitfalls experienced by second-generation reformists 
were commonly shared, and can be linked to the commonly shared origin and nature of their 
electoral strategy and electoral coalition, as outlined in this study. The political strategy and 
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bases of public support that brought electoral success for a second generation reformist 
campaigns were to a great extent incompatible with effective governance and policy-making.  
 
 In the concluding section, I examine the sources of the reformist weakness that emerged 
in all three cases. The differing outcomes of the De la Rúa , Toledo, and Fox administrations can 
be understood in large part as resulting from these shared governance challenges, in combination 
with the varied influences of the different party systems and economic contexts present in each 
case. 
 
Independent Leaders, Independent Voters 
 
 All three of the second generation reformist challenges were characterized by a pattern of 
weak links between leaders and their parties, as well as between opposition politicians and the 
electorate. In Peru, this weakness was a consequence of the overall political environment, where 
virtually all political representation was weakly institutionalized and personalistic; In Argentina 
and Mexico, where parties were stronger overall, this independence was associated with 
deliberate campaign strategies of the opposition.   
In each of the three cases, the relative weakness of the ties between leaders, parties, and 
voters was linked to the successful adoption of a second generation reformist message. In 
Argentina, the alliance between the UCR and FREPASO was made possible in large part by the 
political independence of the main leaders of each party, and their ensuing ability to formulate a 
unified campaign message that glossed over the ideological differences among their parties’ 
internal factions and supporters.  In Peru, Toledo’s Perú Posible movement was personalistic and 
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amorphous even in comparison to the other parties in Peru’s highly inchoate post-liberalization 
party system. Toledo’s campaign emphasized flexibility and pragmatism in general, and was 
built largely around the candidate’s personal profile; this independence from discredited political 
parties and direct appeal to unaffiliated voters allowed him to quickly take on the mantle of the 
anti-Fujimori opposition following the successive declines of Andrade and Castañeda. In 
Mexico, Fox’s independent campaign (and independent funding) allowed him to buck pressures 
from the traditional wing of his own party, put forth a message that emphasized the PAN’s 
commitment to democratization while de-emphasizing less popular elements of the party’s 
identity and rhetoric, and cultivate support from anti-PRI voters and political figures from a wide 
range of ideological persuasions. In each case, the opposition relied to a great extent on voters 
whose political loyalties had been shaken by the crisis of corporatism and the shift to a free 
market model, and who had not been included in the neoliberal populist coalition; the loyalties of 
these voters tended to be contingent and potentially volatile.  
Furthermore, like their neoliberal populist predecessors, second generation reformist 
candidates tended to distance themselves from partisan activists and structures, pursuing 
campaigns that centered on the personal characteristics of leaders, and formulating policy 
agendas and campaign messages relatively independently of the party’s organizational base.  
Overall, the weak ties between reformist leaders and their voters and party organizations allowed 
second generation reformist candidates considerable flexibility in crafting an opportunistic 
message that could appeal a heterogeneous and loosely affiliated support base, and adjust to the 
electoral weaknesses and liabilities of neoliberal populist incumbents. 
 This independence, while essential to the electoral success of the second 
generation reformist campaigns, universally became a severe liability once the reformist 
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challengers assumed office.  Lacking a strong base of loyal followers, second generation 
reformist leaders found their public support to be both volatile and of limited political 
utility.  Having relied on promises that political change would bring about improved 
social and economic outcomes, reformist leaders discovered that many of their voters had 
little patience when the promised improvements failed to materialize in the short term.   
The weak and contingent public support for second generation reformists undermined 
their efforts to maintain internal partisan unity or secure legislative assent for their 
agenda by mobilizing public opinion; even during periods in which reformist presidents 
maintained respectable approval ratings, dissenting factions within their own party felt 
little need to maintain unanimity regarding the leadership’s proposals,  and their partisan 
opponents saw little incentive to refrain from obstruction.  
 
Ideological Heterogeneity and Negative Campaigns 
 
 The second generation reformist opposition campaigns in Argentina, Peru and Mexico 
were notable for the degree of ideological diversity present among both leaders and supporters. 
Given the composition of attitudes among potential opposition supporters, this broad appeal was 
viewed as necessary to overcome the electoral challenge represented by the persistence of a 
neoliberal populist incumbent coalition. As such, the opposition candidates in each case 
deliberately promoted a wide-ranging message at the expense of internal coherency and 
consensus. 
 In each case, the second generation reformist appeals that had temporarily bridged 
ideological differences proved inadequate to maintain a unified coalition following the election.  
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The manner in which policy differences reemerged varied among the three countries, and this 
variation had significant consequences for the eventual fate of second generation reformist 
leaders.  In Argentina, behind the Alianza’s reformist facade lay a substantive divide over 
economic policy priorities that split the two parties of the coalition, and divided the UCR 
internally.  The conflict between domestic demands for welfare-oriented social policies in 
response to persistent recession, and international demands for austerity, turned these splits into 
open conflicts.  The resulting cycle of political turmoil and declining confidence eventually 
wrecked both the economy and the coalition.  In Peru, the lack of consensus with the governing 
party represented more an overall incoherence than fractures along clearly defined ideological 
divisions; overall, the lack of partisan cohesion contributed to Toledo’s perceived ineffectiveness 
and eventual irrelevance. In Mexico, the anti-PRI support that Fox had attracted from the left, 
and from potential PRD voters in particular,  effectively ceased following his assumption of 
office.  While a majority of the public welcomed the PRI’s defeat, much of the specific policy 
agenda that Fox attempted to implement (such as reforms to the tax system) had minimal support 
outside his own party.  While Fox maintained personal popularity, he was unable to sustain the 
political loyalty of some of his 2000 supporters; as a result, in the 2003 and 2006 elections, the 
PAN’s vote was reduced to little more than its partisan base (although the decline in support for 
the PRI meant that even this reduced appeal was sufficient to retain the presidency, if only 
barely). In each case, the ideological vagueness and diversity that second generation reformist 
politicians intentionally cultivated during their campaign proved a major hindrance to effective 
governance following the election. 
 A closely related problem was the essentially negative character of the second generation 
reformist campaigns.  Rather than espousing a clear future course of action, the campaign 
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rhetoric of second generation reformists was defined in large part by rejection of the least 
popular aspects of the incumbent administration.  In Argentina, the Alianza settled on corruption 
as its primary campaign theme in part because the issue was Menem’s clearest and most 
consistent weakness; furthermore, disgust with corruption provided a way to link the unpopular 
president to Duhalde (despite Duhalde’s attempts to differentiate himself with a more leftist 
economic message). The specific goals and policies of the eventual Alianza administration 
assumed secondary importance to their attacks on the most discredited aspects of Menemism.  In 
Peru, Toledo attained his stature as the head of the opposition and the standard bearer for 
redemocratization largely as a result of being the clearest available alternative to Fujimori 
following the regime’s dismantling of the campaigns of Andrade and Castañeda; his personal 
qualities and policy preferences became almost irrelevant as the campaign evolved into little 
more than a public judgment on Fujimori’s leadership. Similarly, in Mexico, Fox explicitly 
depicted his campaign as representing almost nothing beyond “change,” going as far as to state 
that his mission would be completed upon winning the election; his strategy involved 
deliberately reducing the campaign to a plebiscite on continued PRI rule. While this intensive 
focus on public discontent with the incumbent, and the corresponding emphasis on the 
governance issues that were the incumbent’s greatest weakness, proved extremely effective as a 
campaign strategy, it also left the opposition with little of a mandate upon the assumption of 
office.   
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An Obsolete Coalition 
  
 The second generation reformist electoral coalition, and the campaign message that 
united its diverse supporters, were a product of specific characteristics of the neoliberal populist 
political strategy. The opposition’s initial inroads occurred primarily among middle class, urban 
voters who were effectively excluded from the neoliberal populist model and whose economic 
fortunes had tended to decline relative to other groups, but whose social status and ideological 
inclinations made many of them unlikely to be receptive to critiques that focused on the 
“neoliberal” aspect of that model (especially within the context of the overall economic recovery 
of the early to mid-1990s).  This group was sizable in Argentina and Mexico, and significantly 
less so in Peru; in none of the three countries was it sufficient to produce an election plurality. As 
a result, the eventual success of second generation reformists depended on the attraction of 
voters from a variety of social classes, whose concerns went beyond the governance and 
democracy related issues stressed by reformist campaigns. To attract this support (while 
maintaining their core electorate), second generation reformists relied on extravagant promises of 
improved economic performance and standards of living, asserting that an improvement in the 
quality of leadership would bring about improved results. 
This particular configuration of social support patterns and programmatic messages, then, 
did not represent an effort to craft a programmatic agenda to meet the objective and enduring 
needs of a cohesive support coalition.   Rather, it arose from an opportunistic cobbling together 
of the voters that were politically available, and the general messages that were politically 
convenient, at a specific political conjuncture. In each case, the decline or disappearance of the 
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neoliberal populist leadership following the election undermined the apparent consensus that had 
formed around free market economics.   
Following the defeat of the incumbent, the general motivation for opposition unity was 
removed.  The second generation reformist administrations’ need to move from generalities to 
specific policies rapidly brought to the surface the contradictory social interests present within 
their own coalition.  The failure of the second generation reformists to rapidly make good on 
their promises of economic improvements cost the opposition the loyalty of economically 
deprived voters who had placed their hopes on “change.” At the same time, lower class voters 
who had previously been loyal to a leader or party that had espoused market reform reentered the 
political arena without their prior political attachment. As a consequence of these trends, 
reformist leaders had little ability to mobilize mass backing in support of their agenda.   
 
Clientelism and State Resources 
 
The general weaknesses identified above can be linked to a common condition faced by 
second generation reformist leaders – the inability to employ clientelistic methods or state 
resources with anywhere near the effectiveness of the leaders they had removed from power.  
Some of the challenges faced by second generation reformist leaders were not unprecedented: 
neoliberal populist leaders also had to govern at the head of fractious parties, to overcome 
temporary public disenchantment, and to implement policies that differed (sometimes 
drastically)  from those that their voters might have preferred at the time. Clientelism and state 
resources were essential parts of the solution these difficulties; they allowed leaders to 
compensate strategically significant voters, to cultivate new support bases to replace groups that 
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had found themselves on the losing end of market reforms, and to establish sources of power 
entirely separate from the electoral and political arena.  
This option was largely unavailable to second generation reformist candidates. The tight 
control of the levers of the state enjoyed by the PRI and by Fujimori was not remotely replicable 
by the parties that replaced them.  In Argentina, the UCR had something of a clientelistic 
machine of its own in certain provinces. However, studies have shown (for example, Valdez 
2004, Calvo and Murrillo 2005) that the scope and effectiveness of patronage as employed by 
other Argentine parties does not come close to approaching the clientelistic capacity of the PJ. 
Second generation reformists were unable to pursue a clientelistic approach in part because they 
lacked the capacity to do so, but also because any attempt to develop such a capacity would 
violate the fundamental justifications for their taking power in the first place: integrity and 
accountability of governance (and in Peru, decentralization). The practical impact of this can be 
seen in the political impact of allegations of bribery of senators by the Argentine Alianza. 
Similar allegations directed toward Menem in the first years of his term would have raised few 
eyebrows; with a second generation reformist government in power, the scandal led to severe 
divisions within the government,  the resignation of the vice president, and a massive political 
crisis that was viewed as a turning point in the overall collapse of the Alianza. Differing levels of 
access to clientelism and state resources deprived the reformist challengers of a political 
resource; it also strengthened their main opponents, as can be seen in the results of subsequent 
subnational elections following reformist presidential victories. 
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Conclusion 
 
The link between a neoliberal populist background and a second generation reformist 
alternative, as well as the essentially ephemeral nature of that reformist alternative, are further 
substantiated by subsequent political developments in each country. In each case, the decline or 
disappearance of the neoliberal populist leadership and its characteristic associated social 
coalition was accompanied by the reemergence of  political contestation over the basic features 
of the free market model.  In Argentina, the dominance of leftist and nationalistic economic 
ideology post-2001 can be clearly linked to the Alianza’s disastrous economic failures.  The 
persistence of recession throughout the Alianza’s administration, and the ensuing economic 
catastrophe and social devastation, thoroughly discredited both the free market economic policies 
of Menem and the second generation reformist approach that had followed. The hegemonic 
leadership and economically nationalistic messages of Duhalde and Kirchner filled the resulting 
political vacuum.   
However, even in Peru and Mexico, where the macro-level economic performance under 
second generation reformists represented an improvement over previous years, the political 
consensus on the free market model that had prevailed among the major competitors in 2000 was 
replaced by renewed ideological polarization by the time of the next election. In Peru, signs of 
this diminishing elite consensus had begun to emerge as early as 2001, with the unexpectedly 
strong presidential challenge of Alan García, a candidate whose image was inextricably linked 
with heterodoxy and hyperinflation.  The violent anti-privatization demonstrations that 
compelled Toledo to change course and remove his finance minister soon provided a forceful 
demonstration of the temporary and superficial nature of the previous concordance on neoliberal 
 315 
economics. This increased polarization was most dramatically signaled by the rapid rise to 
proninence and near presidential victory of Ollanta Humala in the 2006 elections. The spectre of 
a Humala victory, made possible by the failure of the major second generation reformist 
candidates to qualify for the second round, led Peru’s middle and upper classes to turn to Alan 
García, their former bete noir.  Whereas in 2000 Peruvian voters chose among candidates 
committed to neoliberalism, in 2006 the Peruvian establishment was obliged to opt for a center-
leftist to defeat a radical populist. An examination of the sources of Humala’s support suggests 
that it was the disappearance of Fujimorism, and the associated clientelistic machine, that made 
available the poor and rural voters who were central to his support. In the absence of a neoliberal 
populist leader, the free market consensus dissolved, and second generation reformism became 
an unviable alternative. 
A similar, although more muted, pattern can be seen in Mexico; in this case, the 
neoliberal populist party declined, but did not disappear. The PRI, while greatly diminished, 
retained 17% of the vote, and its vote continued to be concentrated within poor and rural 
communities.  The continued electoral weight of the PRI’s ties to the rural poor, while 
insufficient to sustain the party’s competitiveness in presidential elections, nonetheless inhibited 
the emergence of a populist alternative based in the lower classes. Thus, while the 2006 Mexican 
election saw a renewal of polarization on economic policy issues, neither the main candidate of 
the left or the right was able to extend its reach beyond roughly 35% of the electorate. In the end, 
the pro-market appeals of Calderón won the day by a slim margin, based on continued strong 
support among more affluent voters (Klesner 2007). However, it seems unlikely that the PAN’s 
strategy and support base would have been adequate to fend off a more populist challenge and 
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retain the presidency in the absence of the PRI’s diversion of poor voters away from López 
Obrador. 
          Thus, subsequent elections and political developments in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico 
tend to support the contention that the prevailing elite consensus on the free market model, and 
the ensuing opposition reliance on second-generation reformist messages, can be traced to the 
presence of a neoliberal populist incumbent. In the absence of neoliberal populist leadership, 
political polarization over the neoliberal economic model returned (irrespective of the varying 
economic performance among the three countries), and the political appeal and relevance of 
second-generation reformism faded dramatically.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 
 The emergence and success of second generation reformist opposition in 
Argentina, Peru, and Mexico is best understood in the context of the prior patterns of 
political representation and leadership strategy that accompanied economic liberalization.  
The successful application of a neoliberal populist approach to market reform led to the 
appearance of an opposition that depended on receiving strong majorities among more 
affluent, educated, and urban constituencies, and who appealed to those constituencies 
through an emphasis on governance. This explanation provides broader insights into 
issues of political competition in Latin America in the era of “reform fatigue.” 
  
An initial contribution from this comparative study of Argentina, Peru, and 
Mexico at the end of the 1990s is the extension of previous research into the phenomenon 
of populism and neopopulism in the free market era. The combination of populist politics 
and market economics, with the associated pattern of “policy switches” attracted 
substantial scholarly attention during the 1990s. While researchers have examined the 
origins of the neoliberal populist approach, its implications for the success market reform 
and the reshaping of political representation, and the sustainability of neopopulist 
leadership, little systematic attention has been devoted to the longer term consequences 
of this trend. This study provides an indication of those consequences: the emergence of 
political consensus (albeit a fragile and potentially temporary one) on the desirability of 
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the free market reform and the elevation of good governance and democracy to the top of 
the political agenda. Conversely, countries in which the neoliberal populist approach was 
tried and failed, in particular Venezuela and Bolivia, did not experience this ideological 
narrowing; in fact, those two countries were associated with an increasing political 
polarization around economic issues during the reform fatigue period. And in the three 
countries examined here, the removal of a neoliberal populist incumbent led to the 
disappearance of the previous free market consensus. 
The question of whether and under what circumstances a political opposition will 
propose second generation reformism as an alternative is particularly notable in relation 
to prominent international debates regarding the appropriate responses to disappointing 
results of market reform. The second generation reformist perspective accorded closely 
with efforts to modify the Washington Consensus that had emerged among market reform 
advocates in response to Latin America’s post-liberalization economic lethargy. Perhaps 
more than anywhere else in Latin America, the major opposition parties in Argentina, 
Peru, and Mexico reacted to economic discontent in a manner consistent with the 
preferences of the international economic establishment.  
However, the conclusion of this study is that the adoption of second generation 
reformism did not represent a genuine and durable social consensus on the free market in 
the three countries in which it occurred, nor did it suggest any sort of region-wide 
attitudinal shift that paralleled shifts in the evolving economic orthodoxy on market 
reform. Second generation reformist opposition was an opportunistic and ad hoc 
rhetorical strategy adopted in response to the opportunities and constraints associated 
with a narrow set of political circumstances at a particular moment in time. In the absence 
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of those circumstances – the presence of a successful neoliberal populist incumbent party 
during a period of economic discontentment – second generation reformism was not 
likely to be a viable opposition approach. Previous studies of the second generation of 
economic reform have addressed the issue in primarily technical terms, with little 
attention to the politics of promoting second generation reforms in the context of 
electoral democracy; what attention has been paid to the politics has tended to be 
speculative or theoretical. This study of the experiences of actual second generation 
reformist opposition parties allows additional insight into the (very limited) conditions 
under which those policies appear to have been a viable basis for partisan identity and 
political campaigns. 
 
The political viability of second generation reformism has two components: the 
ability of second generation reformist parties and candidates to win elections, and their 
ability to successfully pursue a reformist policy agenda once in office. In this regard, the 
comparison of Argentina, Peru, and Mexico is also instructive.  In each case, to some 
extent, the victorious reformist challengers faced similar obstacles to effective leadership: 
the weakness and contingent nature of ties between leaders and their parties as well as 
between parties and their supporters, ideological disunity within the opposition, the lack 
of a clear policy agenda or mandate, and an electoral coalition that became largely 
obsolete once the neoliberal populist incumbent was removed from power.  Many of 
these governance difficulties can be tied to the origin and nature of second generation 
reformism as a political strategy, as well as to the political environment inherited from 
neoliberal populist predecessors. In practice, the outcomes of second generation reformist 
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administrations varied greatly, ranging from political and economic breakdown in 
Argentina to incapacitation in Peru to political stalemate in Mexico. Nonetheless, the 
commonly shared difficulties of the three reformist challengers point to a general 
conclusion: the political conditions that were central to the effectiveness of second 
generation reformism as an electoral strategy directly contributed to the ineffectiveness of 
reformists upon assuming office. 
This conclusion further develops a general point raised in Chapter 2 of this 
manuscript:  a purely technocratic conception of policy reforms as occurring in clear 
sequential stages is likely to be inappropriate or misleading, insofar as it fails to take into 
account crucial political considerations. In these three cases, the turn toward second 
generation reformism in the political debate was a direct consequence of the neoliberal 
populist method by which the first generation of reforms were implemented. Yet, the 
political effects of that same initial market reform strategy worked against the possibility 
of moving beyond second generation reformist rhetoric to the enacting of a reformist 
policy agenda.  The neoliberal populists’ reliance on clientelism and state resources, and 
their tendency toward discretionary and often autocratic excercise of executive power, 
ensured that those same leaders were not likely to pursue good governance as a major 
goal. When reformist challengers emerged, the prevailing patterns of political 
representation led to an electoral coalition that was characterized by a narrow social base, 
isolated leadership, ideological disunity, and weak voter loyalties.  
As a result, once in power the newly elected challengers found themselves unable 
to sustain a strong public mandate or to overcome obstructions to their policy agenda 
from opposition parties and organized social interests. In the post-liberalization political 
 321 
environment, a capacity to effectively govern was associated with an ability to draw on 
clientelistic resources and to exercise untrammeled executive power; leaders’ inclination 
to govern democratically and to adopt second generation reformist policies tended to be 
inversely correlated with their ability to govern at all.   
 
Discussing the prospects for the implementation of second generation reformist 
measures, Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and William Smith.point to a debate about the 
role of social mobilization in pursuing those policies: 
 
[An] issue of contention involves the relationships among democracy, 
economic growth, and social mobilization. While a broad consensus holds that 
states have an important regulatory role to play in attacking corruption and rent 
seeking and ensuring competition and market transparency, some argue that social 
mobilization is pivotal to achieving these objectives, while others are wary about 
the potential uncertainty that might be inherent in such mobilizations. For many 
political parties, social movements, and NGO’s, active social mobilization and the 
strengthening of the capacity for collective action of subordinate or excluded 
groups or excluded groups are crucial to promoting future democratization. 
(Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000, 38-39). 
 
Korzeniewicz and Smith go on to note that an emphasis on social mobilization in support 
of a reformist agenda might be opposed by economic elites and policy makers concerned 
about the potential destabilizing effects of social mobilization, and that the inclusion of 
previously marginal groups might provoke resistance from organized interests and 
privileged social sectors.  
The would-be reformist challenges in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico were distinctly 
lacking in organized social mobilization in support of their policy agenda, and their 
experience in government points to the weaknesses associated with that absence.  The 
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adoption of second generation reformism was largely a top-down affair, in which 
independent leaders formulated and adjusted their campaign message to adapt to the 
immediate electoral circumstances. While the general emphasis on governance issues 
accorded with the attitudinal tendencies of the middle class vote, little effort was made to 
construct a detailed policy program that would address the material interests of political 
supporters; in fact, the second generation reformists avoided policy specifics as much as 
possible, in part to avoid alienating sectors of their heterogeneous support base. Far from 
promoting the mobilization and incorporation of marginal groups, second generation 
reformist opposition campaigns were disproportionately oriented toward relatively 
privileged sectors. 
 In Argentina, Peru, and Mexico at the end of the 1990s, this essentially elite-
centered, top-down, and ad hoc approach to second generation reformism was probably 
the only realistic approach.  The construction of a reformist movement built around on 
the mobilization of the excluded, a difficult and uncertain prospect under any 
circumstances, would be clearly impractical in an environment where the popular sectors 
remained loyal to a neoliberal populist party. Nonetheless, the limitations of an approach 
to second generation reformism along the lines of the countries examined here are clear; 
the experience of Argentina, Peru, and Mexico suggests that the absence of organized 
social mobilization behind a reformist agenda tends to prevent that agenda from moving 
beyond the realm of election slogans.  
 
In the current economic and political environment in Latin America, some of the 
issues raised by this study no longer seem immediately relevant. Perceptions of an 
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emerging region-wide consensus on the free market model have been replaced by 
increasingly prominent examples of anti-neoliberal backlash and debates over the 
resurgence of the Latin American left. The era of “reform fatigue” has generally given 
way to strong economic growth in the region, driven in large part by high prices for 
commodities; the revenues from this commodity boom have promoted an increasingly 
activist role for government in some countries. Nonetheless, given that the current boom  
(like all previous ones) must eventually come to an end, the experiences of Latin 
America’s would-be reformists retain important lessons for future efforts to promote 
sustainable economic growth, equitable distribution,  and institutional reform in the 
context of democratic competition. While this study has explored and illuminated the 
origins and limits of the second generation reformist  movements that emerged from the 
set of circumstances present in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico at the end of the 1990s, the 
broader question of how to make a reformist electoral strategy compatible with successful 
reformist government remains largely open.  
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APPENDIX: DETAILS ON PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL DATA 
 
I. Public opinion data 
 
For Argentina, the primary poll consulted was an April 1999 nationwide survey 
conducted by Estudio Graciela Romer, and obtained via the Latin American poll archive 
of the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut; results include only those who 
expressed a preference for a candidate.  No polls from closer to the October election were 
publicly available in digital form; however, the election results obtained in the April 
Römer poll were within one point of the eventual presidential vote. Other poll data cited 
in the text was obtained in the form of cross-tabs provided by Catterberg & Asociados, or 
from newspaper articles.  
 
  For Peru, the poll results for vote choice by socioeconomic level within Lima are 
drawn from APOYO’s survey following the first round election, and assess vote choice in 
the second round. This poll is available via the Roper Center; its results are also presented 
in the April 2000 Informe de Opinión. Due to the difficulties involved in reaching poor 
respondents, the sample over-represents wealthier respondents somewhat, a fact that 
APOYO adjusts for by weighting the results. The percentages given are for the raw, 
unweighted sample. APOYO’s actual estimates of the population percentage in each 
category are: A-4%, B-15%, C-32%, D-36%, E – 12%.  
 
  The nationwide survey data on vote choice is drawn from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems project (CSES), conducted by Datum International in Peru; the dataset 
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is publicly available. The CSES poll was conducted immediately following the first 
round election; respondents were asked which candidate they voted for, and the results 
include only those who reported casting a valid vote. The obstacles to obtaining a 
representative sample in Peru are greatly magnified outside of Lima; as such the sample 
of the CSES poll is disproportionately urban, educated, and affluent compared to the 
Peruvian population. Perhaps as a result, Toledo finishes only one point behind Fujimori 
in the survey. Accordingly, the results of the poll may require some skepticism, although 
the patterns of vote choice by education and residence comport with similar tendencies in 
Lima-based surveys and in the geographic distribution of vote totals. 
 
  Additional nationwide poll data cited in the text was obtained in the form of cross-
tabs that were generously provided by Datum International. Other results were drawn 
from newspapers; I accessed many of these via the no longer operating “Peru Elections 
2000” website of Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario. 
 
  For Mexico, sources of data on vote choice were the exit poll conducted by  
Reforma, published in the that newspaper and cited in Klesner (2001), and the Mexico 
Panel Study of 2000, for which data is publicly available (as of July 2007) at:  
 
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/faculty/C.Lawson.html 
 
  The vote choice results from the panel study are drawn from the wave initially 
following the election (in which the winner’s margin of victory was slightly exaggerated, 
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as is common in post-election surveys). Results include only those who reported casting a 
valid vote. I additionally consulted the exit poll of Mitofsky International (data available 
via the Roper Center), as well as survey data obtained in digital form from CIDE, Mexico 
City. 
 
II. Electoral and Demographic Data 
 
  For Argentina, data for poverty (defined in terms of percentage of the population 
with unsatisfied basic needs), illiteracy, and population density were drawn from the 
national census of 2001, available online via the website of the national statistics 
institute: 
 
http://www.indec.gov.ar/webcenso/index.asp, accessed July 2007. 
 
Census data for population density within the city of Buenos Aires was not provided 
according to electoral district; as a result, I obtained this data from the website of the 
government of Buenos Aires:  
 
http://www.buenosaires.gov.ar/areas/hacienda/sis_estadistico/anu_estadistico/01/web01/c
117.htm, accessed July 2007 
 
Electoral data by district was generously provided by Andy Tow, proprietor of the 
online Argentine electoral atlas at www.towsa.com/andy/index.html,  and by the Ministry 
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of the Interior.  District-by-district vote totals for 1999 were not available for the 
province of San Luis. As result, San Luis is excluded from the calculations in Tables 6.2 
to 6.4. For the correlations in Table 6.5,  I used unofficial percentages from the initial 
vote tabulation conducted by the private company Indra Sistemas S.A. for San Luis (data 
provided by Andy Tow); nationwide, these percentages typically differed by less than 
one percent from the final, official tallies.  
 
In addition, due to irregularities in the data, votes are missing from the district-by-
district votes in some provinces (evidenced by the total number of votes in districts being 
lower than the official total for the entire province). In most cases, this appears to be due 
to the district tally only including voters whose gender was recorded as male or female, 
and excluding those whose gender was not reported. The total number of missing votes 
(aside from the absent province of San Luis) is 36,227. 
 
For Peru, data for rural/urban population and illiteracy come from FONCODES, and 
are based on the 1993 census. Data for illiteracy were unavailable for 25 districts with a 
combined population of approximately 450,000. Data for poverty are drawn from the 
2000 poverty map of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, more information about 
which can be found at: 
 
http://www.mef.gob.pe/ESPEC/mapa_pobreza.php (accessed July 2007). 
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Electoral results come from the National Office of Election Processes (ONPE); voting 
data was not available for nine districts with a combined population of approximately 
285,000. Both the demographic and electoral data were provided by Gregory Schmidt, 
whose assistance was invaluable for this project. 
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